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The key objective of the project was to develop a risk ranking model to assess the apparent 
level of safety of buildings designed to the Approved Document for New Zealand Building 
Code, Fire Safety Clauses C1, C2, C3, C4 (C/AS1)(1). This is a prescriptive fire safety code. 
 
The study included a literature review of fire risk analysis methods. This found that there are 
numerous methods from simple risk ranking techniques such as that used in this project to 
detailed probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) techniques. It was generally found that more 
sophisticated analysis, such as PRA and Reliability Index methods are most suited to specific 
engineering problems while the risk ranking schemes are better suited to “broad-brush 
analyses” across a large range of buildings.  
 
The risk ranking model developed is based on a simple weighted points system where the 
building geometry, use and fire safety features are graded according to the likely impact they 
will have on safety. The model output is a single numerical index value, termed the Fire 
Safety Index (FSI). A high index indicates a safer building. The model is best used for a 
comparative analysis as the results are not an absolute measure of risk. 
 
The results of the analysis of buildings designed to C/AS1 indicate that the level of safety 
increases predominantly with increasing building escape height and/or increasing occupant 
numbers. The report raises questions over the level of safety afforded by sprinkler systems 
and whether or not the sprinkler tradeoff provisions of C/AS1 are appropriate. 
 
The model proposed in this study could be developed further and used to determine whether 
or not a specific fire engineering design (alternative solution) provides an “equivalent” level 
of safety to that achieved by the prescriptive solution C/AS1. The model requires further 
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The 1st Schedule of the New Zealand Building Regulations 1992(2) comprises the 
New Zealand Building Code(3). This is a performance based code. Clauses C1 to C4 sets out 
the performance criteria for the design of buildings for fire safety in New Zealand. There are 
two means for designing a building to meet these requirements. The first is to use the 
Approved Document for New Zealand Building Code Fire Safety Clauses C1, C2, C3, C4(1). 
This is a prescriptive solution which, is commonly referred to as the “Acceptable 
Solutions”(C/AS1).  The second method is by specific fire engineering design, which is 
commonly referred to as an “Alternative Solution”.  
 
The level of fire safety of buildings designed to meet C/AS1 is not specified in numerical 
terms in the document but is loosely defined as follows.  
 
 “Designing a building to provide adequate fire safety, involves decisions on both the 
construction materials and layout needed to reduce the perceived risk to an 
acceptable level.” [Cl. 2.1.2 C/AS1] 
 
The term “acceptable level” is not defined. In fact the engineering basis behind the C/AS1 
document is not laid out in any format that would enable an engineer to readily calculate 
whether or not deviations from C/AS1 have a significant positive or negative impact on the 
level of safety of a building. Therefore comparisons of fire safety between designs cannot be 
readily carried out without a time consuming and expensive probabilistic risk analysis. The 
reliability of such analysis could also be questioned given the current lack of comprehensive 
data available to the design engineer on the performance of fire safety features, fire behaviour 
and human response to fire. 
 
It is prudent to note that C/AS1 is a prescriptive code that is prepared with non-engineers in 
mind. There is no requirement in New Zealand for fire design to C/AS1 to be carried out by 
qualified fire engineers. In fact a significant number of fire designs in New Zealand are 
carried out by architects, engineering technicians and professional engineers (without fire 
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engineering qualifications). Therefore, it is not unreasonable to exclude the technical 
background from such a document to prevent inappropriate use by persons who lack the 
technical knowledge and understanding to use the information correctly. 
 
1.2 Meeting the Building Code 
 
A Building Consent is a permit to build, extend or modify a building or structure. Under the 
New Zealand Building Act 2004(4), a Building Consent is required for any work that affects 
the size, use or structural stability of a building. Building maintenance does not usually 
require a Building Consent. A Building Consent is issued by a Building Consent Authority. 
 
Territorial Authorities (City and District Councils) are Building Consent Authorities under the 
New Zealand Building Act 2004(4) and are responsible for issuing the majority of Building 
Consents for the modification or construction of new buildings. Independent Building 
Certifiers can also be registered as Building Consent Authorities under the Act, but at this 
time majority of Building Consents in New Zealand are issued by Territorial Authorities. The 
Territorial Authority has 20 working days to review the Building Consent Applications, 
including fire safety design documentation, and issue or decline consents.  
 
It is becoming more common practice to engage professional fire engineers to carry out 
specific fire engineering design of buildings. There is an expectation amongst building 
owners, developers and architects that specific fire engineering design provides more design 
flexibility and a more economical solution than designs prepared to C/AS1. However this 
results in alternative designs that deviate from C/AS1 and as such difficulties can arise when 
trying to obtain a Building Consent or construction certification. There are several reasons 
why an alternative design may not receive Building Consent or construction certification: 
 
a) The design is clearly inadequate (e.g. something is obviously missing). 
b) The design is adequate but the design documentation is incomplete and does not 
adequately demonstrate compliance. 
c) The design is being compared to the C/AS1 instead of the performance criteria of the 
New Zealand Building Code. 
d) Contradictory expert opinion. This may be technical or philosophical. 
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The first two, (a) and (b) above, are the responsibility of the design engineer. The design 
engineer is generally required to correct any obvious mistakes and /or provide additional 
information necessary to demonstrate compliance. 
 
The third reason, (c) above, that alternative designs often fail Building Consent applications, 
is that the C/AS1 are often treated as the only means of meeting the “Building Code” by 
Territorial Authorities and certification agencies. This results in alternative designs being 
compared to the C/AS1 instead of the performance criteria of the Building Code. There is an 
expectation, rightly or wrongly, that alternative designs should provide an “equivalent” level 
of safety to a design prepared to the Acceptable Solutions. However, alternative designs that 
are clearly documented, and adequately demonstrate that the design meets the performance 
requirements of the Building Code are an acceptable method of complying with the NZ 
Building Code. It should be noted that the Department of Building and Housing (DBH) have 
decreed in a number of Determinations (5, 6) that: 
 
“The Authority (DBH) sees the acceptable solutions as an example of the level of fire 
safety required by the Building Code. Any departure from the acceptable solution must 
achieve the same level of safety if it is to be accepted as an alternative solution 
complying with the building code.”  
 
The fourth reason, d) above, generally occurs where a design or a component of a design is 
based on subjective judgment as there is no or limited calculation methods or data available. 
These can be time consuming and expensive debates to resolve. As the fire engineering 
profession evolves and methods of analysis are improved then these types of issues may 
subside. 
 
Currently there are few methods (either an internal or external peer review) available to the 
territorial authorities for reviewing and approving specific fire engineering designs 
(alternative solutions) in an expedient manner.  Therefore the practice of comparing 
alternative solutions to C/AS1 is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. The introduction 
of the International Fire Engineering Guidelines (7) aims to provide a standard method for 




1.3 Acceptable Level of Safety 
 
In a fire engineering consulting environment C/AS1 still provides a rapid and adequate 
method for determining Building Code compliant fire safety designs for the majority of 
buildings. However, as specific fire engineering design become more common, there is a need 
to know what is an acceptable level of fire safety for buildings, how to calculate it and what 
an appropriate method for verification is.  
 
It is likely to be beneficial to both design engineers and Building Consent Authorities if the 
acceptable level of fire safety and method for calculating/verifying it was legislated into a 
Code of Practice or Standard endorsed by the appropriate government agency. This is 
common practice for other engineering disciplines in New Zealand, structural for example. 
However, no one in New Zealand or in fact many other countries in the world have derived a 
method for determining the absolute level of safety of a building design or established an 
absolute acceptable level of fire safety for buildings, that can be readily incorporated into a 
Code of Practice.  
 
A standard level of fire safety could be represented by an “expected risk to life”, i.e. an annual 
probability of dying in a building fire or it could be expressed as a minimum safety margin. 
One could even follow the structural code (NZS 4203:1992(8)) lead and specify a “load” factor 
and “capacity reduction” factor limit state format, which could be presented as follows in a 
fire engineering context: 
 
 
1.5 R ≤ 0.5 S (Limit state equation for occupant egress) 
 
Where :  R = Required safe egress time (RSET), “response & evacuation time” 
S = Available safe egress time (ASET), “time to untenable conditions” 
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Alternatively, an acceptable level of safety could be determined by investigating the 
“apparent” level of safety to buildings designed to C/AS1 so “equivalence” comparisons can 
be readily made to appropriately designed and detailed alternative solutions. 
 
1.4 Safety Provided by C/AS1 
 
Before one can begin to address issues such as, what is an acceptable level of fire safety for 
buildings and whether or not an “equivalency” approach is reasonable, it is prudent to 
evaluate and ascertain the level of fire safety provided by the New Zealand Building Code 
Approved Document C/AS1. Questions to be considered include: 
 
• What is the apparent level of safety of buildings designed to C/AS1? 
• Is there a variation in safety across building types, heights etc? 
• What fire safety features impact most on the safety of a building? 
 
The primary aim of this project is to investigate the apparent level of safety of buildings 





This report investigates the apparent level of safety of building designed to the Approved 
Document for New Zealand Building Code Fire Safety Clauses C1, C2, C3, C4: June 2001 
Revision (C/AS1)(1) with the following objectives: 
 
1. To investigate and identify suitable methods for undertaking fire safety risk 
assessments. 
 
2. To develop a risk ranking scheme that can be used for assessing the apparent level of 
safety of building designed to C/AS1. 
 
3. Using the risk ranking scheme developed to evaluate the apparent level of fire safety 
inherent in buildings designed to C/AS1 by comparing the risk/safety between a 
variety of building categories, occupancy types and building heights. 
 
This report does not attempt to determine the “absolute” level of safety of buildings designed 
to C/AS1. Furthermore no attempt has been made to determine an “appropriate” level of 
safety that fire safety engineers and building consent authorities can use as a benchmark for 
designing buildings. 
 
The issue of “equivalency”, comparing alternative solutions to the Acceptable Solutions, is 
discussed in Chapter 8 with a view to using the risk ranking model proposed in this report as a 
possible tool for carrying out equivalency design comparisons. The pros and cons of 
“equivalency” are discussed but no attempt is made to determine whether or not the 
“equivalency” approach is a valid method. 
 
C/AS1 provides fire safety solutions for a large range of buildings and purpose groups. The 
types of purpose groups, building sizes and occupant number categories assessed in this report 
has been limited for a variety of reasons as discussed later in Section 4 of this report, but 
primarily to provide a practical and definitive scope for the study. Therefore the following 
purpose group, building height and occupant number categories have been assessed in this 




CS   Crowd Small 50< Occupants < 100 
CL  Crowd Large > 100 Occupants 
CM   Crowd Mercantile 
SA  Sleeping Accommodation 
SR  Sleeping Residential 
WL  Working Low (Fire load) 
WM  Working Medium (Fire Load) 
 
Escape Heights: 
4m to <10m 
10m to < 25m 
25m to <34m 
34m to < 46m 
46m to < 58m  
Over 58m 
 
Occupant Numbers:  
Up to  100 
101 -500 
501 - 1000  
Over 1000 
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The New Zealand regulatory framework governing the design and construction of buildings 
for fire safety has evolved over the last century based around prescriptive code environment. 
In a prescriptive code environment the design requirements are typically fully “prescribed”, 
hence to complete a design the designer simply determines the design features required from a 
list or table, generally no engineering calculations are required.  A shortcoming of the 
prescriptive code environment is that there is very little scope for engineers to tailor designs to 
meets the specific requirements of a building.  
 
In 1991 a new Building Act was legislated based on a performance based code where, rather 
than prescribing the exact design required to meet the Building Code, the performance criteria 
for each fire safety requirement was specified. The building designer then had a choice of 
methods for demonstrating compliance. In the case of fire safety design this compliance can 
be achieved in one of two ways, firstly by working through the Approved Documents (1), a 
prescriptive code (also known as the “Acceptable Solutions” C/AS1) or secondly preparation 
of specific fire engineering design, known as an “Alternative Solution”. 
 
The Building Act(4), Building Regulations(2) and Fire Safety Approved Documents(1) have all 
been reviewed, amended and in some cases completely reissued in the past 14 years. 
Although the changes have been significant, the codes and regulations for fire safety are still 
based around the performance code environment established in 1992. Nevertheless the 
“prescriptive code”, Approved Document C/AS1 has been retained. Furthermore, under the 
Building Act 2004, the Fire Service has been given a role at the design stage of a building 
project for certain classes of building to review and comment on the fire safety design and 
facilities for fire fighters, with respect to means of escape only, prior to a Building Consent 
being issued. 
 
The design, construction, and maintenance of buildings for fire safety in New Zealand is 
governed by several pieces of Government Legislation which in turn are overseen and 
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enforced by a number of regulatory and territorial authorities. The documents relevant to the 
design of building for fire safety are as follows: 
 
• Approved Document for New Zealand Building Code Fire 
Safety Clauses C1, C2, C3, C4 (C/AS1)(1) 
• Building Regulations 1992 (including subsequent amendments)(2) 
• Building Code (1st Schedule of the Building Regulations) (3) 
• Building Act 2004(4) 
• Fire Services Act 1975(9) 
• Fire Service Regulations 2003(10) 
• Fire Safety & Evacuation of Buildings Regulations 1992(11) 
• Material and Systems Standards and Codes of Practice 
 
The basic interrelationship between the various Acts and Regulations as they pertain to the 
design of a building for fire safety are shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
The following organisations have responsibilities under the regulatory framework for 
administering, reviewing and updating and complying with the various fire safety statutes and 
laws: 
 
• Building Owner 
• Department of Building and Housing (DBH), Ministry of Housing 
• Territorial Authority (City and District Councils) 
• Building Consent Authority (Licensed Certifiers or Territorial Authorities) 
• Licensed Building Practitioners (Designers and Builders)(after 2009) 















Fire Safety Performance Criteria
Building Act 2004 
Building Regulations 1992 




Material and Systems Standards and Codes of Practice 
Fire Service Act 1975  
Building Consent 













3.2 Building Act 2004 
 
The New Zealand Building Act 2004(4) is the legislative document enacted by Parliament that 
sets out the laws relating to the design, construction and maintenance of buildings and 
structures in New Zealand. The Building Act has the following purpose (4): 
 
The purpose of this Act is to provide for the regulation of building work, the 
establishment of a licensing regime for building practitioners, and the setting of 
performance standards for buildings, to ensure: 
 
(a) people who use buildings can do so without endangering their health; and 
(b) buildings have attributes that contribute appropriately to the health, physical 
independence, and well being of the people who use them; and 
(c) people who use the building can escape from the building if it is on fire; and 
(d) buildings are designed, constructed and are able to be used in a way that promotes 
sustainable development. 
 
The Building Act contains five main parts as detailed below and four schedules (not detailed): 
 
Part 1 – Preliminary Sets out the purpose, role of Crown and definitions 
 
Part 2 – Building Sets out the legal requirements of buildings, building 
consent process and identifies relevant regulations 
that a building must comply with.  
 
Part 3 – Regulatory 
Responsibilities and 
Accreditation 
Sets out the legal responsibilities of the Regulatory 
Authorities (Generally Building Consent Authorities, 
City and District Councils) and Accreditation 
Agencies. 
 
Part 4 – Regulation of 
Building Practitioners 
Sets out the laws and procedure for licensing and 
controlling the licenses of building practitioners. 
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Part 5 – Miscellaneous 
Provisions 
Generally deals with offences, fines, proceedings, 
procedures and transitional provisions. 
 
The following key clauses of the New Zealand Building Act 2004 are pertinent to the design 
of building for fire safety: 
 
Section 17 : All work must comply with the building code. 
Section 46 : Copy of certain applications for building consent must 
be provided to New Zealand Fire Service Commission. 
Section 47 : New Zealand Fire Service Commission may give 
advice on applications under section 46. 
Section 100 : Requirement for a Compliance Schedule. 
Section 108 : Annual Building Warrant of Fitness. 
Section 112 : Alterations to Existing Buildings 
Section 114,115 : Change of Use, extension of life, and subdivision of 
buildings. 
 
The most significant changes from the 1991 Act to the 2004 Act from a fire safety perspective 
come in Sections 46 and 47 where prior to issuing of a building consent the Fire Service 
Commission Design Review Unit must be sent and may review or comment on the fire safety 
features of  a design for “certain applications for building consent”. The type of building that 
this applies to is typically large multistorey buildings or buildings with large occupant number 
and a numbers of active fire safety features that would generally require compliance schedules 
and/or warrants of fitness such as sprinklers, smoke/heat detection alarm systems and 
ventilation or pressurisation systems. Alternative designs must also be submitted to the Fire 
Service Commission under the provisions of Sections 46 and 47 of the Act. 
 
The Fire Service Commission may comment on two aspects of design under the provisions of 
Section 47, these being means of escape from fire and the needs of persons who enter the 
building to undertake fire-fighting operations. Note that the Building Consent Authority is not 
bound by the Fire Service Commissions comments. 
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In summary the Building Act 2004 generally requires work on all new buildings, alterations 
to buildings (limited to means of escape) and changes of use of a building (as near as is 
reasonably practicable) to comply fully with the Building Code. This includes a building 
consent, design review by the fire service, compliance schedule and an annual warrant of 
fitness where appropriate. 
 
3.3 Building Regulations 1992 
 
The New Zealand Building Regulations 1992(2) contain eleven regulations (clauses) generally 
governing the responsibilities of the owner, Territorial Authority and Building Certifiers in 
the building consent and certification process. The regulations also contain two schedules, 
The Building Code and Building Consent and Certification Forms. The regulations have been 
amended several times during the past 13 years and a number of Building Amendment 
Regulations issued. From a fire safety design point of view the 1st Schedule to the regulations, 
The Building Code(3), is the most important as this sets out the performance criteria for the 
fire safety design of buildings 
 
3.4 Building Code and Approved Documents 
 
The New Zealand Building Code (Schedule 1 of Building Regulations)(3) contains the 
following sections governing the design of buildings. Acceptable design details are also 
specified for each of these sections in the Building Code Approved Documents: 
 
A1 - A2 General Provisions 
B1 - B2 Stability 
C1 - C4 Fire Safety 
D1 - D2 Access 
E1 - E2 Moisture 
F1 - F8 Safety of Users 
G1 - G15 Services and Facilities 
H1  Energy Efficiency 
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Fire Safety (C1 – C4), Lighting for Emergency (F6), Warning Systems (F7), and Sign (F8) 
are pertinent to the design of building for fire safety. Ventilation (G4) Electricity (G9), and 
Water Supply (G12) to a lesser extent. The fire safety clauses are: 
 
C1  - Outbreak of Fire 
C2  - Means of Escape from Fire 
C3  - Spread of Fire 
C4  - Structural Stability During Fire 
 
 
The Building Code specifies the performance criteria for each fire safety clause. These are 
given under the headings of Objective, Functional Requirements and Performance. The 
performance criteria for all fire safety clauses C1 to C4 are shown in Appendix A. 
 
This report focuses on establishing the level of safety for buildings designed to Sections C2, 
Means of Escape and C3, Spread of Fire from the Building Code Approved Documents, 
C/AS1. The objective of the report is to investigate and determine those factors, which affect 
the ability of occupants to safely escape a building.  
 
Section C1, Out Break of Fire, is not assessed in this research as the installation of solid and 
gaseous fuel appliances is judged to have no direct bearing on the ability of a person to escape 
from a building. Furthermore any impact or risk of fires caused by such appliances is assumed 
to be taken into account in the Fire Hazard Category (BU4) parameter in the proposed model. 
Refer to Chapter 6 for a full description of the risk ranking model. 
 
Section C4, Structural Stability During Fire, is also not assessed in specific detail in this 
research. This research focuses on the impact of active fire safety features such as sprinklers 
and alarms and passive protection such as smoke and flame barriers to means of escape. 
These systems have an immediate impact on the ability of occupants to be alerted to a fire and 
safely leave the building. A nominal allowance for structural safety has been included in the 
model by the inclusion of the Structural Endurance (S) Rating parameter (A2). Refer to 
Chapter 6 for a full description of the risk ranking model. 
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A detailed review of the Approved Document for New Zealand Building Code Fire Safety, 
Clauses C2, Means of Escape and C3, Spread of Fire is carried out in Chapter 4 of this report. 
 
3.5 Fire Services Act 1975 
 
The Fire Service Act 1975(9) is the legislative document enacted by Parliament that sets out 
the laws relating to the role, responsibilities and management of the New Zealand Fire Service 
and The New Zealand Fire Service Commissioner. The Act has had 24 amendments in the 
past 30 years with the most recent being 2005 and relating to the new Building Act. Five of 
the amendments have been repealed.  
 
The Fire Service Act 1975 has little impact on the design of a building for fire safety. The 
only clause relevant to the design and certification process is Clause 21A – Evacuation 
Schemes for Fire Safety. This clause sets out the criteria for determining which buildings 








3.6 Fire Safety and Evacuation of Buildings Regulations 1992 
 
The Fire Safety and Evacuation of Building Regulations 1992(11) contain regulations relating 
to the safe use of buildings with respect to fire safety and preparation, review and approval 
processes for evacuation scheme as follows: 
 
Part I - Fire Safety :  
 
Regulations pertaining to management of escape routes, control of hazardous appliance 
and materials and use of occupant fire fighting equipment. 
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Part II – Evacuation Schemes:  
 
Regulations pertaining to the requirements for and approval and maintenance of 
evacuation schemes. 
 
Part III – Miscellaneous:  
 
Regulations pertaining to the Fire Service and building owner’s responsibilities. 
 
All of the above regulations relate to “house keeping” in that they specify the basic 
requirements for using a building and maintaining a complying evacuation scheme.  The 
purpose is to ensure that the level of safety of the building resulting from being designed to 
the Building Code is not compromised, for example escape routes are not blocked by 
furnishings or stored materials, fire hazard is not increased by storage of large quantities of 
flammable liquids/fuels and fire fighting equipment for use by occupants is maintained.  
 
Failure to comply with a number of the above regulations may result in a reduction of the 
safety of a building. This research project focuses on the “designed” level of safety of 
buildings and therefore assumes that building will be used in accordance with these 
regulations. The impact on the level of safety due to the owner or occupants not complying 
with these regulations has not been taken in account in this report as it is beyond the scope of 
this research.  
 
Under Part I - Section 10 “ Fire Fighting Equipment for Use by Occupants”, the National Fire 
Commander may require handheld fire fighting equipment to be installed in a building which 
otherwise does not require them under the Building Code. In this situation the safety of the 
building is increased over and above the level of safety required by the Building Code. The 
impact of this on fire safety of building designed to the NZ Building Code Approved 
Documents is beyond the scope of this research project as the objective to this report is to 
establish the level of safety of buildings designed to C/AS1. Therefore only fire safety 
features required by the Building Code are assessed in this report. 
 
 
4 REVIEW OF NZBC APPROVED DOCUMENT  
 
4.1 Design Procedures 
 
The procedure for determining the fire safety design requirements of a building to the 
Approved Document (C/AS1), based on Clause 1.3.2(1), is summarised below: 
  
1. Determine application of Building Act, i.e. new building, alteration or change of 
use. 
2. Determine owner’s requirements (Assume nil for purposes of this project). 
3. Determine purpose groups and fire hazard category. 
4. Determine number and distribution of occupants. 
5. Determine the means of escape from fire from all firecells. 
6. Determine the number of firecells, firecell rating and fire safety precautions 
7. Determine any additional protection and structural fire endurance (S) rating. 
8. Determine the Fire Resistance Rating (FRR) of building elements including. 
requirements for structural stability.   
9. Determine requirements for control of internal fire spread. 
10. Determine requirements for control of external fire spread. 
11. Determine the requirements for fire fighting. 
12. Determine requirements to control outbreak of fire. 
 
Note that steps 4, 5 and 6 are carried out iteratively as each has an impact on the previous or 
successive step, i.e. the fire safety precautions could have an impact on the allowable escape 
length while an excessive escape length may require an increase in fire safety precautions 
such as an upgrade of an alarm system and detector type. 
  
This project will focus on the life safety aspects of the design procedure. These are steps 3 to 
9 and to a lesser extent 11 and 12. Spread of fire externally to neighbouring property will not 
be considered.  
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4.2 Basic Fire Parameters [Part 2 – C/AS1] 
 
The fire hazard risk is assessed taking into account the: 
 
a) Fire Hazard Category - Nature of the building materials and contents 
(i.e. fire load) 
 
b) Purpose Group - Type of activities undertaken and persons 
occupying or using building. 
 
c) Occupant Load - Number of the occupants. 
   
4.2.1 Fire Hazard Category 
 
The Fire Hazard Category (FHC)is a numerical grading from 1 to 4 based on the Fire Load 
Energy Density (FLED) as shown in Table 4.1 below: 
   
 
FHC FLED Range 
(MJ/m2) 
Design FLED Value 
(MJ/m2) 
1 0-500 400 
2 501-1000 800 
3 1001-1500 1200 
4 >1500 Specific Design 
 
Table 4.1 - Fire Hazard Category 
 
 
The FLED is defined as the fire load of all combustible materials and contents measured in 
energy divided by the floor area (MJ/m2). The fire growth rate is generally not considered 
separately (except Purpose Group WF) when assessing the fire hazard parameters for fire 
safety to C/AS1. However the fire severity is not controlled by FLED alone.  Fuel layout, 
surface area to mass ratio, ventilation, fire growth and spread characteristics of the fuel also 
influence the fire severity.  It is inferred from the code that some qualitative measure of these 
aspects were taken into consideration when assigning FHC categories to various occupancies.  
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This is an important point of difference with engineered solutions, as specific fire engineering 
designs are usually based around design fire scenarios, which include a design fire curve. The 
growth rate and rate of fire spread are the most rudimentary elements of a design fire curve as 
they determine critical time related parameters such alarm activation time, time to untenable 
conditions etc. 
 
The growth rate of the fire can be more critical than the total quantity of the fuel in small fire 
cells where the occupants have to leave within minutes of the fire having established burning. 
For example a large single burning object (e.g. sofa seat) is likely to give off enough toxic 
smoke to incapacitate or cause death to a person prior to fire flashover to full room 
involvement. 
 
The FHC in combination with a ventilation factor is used to determine the structural fire 
endurance (S) rating.  This will be discussed later (Section 4.5) but it should be noted that the 
S rating is based on the time to burn all the fuel in the firecell and in most cases would assume 
full room involvement of the fire. 
 
4.2.2 Purpose Group 
 
The purpose group establishes the occupancy type, i.e. what type of people are in the building, 
what are they doing and what is their state of consciousness.  This has been broadly classified 
into sixteen Purpose Groups as follows: 
 
a) Crowd Activities: 
 
 CS – Crowd Small (≤ 100 persons) and CL – Crowd Large (>100 persons) 
Large groups of people based on mixed occupancy of general public, i.e. men, woman, 




 CO – Crowd Open  
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 Same occupant mix as CS and CL but based on large crowds viewing open-air 
activities at stadiums such as concerts and sports events. This purpose group is not 
included in this study 
 
 CM – Crowd Mercantile 
Same occupant mix as CS and CL but based on large crowds in shops, malls, market 
places and exhibition halls. 
 
b) Sleeping Activities 
 
 SC – Sleeping Care 
Includes hospitals and care institutions for elderly, children or persons with 
disabilities. This purpose group is not included in this study. 
 
 SD – Sleeping Detention 
 Includes prisons and police stations and is not included in this study. 
 
 SA – Sleeping Accommodation 
 Occupancies that provide for transient accommodation used by the general public.  As 
such the occupants may not be familiar with the building.  Examples are hotels, 
motels, hostels, boarding houses and community care institutions. 
 
 SR – Sleeping Residential 
 Attached and multi-unit residential dwellings including flats, apartments and 
household units where attached to another household or other purpose groups. 
 
 SH – Sleeping Household 
 Comprises single residential dwelling occupied by a single family and is not included 







c) Working Business or Storage 
 
 WL – Working Low (Low fire load) 
Spaces used for working, business of storage activities where there is a low fire load.  
The fire load is defined as FHC 1 or 2. Examples of WL - FHC 1 are cool stores, 
covered cattle yards and packing plants for horticulture products. Examples of WL - 
FHC 2 are general business offices, dental or medical offices, radio and TV stations 
etc. 
 
 WM – Working Medium (Medium fire load) 
Spaces used for working, business of storage where there is a medium fire load.  The 
fire load is defined as FHC 3 and fire growth rates equivalent to t2 fires of slow, 
medium and fast speeds. 
 
 WH – Working High (High fire load) 
Same occupancies as WM but for larger buildings with a higher FLED.  The fire load 
is FHC 4 and fire growth rates equivalent to t2 fires of slow, medium and fast speeds. 
 
 WF – Working Special Fire Hazard 
Generally includes buildings for the manufacture or storage of highly flammable, 
volatile or explosive materials.   Fire hazard category FHC is 4 or greater and fire 
growth rate is ultra fast (>1MW in 75 sec). WH and WF are not included in this study. 
 
d) Intermittent Activities 
 
 IE – Intermittent Exitways 
Exitways on escape routes such as protected (from passage of smoke) paths and safe 
(from passage of fire) paths. IE areas are normally located in all multi-storey buildings 
of 3 stories or more. This will not be assessed as a separate occupancy type in this 
study.  However, the safety aspects of providing protected or safe paths will be 
addressed as a key item of the risk analysis in this study. 
 
 IA – Intermittent Activities 
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Spaces provided for intermittent activities or a support function to the building.  
Examples are car parks, corridors, laundries, lift shaft, toilet and amenity facilities. 
Although all buildings have IA occupancy areas they usually form a small area of the 
building and the fire safety features applied are based on the primary purpose group. 
The only exception to this is car parks which have their own specific fire safety 
requirements. Therefore, this occupancy will not be assessed further in this study. 
 
 ID – Intermittent Dangerous 
Same as IA but occupancies that house machinery or appliances that requires solid 
fuel, gas or petroleum fuels as an energy source. 
 
This study has been limited to buildings of general rather than specialised occupancy.  
Therefore hospitals and prisons (SC & SD purpose groups respectively) have not been 
included. Domestic houses (SH) which have very little life safety requirements under C/AS1 
will also be excluded. This report is focused on multi-storey buildings and as such Crowd 
Open (CO) will also be excluded as this occupancy is more commonly found at sports stadia. 
 
It is assumed that all buildings in this study will have a small proportion of Intermittent 
Activity areas.  It is further assumed that these areas will not be large enough to constitute a 
primary purpose group and as such would require the fire safety features required for the 
primary purpose group. 
 
The purpose groups to be assessed in this study are: 
 
  CS – Crowd Small 50< Occupants < 100 
  CL – Crowd Large > 100 Occupants 
  CM – Crowd Mercantile 
  SA – Sleeping Accommodation 
  SR – Sleeping Residential 
  WL – Working Low (Fire load) 
  WM – Working Medium (Fire Load) 
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4.2.3 Escape Height and Occupant Numbers 
 
The building heights and occupant numbers to be assessed in this study have been selected 
based on the broad categories set out in Tables 4.1/1 to 4.1/5 - C/AS1 as follows: 
 
a) Building Escape Height Categories 
 
Six building escape height categories have been chosen for this study as shown in Table 4.2. 
Note that the number of floors shown in Table 4.2 has been determined based on an assumed 




Escape Height Category to 
Tables 4.1 C/AS1 
Number of floors 
4 m <  He ≤ 10 m Up to 3 floors 
10 m < He ≤ 25 m 3 – 8   floors 
25 m < He ≤ 34 m 9 – 11 floors 
34 m < He ≤ 46 m 12 -14 floors 
46 m < He ≤ 58 m 15 – 18 floors 
He > 58 m Over 19 floors 
 













b) Occupant numbers  
 
The occupant number categories in accordance with C/AS1 are shown in Table 4.3: 
 
 
Occupant Numbers for Purpose 
Groups CS, CL, CM, WL and  
WM 
Occupant Numbers for Purpose 
Groups SA, and  SR 
Up to 100 persons Up to 40 persons 
101 – 500 persons Up to 100 persons SA* 
501 – 1,000 persons Up to 160 persons SA* 
Over 1,001 persons   
 * With Type 7 Alarm (Sprinklers and smoke detection) 
 
Table 4.3 - Occupant Number Categories 
 
 
c) Occupant Densities 
 
The occupant densities [Table 2.2 C/AS1] are used to determine the number of occupants in a 
building. Occupant densities vary depending on the activity in each firecell. Broad ranges are 
given for typical occupancy types as follows: 
 
  Crowd Activities  0.01 – 2.0 person/m2 
 
  Sleeping Activities Number of beds 
 
  Working 0.01 – 0.2 persons/m2 
 
  Intermittent 0.02 – 0.2 persons/m2 
   
The occupant density will affect the travel speed and hence the length of the travel time in the 
open paths, but given the variability of densities it is not practical to include this aspect in this 
fire safety analysis. The total number of occupants that governs total travel and queuing times 
will be taken into consideration. 
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4.3 Means of Escape – Part 3 – C/AS1 
 
The means of escape provisions generally cover the type, geometry, number, and critical 
design features of escape routes. 
 
All buildings are required to have a means of escape from fire to a safe place. A safe place 
can be outside the building, in an adjoining building or in a refuge area within the building 
that is on fire. 
 
The degree of protection of the escape route must not decrease in the direction of escape. 
 
The following egress paths may make up an escape route: 
 
• Dead End Open Path: - open path with only one possible direction of escape.  
Occupants may be exposed to the products of combustion whilst escaping. 
 
• Open path: - open path where the occupants generally have a choice of escape 
routes but may be exposed to the products of combustion. 
 
• Protected path: - escape route that is protected from the ingress of smoke with 
smoke barriers and smoke stop doors.  A protected path forms a part of an 
“exitway” under C/AS1 and is subject to special provisions for exitways. 
 
• Safe Path: - escape route that is protected from the ingress of smoke and fire with 
fire rated barriers and doors.  A safe path forms a part of an “exitway” under C/AS1 
and is also subject to special provisions for exitways. 
 
• Final Exit: - is the point at which the occupants leave the building and reach a place 
of safety. 
 
Key aspects for assessing means of escape are summarised below in Sections 4.3.1 to 4.3.5.  
This is not a comprehensive list and is based on those aspects, which have an impact on life 
safety in the building occupancies under consideration in this study. 
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4.3.1 Number of Escape Routes 
 
Buildings generally require a minimum of two escape routes.  The provisions for single 
means of escape only apply to buildings with less than 50 persons per firecell and as such are 
not included in this study. 
 
Number of escape routes: [Table 3.1 C/AS1] 
 
Sleeping purpose groups: 
   
  SA and SR Up to 100 beds 2 
  SA and SR Over 100 beds 2 + 1 per 100 beds 
 
All other purpose groups: 
   
  Up to 500 persons 2 
  Up to 1,000 persons 3 
  Over 1,000 persons ≥ 4 (Depending on number of persons) 
  
  
4.3.2 Height of Escape Routes 
 
Clear height shall not be less than 2.1 m [Cl 3.3.1 C/AS1].  This is not usually critical given the 
standard ceiling height is 2.4 m (residential) and approximately 2.7 m (commercial). 
 
4.3.3 Width of Escape Routes 
 
The minimum width of escape routes is determined by the number of persons in the firecell 
(note a firecell is taken to be the entire floor of a building in this study) or a minimum specified 
whichever is greater. The width of escape routes is also a function of travel inclination, i.e. 
vertical or horizontal travel.  Vertical (stairs) travel paths are required to be wider than 
horizontal travel paths. 
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C/AS1 also requires the width of escape routes to be assessed taking into account the provision 
of one unusable escape route where the building is unsprinklered.  Therefore if only two escape 
routes are required then each escape route must be of sufficient width to take the full occupant 




Minimum Width of Individual Escape Route 
Vertical Travel Path Horizontal Travel Path 
1,000mm 850 mm 
Total Width Required 
Total No. of  
Occupants 










500 2 4,500 mm 3,500 mm 
1,000 3 9,000mm 7,000 mm 
 
Table 4.4 - Minimum Width of Escape Routes [Table 3.2 C/AS1] 
 
  
The width of escape routes should increase in the direction of travel.  The total width of escape 
routes is to be based on the firecell with the highest occupancy.  This particularly applies to 
multiple purpose group occupancies where considerable variation in occupant number can 
occur in a building. 
 
4.3.4 Length of Escape Routes 
 
The length of escape routes is a critical item in the design for fire safety.  The length of an 
escape route has a direct bearing on the length of time a person takes to evacuate a building 
and/or the length of time a person is exposed to the products of combustion. 
 
Basic requirements for escape path lengths in accordance with Section 3.4 - C/AS1 are: 
 
a) The length is measured from a point 1m from the most remote point in the building. 
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b) For multiple purpose groups, the purpose group with the shortest maximum permitted 
length shall apply. 
 
c) An allowance should be made for travel around furniture and obstructions. 
 
d) Where multiple escape routes are required the escape route lengths from any point on a 
floor to no fewer than two exits shall not exceed the required lengths. 
 
e) In unsprinklered fire cells a protected path (smoke protected) shall have sufficient space 
to provide temporary refuge to occupants as they merge with occupants using a vertical 
stair safe path from other (higher) levels.   
 
The permitted escape route lengths based on Table 3.3 C/AS1 are shown in Table 4.5 below. 
 
C/AS1 permits or requires adjustments to the escape route lengths depending on the type of 
safety precautions installed or architectural features that increase the risk of occupants coming 





Type of path 
CS, CL, CM, SA WL, WM, SR 
Dead End Open Path (DEOP) 18m 24 
Total Open Path* (TOP) 45m 60 
Protected Path (PP) 45m 60 
Vertical Safe Path (VSP) No restriction on length 
Horizontal Safe Path (HSP) Restricted as follows: 
         - Dead End 18 m 24m 
         - Two or more escape directions 135m 180m 
 * Includes DEOP 
 




Permitted adjustments to escape route lengths are: 
 
a) DEOP and TOP measured lengths are increased by 50% for escape from an 
intermediate floor [Cl 3.4.6 C/AS1].  An intermediate floor is a floor that is open to a 
lower firecell floor. Intermediate floors have not been assessed in this project. 
 
b) DEOP and TOP measured lengths are based on pitch line length for stairs, two times 
the height for spiral stairs and three times the height for ladders [Cl. 3.4.7 C/AS1]. 
 
c) The permitted DEOP and TOP lengths are to be reduced by 50% where all of the 
following apply: [Cl. 3.4.8 C/AS1]. 
 
• Both floor and ceiling slope by more than 4m; and 
• Escape is in up slope direction; and 
• Ceiling is less than 4 m high; and 
• Occupant load is greater than 100; and 
• Smoke control is not installed. 
 
d) Permitted increases in open path lengths (DEOP and TOP) based on the installation of 




WL, WM, CS, CL,CM SA, SR 
Sprinklers 100% 50% 
Heat Detectors 20% 10% 
Smoke Detectors 100% 50% 
Maximum Combined 200% - 
 




4.3.5 Means of Escape - Other Requirements 
 
a) Escape is permitted through an adjoining building or from one firecell to another.  Fire 
separation requirements apply and protected paths may be required adjacent to exit 
ways.  This is not critical to this project as only single buildings are to be considered 
and it is assumed that the final exit leads directly to a safe pace.  Each floor of each 
building is assumed to be a single fire cell. 
 
b) Basements can generally be treated like any other floor.  The only exceptions are that 
where a basement shares a safe path with other floors then a protected path shall 
precede the safe path.  Where such an arrangement serves three or more basement 
levels then the safe path shall be pressurised. The impact of basements shall not be 
assessed in this study. 
 
c) There are minor restrictions and requirements in the code on obstructions in escape 
routes, direction of door swing, door sizes and handrail sizes.  While these are 
important for the safe design of a building their impact on life safety is difficult to 
assess both qualitatively and quantitatively.  For example all stairs must have a 
handrail.  The impact of not having a handrail is likely to be a reduction of travel speed 
as persons of unsure footing descend more cautiously.  However, this report focuses on 
the level of safety of buildings meeting the “code” and as such it is assumed that the 
above minor provisions are met. 
 
d) Exitways shall not be used for storage of goods, solid waste or solid waste containers 
or points of entry for solid waste chutes. This is generally a matter of good 
housekeeping and as such exitways should be designed to avoid this.  Therefore the 
impact on life safety of obstacles in exitways is not considered further in this study. 
 
e) Other activities, such as a reception, are permitted in an exitway providing that an 
alternative escape route is available, an alarm system is installed and other activities 
have a FHC not greater than 1; the escape route is not impeded, activities (with the 
exception of ablution facilities) are visible to occupants and exist only to provide 
support to the purpose group users. It is assumed that all these provision are met when 
assessing safety of buildings in this study. 
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f) Lifts are not typically relied upon as a means of escape during a fire event in New 
Zealand. 
 
g) Refuge areas are required in tall buildings (over 58 m escape height). They are usually 
contained within the vertical safe path stairs. Refuge areas are designed to remove 
congestion, allow slow persons to rest or be passed by quicker persons.  They are not 
designed with the intention of a person waiting out a fire emergency. 
 
h) Single escape routes can only be used in limited situations for purpose groups CS, CM, 
CO, WL, WM, WH, WF, IA and ID, SA and SR; and where total occupant load from 
all firecells on each level is less than 50 persons; and number of young children or 
disabled persons on any one floor is less than 10. Height restrictions apply as shown in 
Table 4.7 below. 
    
Purpose group Escape height Max. FHC Sprinklers Installed
<4.0 m <3 No 
<10.0m <2 No 
<10.0m <3 Yes 
CS, CM, WL, WM, 
IA, ID 
<25.0m <2 Yes 
<10.0m - No SR and SA 
<25.0m - Yes 
 
Table 4.7 - Height Restrictions for a Single Escape Route 
 
 
 The presence of a single means of escape has a significant impact on the safety of a 
building and the ability of occupants to escape a fire.  Occupants do not get a choice of 
means of escape with a single escape route and as such C/AS1 looks to minimise the 
risk by introducing additional safeguards to ensure as far as practical that the escape 
route remains tenable for a sufficient time to enable all occupants to escape. 




 The two key elements for reducing the risk are: 
 
• Limiting the total number of persons, and 
• Additional passive fire safety features to extend the time to untenable 
conditions in the safe path. 
  
The lowest occupant number category assessed in this study is up to 100 people, 
therefore single means of escape building are not applicable. A separate occupant 
number category would be required limited to a maximum of 50 persons. Therefore 
single means of escape buildings were not assessed in this study. 
 
i) There are several life safety issues that need to be considered when evaluating the 
impact of doors on the safety of buildings in fires.  These are: 
 
• Fire and smoke control doors are required to perform a function during the 
course of a fire event.  This function is to maintain the integrity of the 
fire/smoke barrier by preventing the ingress of fire or smoke into the exitway 
and ensuring the exitways remain tenable until the occupants have escaped. To 
achieve this, doors need to be fabricated and installed correctly and maintained 
and used properly. Hold-open devices are required to be used where there are 
more than 1000 occupants in a firecell and for doors between vertical and 
horizontal safe paths in sleeping purpose groups. 
 
• Doors must be able to be opened with minimal force and not impede the flow 
of escaping occupants. 
 
• Final exit doors must be able to be opened without the need to stop and unlock 
the door or remove impeding security measures. 
 
The above items are paramount to the safe evacuation of persons from a building fire.  
Failure of any of these aspects may result in unacceptable risk to the occupants during 
the course of escape with safe and protected path filling with products of combustion 
early in the fire event or unacceptable levels of queuing or backtracking of escapees.  
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It is assumed that fire and smoke control doors are installed and used properly, 
therefore the adequacy of doors is not assessed as a specific item in the risk model 
developed in this study. 
 
j) Some buildings require emergency lighting in exitways and, for larger occupant 
numbers and certain purpose groups and escape heights, in open paths as well. All 
buildings require exits to be clearly signposted. 
 
 The visibility of egress routes and adequate signage is an important aspect of fire safety 
design as it affects the ability of persons to find their way out of a building and as such 
impacts the travel time for escaping occupants. 
4.4 Firecell Requirements 
 
A firecell is defined as: “any space including a group of contiguous spaces on the same or 
different levels within a building which is enclosed by any combination of fire separations, 
external walls, roofs and floors” (1). 
 
In general each floor of a multistorey building is a separate firecell.  Exceptions to this are 
intermediate floors (mezzanine floors) which are generally part of a lower firecell, apartments 
and units in sleeping purpose groups SR (Residential) or SA (Accommodation).  A floor of a 
building may be subdivided to separate firecells for a number of other reasons: 
 
i) To separate highly flammable and volatile contents. 
ii) To reduce the total volume of fire load in the firecell to a level such that a fire can be 
readily controlled and extinguished by the Fire Service. Code restrictions for firecell 
sizes apply in unsprinklered buildings. 
iii) To meet means of escape requirements by providing protected and safe paths to meet 
escape route length requirements. 
iv) To protect neighbouring property in multi-tenanted buildings. 
v) A floor may be subdivided to prevent the rapid spread of fire. 
vi) A floor may be subdivided into smoke cells to prevent the rapid spread of smoke 
throughout the floor. 
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4.4.1 Fire Safety Precautions 
 
Firecells require fire safety precautions (FSP) to ensure that [Cl. 4.2.6 C/AS1]: 
 
i) The occupants have sufficient warning and protection while they make their escape to a 
safe place. 
ii) Fire spread is restricted. 
iii) The Fire Service has sufficient time to undertake rescue operations. 
 
The following aspects of a building are taken into consideration when determining the fire 
safety precautions: 
 
i) The purpose group in each firecell for buildings with multiple purpose groups.  The 
purpose group with the most fire safety precautions is used for their level of occupancy 
and all floors above that level. 
ii) The number of occupants in each firecell. 
iii) The escape height of a building. 
iv) The means of escape requirements.  Alarm systems may be required to be selected 
based on escape route lengths, intermediate or basement floor requirements. 
 
The fire safety precautions and firecell ratings for buildings, [Table 4.1/1 to 4.1/5 C/AS1(1)], are 
shown in Appendix B. 
 
The fire safety precautions play a key role in providing safety to the occupants of a building in 
the unwanted event of a fire.  The performance and reliability of the FSP is an important aspect 
in a risk/safety assessment of a building for fire safety.  Although not the only aspect to be 
considered, the performance, reliability and contribution of FSP to the fire safety of a building 
is to form a significant proportion of evaluation and analysis of this research project. 
 




Type 1 : No type 1 specified - C/AS1: June 2001.  
(Domestic smoke alarm system – C/AS1: April 2003 Amendment).  
 
Type 2 : Manual Fire Alarm 
Activated by a person operating a manual call point (MCP).  Comprises 
manual call points, sounders and alarm panel. 
 
 
Type 3 : Automatic fire alarm with heat detectors and MCP. 
Automatically activated by heat detectors or manually by a person 
operating a manual call point whichever detects or observes the fire 
first. 
 
Type 4 : Automatic fire alarm with smoke detectors and MCP. 
Automatically activated automatically by smoke detectors or manually 
by a person operating a manual call point whichever detects or observes 
the fire first. 
 
Type 5 : Automatic fire alarm system with modified smoke detection and MCP. 
Used specifically in residential and accommodation occupancies to 
reduce false (nuisance) alarms that result in evacuation of the entire 
building and or unnecessary call out of the Fire Service.  Permitted as 
a modification to the requirement for a Type 4 or Type 7 Alarm – 
generally comprising. 
• Smoke detectors in exitways connected into the building alarm 
system. 
• Heat detectors in apartments or units connected into the 
buildings alarm system. 
• Smoke detectors in each apartment or unit that only sound an 
alarm in that unit. 
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Type 6 : Automatic fire sprinklers with MCP.  
Alarm is raised by either activation of the sprinkler system or manually 
by a person operating a manual call point, whichever detects the fire 
first. The sprinkler system can sound an alarm as well as control or 
extinguish the fire. 
 
Type 7 : Automatic fire sprinkler system with smoke detection and MCP. 
A hybrid of a Type 4 and Type 6 system.  Provides both early warning 
from smoke detection and control/suppression from the sprinkler system. 
 
Type 8 : Voice Communication System 
An automatic system with variable tone alerting devices and the ability 
to deliver voice messages to the occupants and allow two way 
communications between emergency services. 
 
Type 9 : Smoke Control in Air Handling System 
Provision for automatic detection, alarm and control by venting, 
shutdown and dampers of a heating, ventilation and/or air conditioning 
system in a building. 
 
Type 10 : Natural Smoke Venting 
Firecells are provided with smoke reservoirs with outlet vents and fresh 
air inlet vents, which open automatically when, activated by a smoke 
detection system. 
 
Type 11 : Mechanical Smoke Extraction 
Firecells are provided with smoke extraction fans to forcefully remove 
smoke from smoke reservoirs. These can be used where natural venting 
is determined to be inadequate due to smoke stratifying below level of 
the vents or adverse effects of wind on buildings. 
 
Type 12 : No type 12 currently specified 
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Type 13 : Pressurisation of Safe Paths 
Pressurisation fans installed to safe paths (typically stairwells) to 
prevent the ingress of smoke while persons are escaping.  Activated by 
smoke detectors, the pressurisation system is required to operate for no 
less than 60 minutes. 
Type 14 : Fire Hose Reels 
Handheld fire hoses for use by both the occupants and fire service.  
Typically only required in sleeping residential and accommodation 
purpose groups.  Commonly installed as additional fire protection in 
other occupancies. 
 
Type 15 : Fire Service Lift Control  
Provides the fire service with exclusive use of any lift for fire fighting 
purposes. 
 
Type 16 : Emergency Lighting in Exitways  
Emergency battery powered lighting in protected and safe paths 
required to guide the occupants to the final exit in the event that the 
building power supply fails. 
 
Type 17 : Emergency Power Supply  
The emergency power supply is required in some buildings to ensure 
the continued operation of fire safe precautions critical to the 
evacuation of the building such as smoke control, emergency lighting 
and lifts. 
 
Type 18 : Fire Hydrant System 
Required where the Fire Service hose run length is likely to be greater 
than 75m from the Fire Service appliance to the most remote area of the 
building. Generally comprises a pipe system with an inlet at ground 
level and outlets at each floor.  Typically located in or adjacent to a 
vertical safe path (stairs). Also required in large low-rise buildings. 
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Type 19 : Refuge Areas 
Required in vertical safe paths of tall building where congestion may 
occur to allow persons to rest and faster persons to pass. 
 
Type 20 : Fire Systems Centre  
A facility for the Fire Service which is: 
• accessible from street level 
• protected from the effects of fire, including falling debris 
• contains control panels indicating the status of the fire safety 
systems in the building. 
 
    
In addition to the above Fire Safety Precautions a number of limitations and dispensations are 
permitted.  These are denoted a-f and are shown in detail in Appendix B and summarised 
below: 
     
 a. Not required. Identifies situations where particular FSP may be omitted. 
 b. Single escape routes which require an upgrade to a Type 4 alarm. 
 c. Provision for when a fire hydrant system is required. 
 d. Provision for when emergency lighting is required in both exitways and open 
paths. 
 e. Provision for when a Type 5 alarm is permitted. 
 f. Provision for when direct connection to the fire service is not required. 
 
4.4.2 Firecell Rating  
 
A firecell rating, F Rating, is also determined as part of the firecell assessment.  The firecell 
rating is the minimum fire rating that shall be applied to fire separations and load bearing 
elements (where the structural endurance rating, S Rating does not govern). 
 
The firecell rating is generally 30, 45 or 60 minutes and is combined with structural fire 
endurance rating to determine the fire resistance rating (FRR) of building elements. 
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4.5 Fire Resistance Ratings 
  
The fire resistance rating (FRR) is the time in minutes that a structural or fire barrier element 
can pass the standard fire rating test. The standard fire rating test in NZ is typically based on 
the AS 1530:Part 4 (12) time temperature curve. 
 
The fire resistance rating has three components.  These are: 
 
a) Stability –  Time to structural failure. This is applied to load bearing elements, 
including floors, beams, column and structural walls and is based on the 
greater of the S or F Rating when designing to C/AS1. 
 
b) Integrity –  Time for fire and combustion products to penetrate a fire barrier. This is 
based on F rating for internal fire spread and S rating for external fire 
spread when designing to C/AS1. 
 
c) Insulation –  Time for heat transfer through a fire barrier to a level such that 
combustibles on the non-fire side may ignite. 
 
Fire resistance ratings are given a three figure number, e.g. FRR 30/30/30, 30 minutes stability, 
30 minutes integrity and 30 minutes insulation. 
 
An element may only have a smoke rating in which case the FRR is -/-/Sm. 
 
The above parameters are important to life safety to the occupants in a building, as they are 
critical to ensuring a building does not collapse, fire and combustion products do not spread 
and providing safe egress routes for occupants. 
 
As noted in the previous sections the F rating is taken from Tables 4.1/1 to 4/1/5 C/AS1.  The 
firecell rating is essentially a time rating based on providing sufficient time for persons to 
escape, and to allow the Fire Service to undertake fire fighting operations by limiting the 
spread of the fire. 
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The structural endurance rating (S) is taken from Table 5.1 C/AS1.  The structural endurance 
rating is essentially a time rating based on ensuring a building or part of a building does not 
collapse prior to the fire burning out or the Fire Service extinguishing the fire.  The primary 
purpose of an S rating is to prevent spread of fire to neighbouring property due to collapse of 
buildings or part of buildings. 
 
Clause 5.7.9 C/AS1 gives a good summary of the minimum FRR to be applied to building 
components. 
 
The most significant concession in C/AS1 for fire resistance rating is that the S rating may be 
halved where sprinklers are installed.  From Tables 4.1/1 to 4.1/5 C/AS1 we can see that the F 
ratings are also reduced for buildings that require a sprinkler system. 
 
4.6 Internal Fire Spread [Part 6 C/AS1] 
 
Section 6 of C/AS1 details specific requirements for control of internal spread of fire for each 
type of purpose group.  In particular it specifies: 
 
  a) Minimum fire resistance ratings 
  b) Where smoke separation is required 
  c) Ventilation requirements 
  d) Car park building requirements 
  e) Firecell construction requirements.  Including fire stopping and 
protecting concealed spaces 
  f) Intermediate floor requirements  
  g) Sub-floor space requirements 
  h) Protected shaft requirements, e.g. lifts, conveyors and service shafts 
  i) Closures in smoke and fire barriers such as door sets and glazing 
  j) Surface finishes including suspended flexible fabrics and control of 
wood and foam plastic building products 
  k) Smoke control requirements 
  l) Building services plant requirements such as smoke control in HVAC 
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This section of the C/AS1 is too detailed to summarise within the scope of this report.  Items 
that impact on life safety shall be discussed as and where they arise in the risk analysis. 
 
4.7 External Fire Spread [Part 7 – C/AS1] 
 
Control of external fire spread is concerned primarily with spread of fire to neighbouring 
properties and as such is outside the scope of this project. 
 
The only exception to this is for sleeping purpose groups – Residential (SR) and 
Accommodation (SA) where fire spread up the exterior face of the building must be controlled 
by installing fire rated spandrels, aprons or sprinklers. External fire spread has not been 
specifically addressed in this report but it is assumed that the required fire safety features are 
taken into account in the firecell (F) rating and sprinkler components of the risk model. Refer 
to Chapter 6 for details of the risk model. 
  
4.8 Fire Fighting [Part 8 – C/AS1] 
 
This section covers the basic requirements of the New Zealand Fire Service including vehicle 
access and fire fighting facilities. 
 
Vehicle access specifies the road requirements, e.g. vehicle loading, width and access distances 
to the side of a building.  These issues have minimal impact on life safety of building 
occupants.  The only impact would be the time it takes the Fire Service to reach the building, 
which is likely to be a small percent of the total response time. 
  
Fire fighting facilities covers the fire hydrant system, fire hose reels, fire systems centre, fire 
service lift control and voice communication system.  No specific details are given for the 
design and installation of these systems as this information is found in the relevant New 
Zealand Standard.  The impact of these systems on life safety will be assessed and discussed in 
detail where appropriate in this report. 
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4.9 Outbreak of Fire [Part 9 – C/AS1] 
 
Section 9 of C/AS1 details requirements for solid fueled, gas fueled appliances and chimneys.  
These requirements generally relate to preventing ignition by providing adequate separation to 
flammable surfaces. The installation of heating, and cooking facilities is very much dependant 
on the region the building is located and the type of fuel available in that region.  
 
The appliances themselves are likely to be contained in a separate plant room in large buildings 
and as such would be separated from the occupied floors. Plants rooms are typically designated 
“Intermittent Dangerous (ID)” and are generally not a primary purpose group and as such the 
fire safety requirements of the primary purpose group would govern the design of most of the 
building’s fire safety features. Therefore the provisions of Section 9- C/AS1 will not be 
included in this study. 
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Buildings are required to be designed in a manner that provides a safe environment for the 
occupants at all times regardless of the function or life of the buildings. Buildings must be 
structurally sound and to achieve this they are designed to the structural building standards, 
they must provide adequate heating, ventilation, lighting and access, and likewise they are 
designed to the appropriate regulations and standards. All of these are based on providing a 
safe internal environment, but in the event of a fire, the safety of the environment is 
deteriorating rapidly. One of the key fire safety objectives is to delay or mitigate the fire 
effects sufficient to allow all occupants time to safely escape the fire and evacuate the 
building by installing appropriate fire safety features.  
 
Unfortunately the above objective is not met in every fire event and a number of persons die 
each year from fires. On average 27 people die per year in building fires in New Zealand 
(based on the 5 years between 1999 and 2004 (60)). Approximately 70.6% of the deaths have 
occurred in domestic houses (SH purpose group), 16.9% in residential (SR), 10.3% in 
manufacturing (WL/WM), 1.5% in assembly (CS/CL) and 0.7% in hotel/motel (SA) 
occupancies. Refer to Appendix H for statistics. 
 
The level of fire safety of buildings designed to the New Zealand Building Code, Approved 
Document is not defined or quantified numerically in the approved document. The 
performance criteria of the Building Regulations 1992 also omit a minimum or acceptable fire 
safety level. At this point in time the level of safety of specific fire engineering solutions is 
generally determined by comparing the fire safety features provided to those that would be 
required by C/AS1. There has been much debate among the fire engineering community as to 
the whether or not differing fire safety features or combinations of fire safety features provide 
an equivalent level of safety to the C/AS1 solutions and a rational and economical method for 
proving the comparability.  Comparisons can be made using a probabilistic risk analysis 
approach but this is time consuming, expensive and given that it still contains subjective 
material, open to debate. 
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From this debate arises a couple of interesting questions of which some are the subject of this 
research and others can only be answered through discussion, debate and/or by agreement 
within the fire engineering and political arenas: 
 
• What is an appropriate minimum level of fire safety for designing building? 
• What is the actual level of fire safety of buildings designed to C/AS1 and is this 
reasonable?  





Safety is often expressed as the inverse of risk (13), i.e. if something is not risky then it must be 
safe.  
Safety    =            1    . 
  Risk 
  
In fire engineering, safety features are introduced into the design to reduce the risk and 
increase the safety. It is not possible to make something completely safe. There will always be 
an element of risk, which cannot be entirely eliminated, i.e. the inherent risk. The purpose of 
fire safety design is to minimise the risks and thereby maximise the safety. The safety in this 
case refers to life safety, i.e. the safety of the occupants. The safety of a building and/or its 
contents is not usually included in a fire safety assessment unless requested by the owner or it 
is a condition of an insurer. The only exception in NZ is prevention of spread of fire to an 
adjoining property, which must be prevented by appropriately detailed fire safety features. 
Safety in terms of this report refers only to life safety. 
 
To determine the level of safety numerically it is necessary to undertake some form of risk 
assessment. This will be discussed in detail later in this section.  
5.3 Risk 
 
Risk is often defined as a function of likelihood and consequence, where the likelihood can be 
determined as the probability of an event occurring and the consequence is the outcome 
measured, for example, in dollar value or human or environmental impact. The outcome may 
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be positive or negative, and significant or insignificant, depending on the initial objective of 
the risk problem.  
 
Risk = f (likelihood; consequences) 
 
In judging risk, an individual must weigh up the significance of the outcome or consequence 
against the frequency of likely occurrence when determining whether or not an individual will 
accept a risk. For example a person caught in a building in which a fire alarm has sounded has 
several choices upon hearing the alarm, they can: 
 
• Ignore the alarm (assume it is a false alarm or that they are safe until finished what 
they are doing) 
• Investigate the fire 
• Fight the fire (if present) 
• Alert the Fire Service 
• Alert other occupants 
• Assist other occupants in escaping 
• Leave the building casually (collect belongings, wander out the way they came in) 
• Leave the building rapidly ( immediately, at pace to nearest exit ) 
 
For each option the individual must assess the risk to themselves and/or other persons in 
taking any of the above options. This assessment will include attributes such as their 
familiarity with the building, personal capabilities, the presence of fire cues, and 
knowledge/history of the alarm system performance and the level of interaction with other 
occupants. In this case each of the above options has a risk that is varying with time, although 
the individual may not appreciate this at the time. 
 
Society assesses risk in a similar manner, however the evaluation is broader, non-
personalised, and in most cases economically or politically motivated. 
 
Individuals, and indeed society, perceive risk in a difference context based on personal 
experiences. A number of single events resulting in one death per event may be considered or 
perceived as far more acceptable by society, than multiple deaths in a single event, even 
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though over time the two scenarios may result in the same risk when risk is determined on a 
scale of say, deaths per year. As an individual, the risk may only be realised when the 
consequence is attained on a personal level. 
 
The Australian/New Zealand Standard for Risk Management AS/NZS 4360:2004(14)(15) 
defines risk as “the chance of something happening that will have an impact on objectives”. 
 
In the terms of fire safety of buildings the chance of something happening (probability) and 




“Chance of something 
happening” 
Objective “Impact on Objective” 
Probability of fire ignition 
and growth. 
Prevent unwanted fires. Adverse risk to life and property in the 
event of an unwanted fire. 
Probability that fire safety 
features function as 
intended. 
Allow occupants to escape 
from fire safely and alert fire 
service. 
Possibility that some or all persons 
will or will not be able to safely 
escape and fire will or will not be 
contained. 
Probability of the fire being 
extinguished. 
Prevent fire spread to entire 
structure and/or neighbouring 
property. 
Possibility that the building may or 
may not be destroyed and the fire 
prevented or allowed to spread to 
neighbouring properties. 
 





In reality the problem is much more complicated than Table 5.1 implies. Each of the above 
components can be expanded and the impact of each event/component on the fire safety of 
buildings assessed against the objectives of the standards required by society. These standards 
although not numerically defined at this time have been laid down qualitatively in the NZ 
Building Code as outlined in Chapter 3 above. 
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The objective of this project is to determine the level of safety inherent in buildings designed 
to C/AS1 using a risk analysis method. The analysis will consider the impact of fire safety 
features, building height and occupancy type on the fire safety of buildings. 
 




AS/NZS 4360:2004(14) set outs a basic procedure for undertaking a risk management process. 
While this is based more on the management of a risk problem the basis of the procedure 
forms a useful framework for undertaking a risk assessment for fire safety in buildings in a 
research setting. 
 
The risk management procedure is summarised in Table 5.2 below. The aspects of the 
procedure that are relevant to this research project (denoted by the shaded area in the table 




Risk Management Process Item Description 
Communicate and consult An ongoing activity where all attributes 
of the risk assessment are advised to the 
Stakeholders and Analysts. 
Establish the context Defines the scope, basic parameters and 
purpose of risk assessment. 
Identify risks Assess what, when, where, how and why 
a risk event can happen? 
Analyse risk Determine the consequences, likelihood 
and the level of risk. 
Evaluate risks Compare risks against set criteria. 
Set priorities for mitigation or treatment. 
Treat risks Identify and assess options. 
Implement plans to treat the risk. 
Monitor and review Ongoing review to ensure that the risk 
assessment and control measures remain 
relevant. 
 
Table 5.2 - Risk Management Process 
 
5.4.2 Definitions  
 
The following definitions have been reproduced from AS/NZS 4360:2004 Australian/New 
Zealand Standard - Risk Management (14)(15) and the International Fire Engineering Guideline 





Risk can be defined as the chance or likelihood of something happening that will have an 
impact on objectives. In terms of fire engineering risk is defined as the likelihood of an 
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unwanted fire event causing harm or death to the occupants of a building or damage to the 
building, adjacent property or the environment. 
 
b) Risk Assessment 
 
Risk assessment is the overall process of risk identification, analysis and evaluation. In fire 
engineering terms it is the process of selecting the design fire scenarios, undertaking the risk 
analysis, which may include fire and evacuation modelling depending on the type of risk 
analysis and evaluating the results, which will depend on the objective of the risk assessment.  
 
c) Risk Identification 
 
Risk identification is the process of determining “what, where, when, why, and how” an event 
could occur. In terms of a fire risk assessment it is determining the appropriate design fire 
scenarios that are likely to pose the greatest threat to the life safety and property protection 
objectives. 
 
d) Risk Analysis 
 
Risk analysis is the systematic process to understand the nature of, and determine or quantify, 




An analysis generally based on subjective judgment of fire hazard, fire 
protection and likely consequences. The assessment broadly classifies risk 
from low to high or on a similar scale. The scale is typically customised to the 
risk problem being assessed. The analysis should be based on factual 
information and data where available.  
 
A qualitative approach is used in this project to assess and determine what fire 
safety parameters/requirement from the NZ Building Code Approved 
Document for Fire Safety C/AS1 has the most impact on life safety.  The 
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parameters are then incorporated in to a semi-quantitative risk model for the 




A semi-quantitative risk analysis (SQRA) is still essentially based on 
subjective judgment but where points or grades are assigned to broadly 
quantify variables. The sum of the points is used to establish a measure of risk. 
In fire engineering terms the method is typically used for assessing/grading 
existing buildings or undertaking comparative risk assessments of a broad 
range of buildings.  
 
Care must be taken when using a SQRA because the numbers chosen may not 
accurately reflect the relativities and this can lead to inconsistency (15). A 
Delphi panel evaluation, where a panel of experts assigns the ranking values, is 
commonly used to establish the basic structure of a SQRA analysis. The order 
of accuracy can be improved by enlarging the group of experts and this may 
have the effect of reducing inconsistencies. 
 
This project will use a SQRA to evaluate the level of risk for buildings 
designed to the NZ Building Code Approved Document for Fire Safety C/AS1. 




A quantitative risk analysis (QRA) (15), also known as a probabilistic risk 
analysis (PRA), is a comprehensive statistical probabilistic risk analysis which 
uses numerical values rather than descriptive scales to quantify risk.   A QRA 
is typically used where the risk problem is complex and there is considerable 
uncertainty or variability in the input parameters, which could lead to 
significant variations in the final risk value. QRA should be accompanied by a 
rigorous sensitivity or uncertainty analysis to thoroughly assess the risk. In fire 
engineering terms QRA is typically used alongside design calculations to 
resolve one or two technical issues for an individual building.  
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The methodology for undertaking a PRA is given in Section 5.6.1. The 
Reliability Index method described in Section 5.6.8 is also a quantitative risk 
analysis method. 
 
e) Risk Evaluation 
 
Risk evaluation (14) is the process of comparing the results of the risk analysis to the risk 
criteria. In this project the risk criteria are based on the objectives, functional requirements 




A hazard is any object or physical phenomenon that will cause harm to life or environmental 
or property damage. Therefore uncontrolled building fires are deemed hazardous. 
 
5.5 Measurements of Risk 
 
The measurement of risk and safety is somewhat dependant on the method of analysis being 
used, the accuracy of the input data available and the purpose or objective of the risk analysis. 
Five measurements of risk typically used in risk analysis are: 
 
• Individual Risk 
• Societal Risk 
• Relative Risk 








5.5.1 Individual Risk 
 
Individual risk is defined as the risk to or perceived by an individual from an unwanted, 
harmful event. In terms of fire engineering it is the risk that an occupant is exposed to at the 
location defined by the fire scenario (16).  
 
Individual risk is typically expressed as an annual probability of exposure to unwanted, 
harmful or potentially fatal events. It has been suggested (Wolski et al 2000)(17) that individual 
risk can be quantified by a probability defined as Expected Risk to Life (ERL) and that a 
mean ERL of 1x10-6 deaths per year is an “acceptable” design risk level. It should be noted 
that this is not a hard and fast number and Wolski et al (17) also suggest nine risk parameters 
that need to be considered when determining an “appropriate” ERL figure and have provided 
a matrix giving a range of acceptable individual risk of 1x10-9 to 1x10-3 depending on risk 
parameters considered.   
 
The nine risk parameters suggested by Wolski et al (17) to be considered are reproduced in 
Table 5.3 below: 
 
 
Risk factor Scale 
Volition Voluntary - Involuntary 
Severity Ordinary - Catastrophic 
Effect Manifestation Immediate - Delayed 
Familiarity Common(old) - Dread (new) 
Controllability Controllable - Uncontrollable 
Benefit Clear - Unclear  
Necessity Necessary - Luxury 
Exposure Pattern Continuous - Occasional 
Origin Natural – Man made 
 




The ERL (7) is given by the following formulae: 
 
ERL   =          Expected number of deaths                 . 
 Number of Occupants x Building Design Life 
 
Caution should be taken when applying any absolute figure to a risk analysis. It is highly 
unlikely that adequate or sufficiently accurate data exists for any risk analysis, in particular 
fire risk, which would enable fixing an absolute acceptable level of risk. 
 
5.5.2 Societal Risk 
 
Societal risk is defined as the overall risk to society in terms of frequency of event and 
number of people exposed. In terms of fire engineering it is the risk that many occupants are 
exposed to at the location defined by the fire scenario and is often expressed in the form of 
Frequency / Number curves (F-N Curves) where the frequency and number are plotted on log 









5.5.3 Relative Risk 
 
Relative risk is the difference in risk between two scenarios. It is quite common to use relative 
risk when undertaking risk assessments so that the result can have a quantifiable meaning. It 
is also common to express relative risk in units of absolute risk. 
 
The advantage of assessing relative risk is that assumptions can be applied equally to both 
scenarios where insufficient or inaccurate data is used thus still enabling a meaningful 
comparison to be made. In this case the analysis should clearly state all assumptions and 
highlight the fact that the results are not absolute values.  Sensitivity analyses should be 
carried out to check the impact of variations in the assumptions on the outcome of both 
scenarios. 
 
5.5.4 Absolute Risk 
 
Absolute risk is the absolute probabilistic value or measure of risk. The ERL given above is 
essentially given in terms of absolute risk, i.e. the risk of dying in an unwanted event is 
1.0x10-6 per year or one death per million persons per year. The difficulty in using absolute 
risk lies in accurately calculating the value given the large amount of uncertainty in risk 
analysis variables, particularly in fire engineering.  For simplicity for the design engineer the 
legislators and building code writers could specify an absolute level of risk that engineers can 
design to and an acceptable method of analysis that would enable the risk to be calculated. 
But given the large variance in the analysis parameters for fire engineering and nature of 




Scales are typically used for qualitative or semi-quantitative risk analysis. The scale is 
generally comprises assigned points, grades or a scoring system.  
 
The scale can be based around a letter grade, (e.g. A,B,C etc), or a numerical grade (e.g.1 to 5 
etc). Care should be taken when using the numerical system to ensure that the grading is 
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consistent with the level and accuracy of the analysis. The scale should not imply an absolute 
risk value (e.g. ERL) if this has not formed the basis of the analysis. 
 
A method for adjusting a scale to reflect actual risk is to use a weighting system (19). The 
component weightings then become the most important part of the risk analysis requiring the 
careful selection and sensitivity testing. 
 
The risk ranking scheme developed for this project comprises a weighted point scheme.  
 
 
5.6 Literature Review - Existing Risk Analysis Methods and Models  
 
 
5.6.1 Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
 
a) Introduction 
A probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) is a commonly used method to assess risk in engineering. 
The method is particularly suited to individual problems rather than assessing generic risk of a 
broad range of structures, although with careful use it can be used for both. The method is 
outlined in the International Fire Engineering Guidelines(IFEG)(7), and Magnusson et al(20), 
and has been used by a number of researchers, Hultquist and Karlsson(21), Enright (22) to name 
but a few.  
The following summary of the PRA method is broadly based on the above references put into 
a fire engineering context, but the general method is well detailed in numerous textbooks, 




The PRA method uses decision tree (event tree) analysis to assess a design fire scenario using 
probabilistic data. The probabilities used can be obtained directly from the literature or 
calculated using fault analysis and historic data. The analysis itself can be done using 
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probability distributions, in lieu of fixed probabilities, and a numerical sampling technique 
such as Monte Carlo analysis. 
 
The basic steps to the analysis are: 
 
i) Define the problem 
ii) Determine the probabilities or probability distributions for each fire scenario event 
(could use fault tree analysis). 
iii) Establish the event tree sequence/fire scenarios 
iv) Identify the branch outcomes/consequences for each fire scenario. 
v) Calculate the probabilities for each design fire scenario. 
vi) Calculated the expected risk.  
 
c) Determining Probabilities of Failure for Fire Safety Components 
 
A fault tree is a logic diagram that traces all the likely sources of fault/failure back to the root 
causes. A fault tree can be used to establish the probability of failure or inversely the 
reliability of a fire safety system or component of a system. Taking a sprinkler system for 
example, the reliability is generally given between 0.8 and 0.99 in the literature (24)(25)(26)(27). A 
fault tree may be used to narrow this down if accurate information is available on local 
systems. 
 















P[A∩B] = P[A] x P[B] P19
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Figure 5.2 - Fault Tree for a Sprinkler System 
 
 
d) Establishing the Event Tree for the Design Fire Scenarios 
 
An event tree traces forward all the possible outcome of an initiating event. In the case of fire 
the initiating event is typically ignition or established burning (self sustaining flame). An 
example event tree for a building fire scenario is shown in Figure 5.4 below: 
 
58 









OutCome Probability of Untenable Conditions
Yes No Untenable Conditions
P(SC)




No Untenable Conditions P(UTC2) = P(EB) . 1-P(SC) . P(SCV) . 1-P(FBF)
Yes 1-P(FBF) Room of Fire Origin
P(EB) No
1-P(SC)




No Untenable Conditions P(UTC4) = P(EB) . 1-P(SC) . 1-P(SCV) . 1-P(FBF)
1-P(FBF)
Ignition
No No Untenable Conditions
1-P(EB)
Probability of Untenable Conditions for Given Design Fire Scenario P(UTC) = P(UTC1) + P(UTC2) + P(UTC3) . P(UTC4)  
 
Figure 5.3 - Example Event Tree for a Design Fire Scenario 
 
 
A similar event tree and analysis is required for the evacuation scenario. The results from the 
design fire scenario and the evacuation analysis are then combined to determine the risk, 
“expected risk to life”. Note that the probabilities for time to untenable conditions and 
evacuation are time dependent and as such additional modelling of these two aspects to 
establish the time-dependant relationships is required. 
 
 
e) Expected Risk to Life 
 
As noted above the output from PRA is generally given as an expected risk to life (ERL) and 










Where: ELLB   =  Expected loss of life during the design life of the building. 
 OP       =  Number of occupants at the commencement of fire. 





This method is suitable for assessing specific building designs. It could only be applied to this 
project if the scope was narrowed so that reasonable assumptions could be made regarding 
building geometry, fire growth, occupant numbers and evacuation. The number of classes of 
buildings would also have to be reduced due to complexity of the analysis. Each building 
class could be assessed in future research work by this method as verification of the risk 




5.6.2 Boyes – Risk Ranking of Buildings for Life Safety 
 
Boyes 1997(28), proposed a method of risk ranking of buildings for life safety. The method 
was developed to assist the New Zealand Fire Service to assess the risk/safety of building by 
undertaking a walk through inspection and ranking elements of fire safety. 
 
The proposed method derives a risk score as follows: 
 
  X  =  Y x Z  
 
Where:    X  =  Risk Score 
Y  =  Probable Fire Severity 
    Z   =  Consequence Score 
 
The probable fire severity (Y) is a matrix where a point value is selected based on the 
probability of ignition (low, medium or high) and the likely fire growth (Low, medium, fast or 
ultra fast). The fire severity points range from 1 for low/low to 6 for high/ultra fast. 
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The consequence score comprises 21 components as shown in the Table 5.4 below. Each of 
the components is assigned point values that range from -4 to +4 depending on whether it has 
a positive or negative impact on life safety. Generally a negative impact on life safety has a 
positive score while a positive impact such as sprinkler protection has a reduction in the score, 
a negative score. 
 
The method proposed assesses the life safety based on the way the building is being used and 
managed rather and than the way the building has been designed and as such cannot readily 
be used for ranking various building designs. Therefore this method cannot be used in its 
current format for assessing building designs to the provisions of C/AS1 but does demonstrate 
that a risk ranking scheme can be developed customised to a particular task or purpose. 
 
Component  Sub-component 
Occupants a) Number 
 b) Age/mobility 
 c) Sleeping 
Building d) Number of stories 
 e) Alternative egress available 
 f) Confusing exits 
 g) Sufficient exits 
Fire & smoke spread h) Concealed spaces 
 i) Open shafts 
 j) Holes in penetrations 
Hazardous substances k) Present or not 
Management practices l) Obstructions in exitways 
 m) Wedges under doors 
 n) Evacuation procedures 
 o) Trial evacuation 
 q) Staff training 
Protection p) Sprinkler 
 r) Smoke alarms 
 s) Heat detectors 
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 t) Manual call points 
 u) Brigade (Fire Service) connections 
 
Table 5.4 - Boyes Method - Risk Analysis Components 
 
 
5.6.3 Fitzgerald – Building Fire Performance Analysis 
 
Fitzgerald (29) has detailed a methodology for assessing the fire performance of a building. 
The methodology is particularly useful as a tool for assessing and understanding the 
performance of existing buildings or a specific building design.  
 
The building fire performance analysis involves determining the growth rate of a fire (design 
fire scenario), the performance of fire safety features, and the response of the occupants and 
performance of the fire service on a probabilistic basis with respect to a time scale. An 
example of the sort of questions asked when performing the analysis is “ given a fire has 
established burning what is the probability that a smoke detector will detect the fire in 
1 minute, 2 minutes, 3 minutes…n minutes. The objective of the method is to build up an 
understanding of the performance by plotting performance curves, probability versus time, for 
the various fire safety features or events. 
 
The performance assessment method involves a three-step evaluation process as follows: 
 
Level 1  - Develops the basic understanding of the fire performance of a building and the 
risk characteristics. This is essentially a qualitative review of the building to 
identify key areas for a more rigorous analysis. This may involve a walk 
through assessment or a desktop study of the building plans to determine 
critical design fire scenarios and likely outcome. Nominal calculations may be 
undertaken to firm up choices. 
 
Level 2  - Focuses on detailed performance of the buildings behaviour. This is 
essentially a more in depth probabilistic risk analysis based on the results of 
the level 1 assessment. A level 2 assessment involves determining the 
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probability of fire development and spread, occupant’s responses; fire safety 
features responses and fire service responses on a time scale using single value 
network and continuous value network analysis.  
 
Level 3  - This is where the variance and uncertainty in the input data, scenario selection 
and assumptions are tested to quantify the impact on the results of the level 2 
analysis. 
 
The building fire performance analysis is based around developing response curves using 
single value network and continuous value network analysis. The method isolates each aspect 
of a complex fire scenario and determines the probability of success or failure with respect to 
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Figure 5.5 - Building Performance Risk Characterisations 
 
A performance curve is a graphical representation of the continuous value network 
calculations and a generic curve is shown below in Figure 5.6 to illustrate the output resulting 
from this approach to fire safety performance analysis. 
 
The result of the analysis is a number of performance curves which when read together build 
up a picture of the performance. The analysis method does not result in a single performance 
curve although occupant egress curve versus the tenability curve would give a good indication 
of safety.  
 
The method is not suitable in detail for assessing generic buildings as it is based around 





















Figure 5.6 - Example of a Building Performance Curve 
 
5.6.4 Gretner Method 
 
The Gretner method (30) was developed by Max Gretner of Switzerland in 1960. The basic 
concept of the method was to develop numerical values for risk factors for fire initiation; fire 
spread and fire protection in order to determine a single index value for the fire risk of a 
building.  
 
The Gretner method is summarised as follows from Watts (2002) (30): 
 
      R =  A x B 
 
Where:  R = Fire Risk 
















































Fire Size (Q) or Time (s) 
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B = Fire hazard, degree of danger or probable severity 
      =        P      . 
    N x S x F 
  
   P = Potential hazard 
   N = Standard fire safety measures  
   S = Special measures 
   F = Fire resistance of a building 
 
The method was also developed for assessing existing buildings but the underlying principles 
will be used in this project for developing a risk ranking scheme. 
 
5.6.5 Dow - Fire and Explosion Index 
 
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index (FEI) (30) was developed by the Dow Chemical Company 
in 1964 to identify areas of “significant potential loss” at its chemical manufacturing plants. 
The system comprises assessing the hazards, the likely area of impact and approximate value 
of any loss. The loss calculation also takes into account business interruption, including the 
cost of any shutdown, and credit for fire safety features. The calculation process has been 

















Figure 5.7 - Dow FEI Risk Assessment Process 
 
 
This method is based on property and business losses for industrial plant, in particular 
chemical factories and as such is not directly applicable to the life safety analysis of buildings. 
However it does provide a useful structure for risk ranking of hazards and demonstrates that it 
is possible to develop a risk ranking scheme for fire hazard analysis. 
 
Select process unit to be evaluated 
Determine material factor 
Determine special process 
hazard factor F2 
Determine general process 
hazard factor F1 
Determine process unit hazard factor 
F3 = F1 x F2 
Determine Fire & Explosion Index   
FEI = F3 x material factor 
Determine exposure area radius 
Radius = FEI x 0.84 (ft) 
Determine the base maximum 
probable property damage 
(MPPD) in area of exposure
Determine loss control credit factor 
LCCF = C1 x C2 x C3 
Determine actual maximum probable 
property damage   
MPDO = LCCF x MPPD 
Determine business interruption costs 
BI 
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5.6.6 NFPA 101A – Fire Safety Evaluation System 
 
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code Handbook (31) can be thought of as the USA equivalent of the 
New Zealand Building Code Acceptable Solution C/AS1(1) for fire safety. NFPA 101 - 
Chapter 5 presents guidelines for undertaking performance based design. These specifics are 
lacking from the NZ code but have been addressed recently in the new International Fire 
Engineering Guidelines 2005(7). 
 
NFPA 101A – Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety 2001 Edition (32) provides risk 
ranking schemes for determining whether or not a performance based design or an alternative 
design provides the equivalent level of safety as a similar building designed to comply with 
NFPA 101. The method is known as the Fire Safety Evaluations System (FSES) and is 
described in detail in Watts (30). The types of buildings covered by NFPA 101A are: 
 
 
a) Health Care occupancies (Hospitals). 
b) Correctional occupancies (Prisons and police stations). 
c) Board and care occupancies (Apartments, boarding houses, and hospices). 
d) Business occupancies. 
 
 
Apartments (purpose group SR), boarding houses/hospices (purpose group SA/SC) and 
Businesses (purpose groups WL and WM) are building types included in this project therefore 




The first step of the FSES procedure (based on the NFPA worksheet 8.6.1- business 
occupancies) requires an assessment of 12 key safety parameters as follows: 
 
1) Determine the type of construction (combustible and non-combustible and number of 




2) Assess segregation of hazards. Determine where hazardous materials are exposed to 
the exit system and the degree of deficiency of the structural system/protection system. 
Hazardous materials are those not typically found in the general occupancies, which 
may or may not be stored in or adjacent to exitways. For example where hazardous 
materials are stored under a non-fire rated timber stair then the ‘Segregation of hazard’ 
would be assessed as ‘exposed and double deficiency’ without sprinklers, or ‘exposed 
and single deficiency’ with sprinklers. The points assigned are -7 and -4 respectively. 
The points vary from 0 to -7 depending on the degree of exposure and the deficiency. 
 
3) Assess vertical openings (stairs, lift shafts, service ducts etc) to determine risk. The 
points are assigned depending on whether or not the shafts are enclosed with fire rated 
construction or open and the number of floors they pass through. The points assigned 
vary from -10 to +1. 
 
4) Determine the coverage and type of sprinklers. Points assigned vary from 0 for no 
sprinklers, to +12 for fast response sprinklers installed throughout the entire building. 
 
5) Determine whether or not the fire alarm has voice communication and/or fire service 
notification. Points are assigned vary from -2 for no alarm, to +4 with both fire service 
notification and voice communication. 
 
6) Assess extent of smoke detection, 0 for none, +1 for corridors, +2 for specific rooms 
and +4 for throughout total building. 
 
7) Assess interior surface finishes for flame spread ratings within exit routes and/or 
rooms. Points vary from -3 to +2 depending on spread of flame parameters and 
location. 
 
8) Assess the type of smoke control, 0 for none, +3 for passive and +4 for active. Note 
that not a lot of credit in the form of increased safety is given to active smoke control 
systems in FSES. However in New Zealand active smoke control is often used as a 
trade off against other fire safety features by specific fire engineering design.  
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9) Evaluate the exit access, escape route lengths. Points are assigned varying from -2 for 
33m of dead end to + 3 for less than 15m of total open path/dead end. 
 
10) Assess the egress route availability and protection. Points are assigned varying from -6 
for single means of escape to +5 for direct access to a safe place. 
 
11) Assess corridor protection/separation from adjoining occupied compartments. This 
assessment determines the level of fire/smoke separation and the presence of door 
closers. Points vary from -6 for incomplete protection to +3 for one hour fire rated 
construction. 
 
12) Evaluate the occupant emergency program, evacuation plan and number of fire drills. 
Points vary from -2 for no fire drills to +1 for more than 2 fire drills. 
 
The points from the above safety parameter assessment are then entered into NFPA101A 
Worksheet 8.6.3, Individual Safety Evaluation (32). They are assigned to S1-Fire Control, S2-
Egress Provided and/or S3-General Fire Safety as appropriate. The sum of the scores provides 
an S1, S2 and S3 points grade for the proposed building. The mandatory grades Sa, Sb and Sc 
for Fire Control, Egress Provided and General Fire Safety respectively are then deducted from 
S1 to S3. If the net sum is greater than 0 then the design has met the equivalency requirements 
and is deemed to comply with NFPA 101 i.e. 
 Fire Control   S1 – Sa ≥ 0   equivalency achieved 
 Egress Provided  S2 – Sb ≥ 0   equivalency achieved 
 General Fire Safety  S3 – Sc ≥ 0   equivalency achieved 
 
The required grades are shown in Table 5.5 below reproduced from NFPA101A Worksheet 











New Existing New Existing New Existing 
1 Storey 0.5 -1.0 1.5 0.0 2.0 -1.0 
2 Storeys -2.5 -4.0 1.5 0.0 -1.0 -4.0 
3 Storeys 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.0 3.0 0.0 
>3 Storeys and ≤ 
23m 
4.0 2.0 2.5 0.0 6.0 2.0 
> 23m but < 46m 9.5 7.5 7.5 5.0 10.0 6.0 
≥ 46m 12.5 10.5 7.5 5.0 10.0 9.0 
 
Table 5.5 - Mandatory Fire Safety Requirement FSES Scores for Business Occupancies 
 
 
The final step in the equivalency process is to assess the facility fire safety requirements, 
NFPA101A Worksheet 8.6.6. This requires a simple yes/no evaluation of the following: 
 
A. Building utilities, lighting, power etc. 
B. Ventilation 
C. Elevators 
D. Rubbish and laundry chutes and incinerator. 
E. Portable fire extinguishers 
F. Standpipes 
 
If all of the above meet their respective code requirements and the individual fire safety 
evaluations exceed the required value the building is certified as being equivalent to a 
building design to the requirements of the NFPA101 Life Safety Code. 
 
The method and safety parameters are similar for other types of occupancies. For example in 
residential occupancies there are some additional parameters to be considered such as 
separation of sleeping rooms from each other or other types of occupancies. There are also 
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four safety evaluation categories for the safety parameters to be assigned to; S1-Fire Control, 
S2-Egress, S3 - Refuge and/or S4-General Fire Safety with four matching acceptance criteria. 
 
This is very similar in structure to the risk ranking scheme developed by Boyes (28) (Section 
5.6.2 above). The main difference is that Boyes is specifically designed to rank existing 
buildings and takes into consideration building maintenance and management issues that 
effect fire safety. 
 
Two other risk ranking schemes have been developed in the United States. These are to 
evaluate fire safety in historic buildings, Watts and Kaplan (33) and rehabilitation and reuse of 
existing buildings in Manitoba for residential, business and personal service use, Richardson 
and Frye (34). Both of these two fire risks indices have been developed based on, and as such 
are similar to, the NFPA 101 - FSES method outlined above. 
 
 
5.6.7 Fire Risk Index Method – Multi-storey Apartment Buildings 
 
A significant amount of work has been carried out at Lund University in Sweden on fire risk 
analysis. The work by Karlsson and Larsson (35), involving development of a fire risk index 
method for multi-storey apartment buildings (FRIM-MAB) by use of a Delphi panel, and 
Karlsson and Hultquist (21) involving testing the results of a fire risk index method on a 
sample of buildings using probabilistic risk analysis procedures are particularly relevant to 
this project. 
 
A Delphi panel comprising 20 professional fire experts, 5 each from the four Nordic 
countries; Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark developed the fire risk index method. The 
work was first published in 2000. 
 
The risk index method was developed for multistorey apartment buildings to provide a quick 
and reliable method for assessing risk. The method outlined in Karlsson and Larsson (35), 
appears to give reasonable answers (21), however the review was only based one comparative 
analysis using a full probabilistic risk analysis and further analysis and sensitivity testing is 
suggested. Further work on development of the risk index method beyond 2000 could not be 
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found, however this does not mean to say that work on this risk index method has not been 
carried out since. 
 
The index method is useful in that it provides a single safety value. This value is a number 
between 1 and 5. 
 
The basic structure used by the Delphi group to determine the risk index method is shown 
detailed below based on Karlsson and Larsson (35): 
 
1. Develop Policy • Fire safety performance should be equivalent 




2. Define Objectives • Provide life safety 
• Provide property protection 
 
3. Develop Strategies • Establish safe egress 
• Control fire growth/spread 
 




• Fire protection 
• Occupant 
 
5. Assign Grades • Assign grades from 0 -5 reflecting the safety 
standard of a given parameter. 
• Sub-parameters are typically assigned a 
grade, N - No grade, L - Low, M – Medium 
and H – High.  
 




The key elements to the FRIM -MAB are the parameters and the assigned weightings. These 
are listed in Table 5.6 below for FRIM-MAB version 1.2. 
 
No. Parameter (Pn) Sub Parameters Weight 
(Wn) 
P1 Linings in Apartments - 0.0576 
P2 Suppression System • Automatic sprinkler system 
• Portable equipment 
0.0668 
P3 Fire Service 
Grade = 0.31P3a+0.47P3b+0.22P3c 
• Capability (P3a) 
• Response time (P3b) 
• Accessibility and equipment 
(P3c) 
0.0681 
P4 Compartmentation - 0.0666 
P5 Structure Separating 
P5 = 0.35P5a+0.28P5b+0.24P5c+0.13P5d 
 
• Integrity and insulation (P5a) 
• Structure and firestop Design 
(P5b) 
• Penetrations (P5c) 
• Combustibility (P5d) 
0.0675 
P6 Doors 
P6 = 0.67P6a+0.33P6b 
• Doors leading to escape route 
(P6a) 
• Doors in escape route (P6b) 
0.0698 
P7 Windows • Relative vertical distance 
• Class of window 
0.0473 
P8 Facades 
P8 = 0.41P8a+0.30P8b+0.29P8c 
• Combustible part of facade 
(P8a) 
• Combustible material above 
window (P8b) 
• Void (P8c) 
0.0492 
P9 Attic • Prevent fire spread to attic 
• Fire separation in attic 
0.0515 
P10 Adjacent Buildings - 0.0396 
P11 Smoke Control system • Activation of smoke control 
• Type of smoke control 
0.0609 
P12 Detection • Amount of detectors 
• Reliability of detectors 
0.0630 
P13 Signal System • Type of signal 
• Location of signal 
0.0512 
P14 Escape Routes 
P14 = 0.34P14a+0.27P14b+0.16P14c+0.23P14d 
 
• Type of escape route (P14a) 
• Dimensions and layout (P14b) 
• Equipment(P14c) 
• Linings and flooring (P14d) 
0.0620 
P15 Structure Load Bearing 
P15 = 0.74P15a+0.26P15b 
• Load-bearing capacity (P15a) 
• Combustibility (P15b) 
0.0630 
P16 Maintenance and Information 
P16 = 0.40P16a+0.27P16b+0.33P16c 
• Maintenance of fire systems 
(P16a) 
• Inspection of escape routes 
(P17b) 
• Information to occupants (P17c) 
0.0601 
P17 Ventilation System - 0.0558 
  ∑ 1.0000 
Table 5.6 - FRIM-MAB Version 1.2- Fire Safety Parameter 
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The parameter or sub-parameter is assessed and given a grading between 0, unfavourable and 
5, favourable. The parameter grades are then multiplied by the weighting and summed to give 
a score out of 5. The score is then deducted from 5 to give the risk index, i.e. the risk index is 
given by: 
 
Risk Index  RI  =  5 - ∑(Pi x Wn) 
 
Where: Pi = Safety parameter 
    Wn =  Safety parameter weighting 
 
The lower the risk index the safer the building. 
 
The risk index is based on an assessment of life safety, property protection and a variety of 
fire safety strategies. Hultquist and Karlsson (21), determine revised weighting based on 
assessing those aspects which have a bearing on life safety (the ability for occupants to 
escape) so that a comparison could be made to a probabilistic risk analysis. The revised 











P1 Linings in 
Apartments 
0.0623 P10 Adjacent Buildings 0.0242 
P2 Suppression System 0.0658 P11 Smoke Control system 0.0701 
P3 Fire Service 0.0571 P12 Detection 0.0814 
P4 Compartmentation 0.0623 P13 Signal System 0.0762 
P5 Structure Separating 0.0588 P14 Escape Routes 0.0839 
P6 Doors 0.0718 P15 Structure Load Bearing 0.0463 
P7 Windows 0.0407 P16 Maintenance and 
Information 
0.0692 
P8 Facades 0.0363 P17 Ventilation System 0.0614 
P9 Attic 0.0320    
 
Table 5.7 - FRIM-MAB Fire Safety Weightings for Occupant Egress 
 
 
By inspection the maximum difference in weighting is approximately a factor of three. The 
weighting of the suppression system is surprisingly lower than could be expected given the 
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effectiveness a sprinkler system has in controlling and/or extinguishing fires. Refer Section 
7.4.3 for further discussion on the effectiveness of sprinkler systems.  
 
The FRIM-MAB method was developed for multi-storey timber framed buildings. There is a 
practical structural limit that the height of a timber framed building can be built. In NZ this is 
typically 4 storeys unless a steel structure is used. The sample buildings assessed in Hultquist 
and Karlsson (21), were 4 stories, and therefore it is inferred the method is suitable for low rise 
timber framed buildings up to 4 storeys.  The limitations of the method are not clearly 
specified but it is reasonable to assume from the reports (21)(35) that the intended use is for low 
rise apartment buildings.   
 
Extrapolating the scheme to larger, more complex building with different occupancies would 
require a careful review of the weightings and points systems, but by inspection the method 
could be adapted and used for such an analysis. 
 
5.6.8 Reliability Index Method 
 
The reliability index method (β Method) has been detailed by a number of authors over the 
past 35 years and has been the subject of research by various fire safety researchers in recent 
years, in particular the researchers based at Lund University in Sweden. The basic 
fundamentals of the method with respect to fire safety are summarised below based on the 
work by Frantzich(1997) (18), Frantzich (1997) (36), Kristiansson (1997) (37) and Frantzich et al 
(1997) (38). For a more comprehensive description the reader is also referred to the following 
well known texts, Ang and Tang (23) and Thoft-Christensen and Baker (39). 
 
a) Limit State Equations 
 
The reliability index method requires the derivation of limit state equations. In the case of fire 
these are typically based on the escape time margin, i.e. the available safe egress time (ASET) 
minus the required safe egress time (RSET) as follows: 
 
G = S – R 
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Where:  G = Escape time margin 
  S = Available safe egress time (ASET), “time to untenable conditions” 
  R = Required safe egress time (RSET), “response & evacuation time” 
 
The exact form of the limit state equation will depend on the design fire scenario that is being 
evaluated. The limit state equations for a generic room may take the form below: 
 
G = S . MS – R . MR 
Where: 
  S = f [fire growth rate (α), room area (A), room height (H)] 
  MS = Fire model uncertainty  
  R = f [ detection time  (D), response time (RT), evacuation time (E)] 
  MR = Evacuation model uncertainty 
 
The equation for time to untenable condition (S) can be derived by using computer fire model 
programs such as CFAST (40) or BRANZFIRE (41) and a regression analysis in a standard 
computer spreadsheet package such as Excel (42). The equation for the response and 
evacuation time (R) can be derived in a similar manner using computer evacuation programs, 
detector activation programs and/or hand calculation methods. Example equations for time to 
untenable conditions (S) and response and evacuation time (R) are shown below adapted from 
Frantzich et al 1997(38): 
 
 
  S = 1.67 α -0.26 H 0.44 A0.54   (Minutes) 
 R = D+RT+E     (Minutes) 
Where:  
D =Detection Time (in this case based on smoke detection) 
    = 5.36 α -0.478 H 0.7      (Minutes) 
RT = Occupant Response Time   (Minutes) 
E = Escape Time    (Minutes) 
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    = N . A 
               W . F 
  α = t2 fire growth rate  (MJ/s2) 
  H = Height of room   (m) 
  A = Area of room (m2) 
  N = occupancy rate (persons/m2) 
  W = door width (m) 
  F = Specific flow of persons through door opening. (person/min/m2) 
 
Therefore the limit state equation for the safety margin would be given by: 
 
  G = S . MS – R . MR          (Minutes) 












⎛++  −     = −0.540.440.26− RT MFW
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The variables in the above equation can be either deterministic or probabilistic in the 
reliability calculations. Caution must be used if using non-normally distributed variables, as 
some form of transformation to normally distributed variables is typically required and 
therefore the result, at best, is an approximation. This is likely to add another source of 
uncertainty to the analysis. 
 
b)  Reliability Index (β) Calculation 
 
The reliability index (β), in its simplest form, based on work by Cornell, 1969(Ang and 
Tang)(23), can be calculated as follows where S and R are normally distributed independent 
variables with a mean (μ) and a standard deviation (σ) resulting in a normally distributed 
safety margin G: 
 





RSG σσσ +=  
 





β =  
 
The probability of failure (Pf) is given by: 
 
( )β−Φ=≤= )0( GPP f  
 
where:  Φ = Standardised normal distribution function 
 
Hassofer and Lind’s (Ang and Tang)(23) improved reliability index involves standardising the 















for variables S and R respectively. 
 
The reliability index (β) is then defined as the shortest distance from the origin to the limit 
state failure surface in the standardised space, and is shown in Figure 5.8 below for a linear 






Figure 5.8 – Reliability Index β in the Two Dimensional Space 
(Adapted from Kristiansson, 1997 (37)) 
 
Where a number of non-linear variables are involved then the failure surface becomes a 
curved hypersurface and solving for β becomes somewhat more complicated. Exact solutions 
to these equations are not possible and as such the solution generally required an iterative 
approach. These are commonly referred to as First Order Second Moment (FOSM) or Second 
Order Second Moment (SOSM) analyses. The reader is referred to Ang and Tang (23) and 
Thoft-Christensen and Baker (39) for a detailed description of these methods. There are a 
number of computer programs, originating out of structural reliability analysis, which can 
perform the calculations, for example STRUREL (RCP Munchen 1995) (43). The capability of 
this program has not been specifically assessed in this research project. 
 
The β method is akin to a full quantitative risk analysis (QRA), requiring the same input data 
and level of analysis. The only difference is that the basic output is the probability of failure 
of the safety margin and resulting safety index instead of the expected risk to life. As such it 
also attracts the same level of uncertainty and hence requires a rigorous uncertainty analysis 
to verify and provide confidence in the results.  
 
Safe State G>0 
Failure State G<0 





Failure State G<0 




a) Linear Failure Surface b) Non-linear Failure Surface 
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This study involves assessing a large number of building heights, occupancy types and 
occupant number combinations, approximately 90 in total. Although the reliability index 
method was used to establish partial coefficients for classes of buildings (38) the analysis 
required some rather broad and simplifying assumptions, for example, that people are safe 
when evacuated from the fire floor, hence the building as a whole entity was not assessed.  
 
The key feature of the β method requires assessment of ASET and RSET and as such building 
geometry, occupant densities and design fires need to be established. Furthermore in NZ 
protected and safe paths generally have a definitive fire resistance rating and therefore form a 
part of a building, which could be subject to failure in the event of a fire. A person in NZ is 
not deemed safe until they have exited the building. In all the studies referenced in this section 
a person appears to be deemed safe when reaching a protected shaft. Given this, to assess the 
safety of buildings designed in New Zealand we need to consider the entire building and not 
just the fire cell or floor of fire origin.  
 
A study of the level of safety using a QRA yielding either a reliability index or an expected 
risk to life output could be undertaken in the future by investigating specific occupancies 
individually or a selection of real buildings designed to the Approved Document. 
 
 
5.6.9 Fire Risk Computer Models 
 
A number of fire risk computer models have been developed for assessing the risk to life in 
building fires. These have not been used or evaluated in detail in this project but are briefly 
described below for reference. 
 
a) FiRECAM ™ 
 
FiRECAM™ has been developed by the National Research Council of Canada (NRCC). 
Information is available on this model from the NRCC website www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca including 
a downloadable trial version.  
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FiRECAM (Fire Risk, Evaluation and Cost Assessment Model) can be used to assess the 
expected risk to life and fire costs of fire safety designs for apartment and office buildings.  
The model is based on determining the level of safety that meets the requirements of the 
National Building Code of Canada (44). 
 
The program is made up of 17 sub-models, three for example are: 
 
 
• Boundary Element Failure Model (BEFM) 
 
Computes probabilities of failure of a wall or floor 
element. 
 
• Design Fire Model (DFMD) Computes the rates of fire occurrences, and the 
probabilities of the fire types being flashover, non-
flashover, flaming fire or smouldering fire 
 
• Fire Growth Model (FGMD) Models the growth of a fire in a compartment and 
calculates temperature and toxic gas concentrations 
as a function of time. 
  
 
The model output is generally in the form of tabulated data, graphs or a 3D model of the 





FIERASystem has also been developed by the National Research Council of Canada (NRCC). 
Information is also available on this model from the NRCC website www.nrc-cnrc.gc.ca.  
 
FIERASystem (Fire Evaluation and Risk Assessment System) is similar to FIRECAM™ and 
can be used to assess the expected risk to life and fire costs of fire safety designs for light 





FIRE-Risk, (formerly CESARE Risk) has been developed by the Centre for Environmental 
Safety and Risk Engineering, Victoria University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia.  The 
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program is a fire risk/cost assessment model based on design compliance with the “Deemed to 
Satisfy” provisions of the Building Code of Australia. Note the “Deemed to Satisfy” 
provisions are the Australian equivalent to the Acceptable Solution C/AS1 in New Zealand. 
 
The program is similar to FiRECAM™ in that it is made up of a number of subroutines. The 
basic components of the FIRE-RISK model are given as follows (46): 
 
• Time Dependant Part (TDP)  − fire and smoke spread  
− effect of fire and smoke spread on fire safety system 
− effect of fire and smoke spread on occupants 
− occupant response 
− fire brigade intervention 
 
• Non-time Dependant Part (TDP)
  
− Possible spread of fire beyond room of origin 
− Possible injuries and fatalities outside room of origin 
− Possible damage outside room of origin 
 
• Economic Model   
 
 
The program is applicable to apartment buildings, hotel and motel buildings and aged care 
facilities. 
 
There is very little published information on this program available in the public domain. 
Therefore a detailed review of the programs capabilities has not been undertaken. The reader 
should contact the Centre for Environmental Safety and Risk Engineering, Victoria University 
of Technology, Melbourne, Australia for further information if desired.  
 
d) CRISP II 
 
CRISP II has been developed by the Building Research Establishment (BRE) in the UK(59).  
The program is an egress/evacuation risk assessment model utilising a Monte-Carlo analysis. 
The program can be run in a fire scenario mode where it calculates all parameters associated 
with the development of a fire, i.e. growth, fire and smoke spread etc, as wells as human 
response and evacuation. The program can also be run in an evacuation mode only as an 
egress model.  
 
83 
There is very little information available in the public domain on this program, therefore this 
program was not assessed further. The reader should contact the BRE at www.BRE.co.uk for 




There are many methods available for assessing fire safety, and not all are suitable for a 
“generic” type evaluation of a building code. Some are more suited to actual buildings or 
specific building designs such as PRA and reliability index method. The literature does 
suggest that these two methods in particular, could be used for evaluating safety requirements 
of “generic” building code categories but, this would entail a significant amount of analysis 
and many years of research. The analysis would still need to be based on trial building 
geometry, fuel load and occupant behaviour models, which could introduce a significant 
amount of uncertainty into the analysis.  PRA computer programs would enable rapid 
assessment of multiple building categories, sizes and occupant numbers, but current models 
are limited in their capabilities at this time.  
 
This project will seek to develop a simple points based risk ranking system and use this 
system to evaluate the apparent level of safety of buildings designed to the New Zealand 
Building Code Approved Document for Fire Safety, C/AS1. 
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The model proposed in this section will be used to assess the level of fire safety of buildings 
designed to the NZBC “Acceptable Solutions” C/AS1.  
 
The model is a simple risk ranking model that produces a single numerical safety index. This 
will enable comparison between buildings of different heights and occupancy types. The 
method proposed is similar to FRIM-MAB(35) as described in Section 5.6.7 above but tailored 
to the safety attributes of C/AS1.  
 
The model will be based on the specific fire safety requirements of C/AS1 and detailed using 
the nomenclature of this document. 
 
6.2 Risk Ranking Model Outline 
 
Risk is typically defined as a function of likelihood and consequences. In the case of fire the 
likelihood relates to the probability that a number of events will happen, including fire 
ignition, fire growth, fire and smoke spread and presence and movement of occupants. 
Consequence relates to the outcome of the fire event, i.e. the extent of damage and whether or 
not occupants escape safely or succumb to injury or fatality. 
 
Neither probability nor consequence will be assessed directly in this model. This model is 
simply a method for ranking a building’s fire safety based on the building use; fire hazard and 
fire safety precautions (FSP) installed as defined by C/AS1.  
 
The ranking scheme shall involve assigning a score between 0 and 5 to each of the C/AS1 
safety or risk parameters. The score is then multiplied by a weighting to give a weighted 
score. The sum of the weighted score for the building/use parameters gives a Building/Use 
Score (BUS), and likewise the sum of the weighted score for the fire safety features 
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parameters gives a Fire Safety Features Score (FSFS). The sum of the BUS and FSFS gives 













ASCs WiAFSFS 1/  
 
FSFSBUSFSI +=  
 
Where: BUS   = Building/Use Score 
FSFS    = Fire Safety Feature Score 
FSI  = Fire Safety Index 
   As  = Individual Parameter Score 
   Wi C/AS1     = Individual Parameter Weighting (sum to 1.0) 
 
The higher the score infers the safer the building. 
 
The following parameters shall be assessed in the Building/Use Score element of this model: 
 
 
BU1)  Purpose Group   
 
BU2)  Building Escape Height  
 
BU3)  Occupant Numbers  
 






The following safety parameters shall be assessed in the Fire Safety Features Score element of 
this model: 
 
A)  Fire Barriers  - Firecell Rating 
    - Structural Fire Endurance Rating 
 
B)  Fire Alarm  
 
C)  Smoke Control - Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning Control 
    - Extraction 
    - Pressurisation of Stairways 
 
D)  Building Fire control - Sprinkler Systems 
    - Water Supply 
    - Occupant Fire Fighting 
 
E)  Emergency Power Supply   
 
F)  Communications System 
 
G)  Fire Service  - Alerting of Fire Service 
    - Lift Control 
    - Fire Fighting Access 
 
H)  Means of Escape - Number of Escape Routes 
    - Width of Escape Routes 
    - Emergency Lighting 
    - Refuge Areas 
    - Dead End Open Paths 
    - Total Open Paths 
    -  Protected Paths Lengths 
    - Surface Finishes Exitways 
    - Surface Finishes Occupied Spaces 





6.3 Model Parameter Point Assignments 
 
The parameter points are assigned on a scale of 0-5 based on numerical data where available, 
calculations or qualitatively based on subjective judgment where no hard data exists. 
Therefore in some cases the parameters are simply placed in likely order of increased safety 
within the scale boundaries. Questionable rankings will be checked by sensitivity tests but in 
reality further independent research is likely to be required to verify and /or refine the model. 
The scale of 0-5 was selected based on the FRIM-MAB(35) model to enable future model 
comparisons if appropriate. 
 
6.3.1 Building/Use Parameters 
 
BU1) Purpose Groups 
 
The term “Purpose Group” covers the occupant type in a building and the activities they may 
be undertaking. This is an important parameter in a safety/risk analysis as the type of person 
and their activities will affect how they respond to fire cues and/or alarm and the length of 
time it takes for the person to escape the building. Therefore this parameter essentially 
assesses the human behaviour aspect of fire safety.  The four key elements under 
consideration are: 
 
• Alertness – awake or asleep, noisy environment or quiet?  
 
• Familiarity  – regular user, resident or casual visitor of the building? 
 
• Capabilities  – Physical (How fast can they walk, do they need assistance?)  
  – Psychological (Will they think clearly or be confused?) 
 





For this project it is assumed that we are assessing the safety of an average person who is 
fully ambulant, is capable of looking after themselves and following authoritative instructions 
if necessary. It is assumed that variance in individual capabilities is accounted for in the 
C/AS1 Purpose Group categories, e.g. children will be under the guidance of an adult and 
disabled persons will have access to appropriate facilities or assistance in the event of a fire 
emergency. Therefore variance in individual capabilities will not be specifically assessed. 
 
A simple independent ranking scheme based on a scale of 0 to 2 was derived by judgment to 
assess alertness, familiarity and occupant density of each purpose group to determine the 
points scored for each purpose group type. Alertness is considered the most important of the 
three factors and as such was weighted by a factor of 3. This was done to account for the fact 
that sleeping persons could take considerably longer to respond to an alarm than a person who 
is awake and/or familiar with a building. The results are shown in Table 6.1 below: 
 
 
Purpose Group Alertness (x3) Familiarity (x1) Occupant Density (x1) 
















Noisy 1.5 4.5 
Unfamiliar & 
Familiar 1 High 0 5.5 3.1 
Working 
WL/WM Awake 2 6 Familiar 2 Medium 1 9 5.0 
Note: The crowd alertness has been reduced by 0.5 points to account for the fact that crowd environments can be noisy. 
 











A similar scoring method was proposed by Sime (49) for deriving efficiency scores for 
determining pre-movement times for various occupancy types. The method is more 
comprehensive than the method used above and includes eight factors as follows: 
B. Alertness  - awake or asleep  
(1 = asleep, 5 = fully alert). 
C. Mobility  - disabilities  
   (1 = low mobility, 5 = high mobility). 
D. Social Affiliation - alone or in a group (e.g. family)  
   (1 = group, 5 = alone). 
E. Role  - ratio of public to staff  
  (1 = public, 5 = staff). 
F. Position  - lying, sitting, standing or moving 
   (1 = lying, 5 = moving). 
G. Commitment - to what degree are people committed to finishing a task 
  (1 = high, 5 = low). 
H. Focal point - are all people focusing there attention on one point 
  (1 = none, 5 = focused). 
I. Familiarity - how familiar are people to the building 
  (1 = unfamiliar, 5 = familiar). 
 
The points are attributed on a scale of 1 to 5. There are no independent weightings so each 
item is weighted the same. Efficiency ratings for the purpose groups under consideration in 
this study were assessed as shown in Table 6.2 below for comparison to the Table 6.1: 
 
Purpose 
Group B C D E F G H I Average 
SA 1 3 1 1 1 4 1 1 1.6 
SR 1 3 5 3 1 4 1 5 2.9 
CS/CL 4 3 3 1 2 4 4 3 3.0 
CM 4 3 3 1 5 2 4 3 3.1 
WL/WM 5 3 5 5 3 3 3 5 4.0 
 
Table 6.2 – Premovement Efficiency Ratings Based on Sime (49) 
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From Table 6.2 the Sime method give the same ranking order as the ranking scheme shown in 
Table 6.1, however the point differential is not as wide with the score ranging from 1.6 to 4.0. 
(Table 6.2), as compared to 1.1 to 5.0 (Table 6.1). Either ranking could be used in this model 
however as some of Sime’s attributes are not applicable to the sleeping purpose groups, e.g. 
Role (E), the attributes scores will be derived based on Table 6.1.  
 
Given the above the attribute scores are shown in Table 6.3 below: 
 
BU1 – Purpose Group 






Table 6.3 – Purpose Group Attribute Scores 
 
 
BU2) Building Escape Height 
 
The points will be assigned in linear manner as shown in Table 6.4 below: 
 
BU2 – Building Escape Height 
Escape Height As 
Over 58m 0 
46m < He ≤ 58m 1 
34m < He ≤ 46m 2 
25m < He ≤ 34m 3 
10m < He ≤ 25m 4 
4m < He ≤ 10m 5 
 





BU3) Occupant Numbers 
 
The points will be assigned in linear manner as shown in Table 6.5 below: 
 
BU3 – Occupant Numbers 
Occupant Numbers As 
Over 1000 1 
501 < Occ. No. ≤ 1000 2 
101 < Occ. No. ≤ 500 3 
51 < Occ. No. ≤ 100 4 
Occ. No. ≤ 50 5 
 
Table 6.5 – Occupant Number Attribute Scores 
 
 
BU4) Fire Hazard Category 
 
The Fire Hazard Category (FHC) is a numerical grading from 1 to 4 as noted in Section 4.2.1. 
C/AS1 defines each category by a Fire Load Energy Density (FLED) which varies linearly 
between 0 and 1500 MJ/m2 for FHC 1 to 3 respectively and FHC 4 for FLED over 
1500MJ/m2. Therefore the points will be assigned in a linear manner as shown in Table 6.6 
below: 
 







Table 6.6- Fire Hazard Category Attribute Scores 
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6.3.2 Fire Safety Features Parameters 
 
A) Fire Barriers 
 
A1 – Firecell Rating 
 
The Firecell (F) rating is the minimum time that is assigned to fire barriers and structural 
elements in order to prevent internal spread of fire between firecells/compartments. Typically 
escape routes (Stairs) and each floor of most multistorey buildings are designed as separate 
firecells. Beams, columns floors, walls, and partitions are given a Fire Resistance Rating 
(FRR) based on the worst combination of the F rating and the structural endurance (S) rating 
discussed below in A2. The F rating is intended to provide sufficient time for the occupants to 
evacuate and the Fire Service to undertake rescue operations before the fire spreads beyond 
the room of origin.  
 
The attribute scores for the F ratings are assigned as shown in Table 6.7 below: 
 
A1 – Firecell Rating 
F Rating (Minutes) As 







Table 6.7– Firecell Rating Attribute Scores 
 
 
Note that the FRR’s are based on fire tests to a standard curve, AS 1530:1997, Part 4 (12), is 
typically used in New Zealand. Also note that the F rating is not related to the time a real fire 
would take to spread through a building but is the actual time a particular product or wall 
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assembly meets the requirements of the standard fire test. Notwithstanding this, the Firecell 
rating can be ranked to provide an indicative measure of safety to account for fire spread.  
 
A2 – Structural Fire Endurance Rating 
 
The Structural Fire Endurance (S) rating is the minimum time that is assigned to structural 
elements in order to prevent spread of fire or collapse damage to other property. Beams, 
columns, floors, and load bearing walls are given a fire resistance rating (FRR) based on the 
worst combination of the F rating and the structural S rating. 
 
The S rating is intended to provide sufficient time for the fire to burn out or be brought under 
control without it spreading to adjoining property. It is a function of the fire hazard category, 
floor area and area of horizontal and vertical ventilation openings. From Table 5.1 C/AS1 the 
structural fire endurance rating is in the range of 30-240 minutes which equates to 1 to 4 times 
the F rating range (30-60minutes). Therefore a structural fire endurance rating of twice the F 
rating shall be used in this project. 
 
The attribute scores for the S ratings are assigned as shown in Table 6.8 below: 
 
A2 – Structural Fire Endurance Rating 
S Rating (Minutes) As 







Table 6.8– Structural Fire Endurance Rating Attribute Scores 
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B) Fire Alarm 
 
The type of fire alarm has a significant impact on the amount of time it takes to alert the 
occupants to a fire. There are several types of alarm that are specified in C/AS1 depending on 
the building’s requirements. These are: 
 
No alarm – Permitted for CS, CM, WL and WM purpose groups where the occupant 
numbers using a escape route are less than 50 and the buildings is maximum two storeys 
high.  
 
Manual alarm (Type 2) – Minimum requirement for CS, CM, WL and WM purpose 
groups where the occupant numbers in a firecell are less than 100 and the buildings is 
maximum two storeys high.  
 
Automatic alarm / heat detectors (Type 3) – Minimum requirement for CS, CM, WL 
and WM purpose groups where the occupant numbers in a firecell are less than 500 and 
the buildings is maximum three storeys or 10m high.  
 
Automatic alarm / heat detectors & local smoke detectors (Type 5) – Minimum 
requirement for SA and SR purpose groups to minimise false alarms from within an 
individual residential or apartment unit. The heat detectors provide full coverage with 
the alarm connected to all apartments while the smoke detectors provide early detection 
and warning in the room of fire origin. 
 
Automatic alarm / smoke detectors (Type 4) – Required for all occupancy types for 
tall/large buildings and large occupant numbers. Also generally required in all 
residential and hotel type buildings.  
 
The simplest way to rank these is in the order of warning speed and common sense suggests 
that this is as follows: 
 
1. No alarm 
2. Type 2 - Manual alarm 
3. Type 3 - Automatic alarm with heat detectors 
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4. Type 5 - Automatic alarm with heat detectors and local smoke detectors. 
5. Type 4 - Automatic alarm with smoke detectors 
 
No alarm – This is the worst case situation. The alarm is only raised if a person within or 
external to the building senses the fire cues, personally notifies the occupants and calls the 
Fire Service on a telephone. A fire may well have taken hold before it is noticed depending on 
the alertness of the occupants and as such occupants may get trapped. For the purposes of this 
project we will assume that the alarm time is not less than 20 minutes. Therefore it is 
reasonable that no points are scored for having no alarm. 
 
Manual alarm (Type 2) – This is only marginally better than having no alarm. The alarm is 
still only raised if a person within or external to the building senses the fire cues and can reach 
and activate a manual call point. The person not having to personally notify the occupants 
saves time, but the Fire Service may still need to be called on a telephone. A fire may well 
have taken hold before it is noticed depending on the alertness of the occupants and as such 
occupants may still get trapped. For the purposes of this project we will assume that the alarm 
time is not less than 10 minutes.  
 
Automatic alarm / heat detectors (Type 3) – This provides a considerable reduction in alarm 
time where a fire is not immediately noticed by an occupant and the alarm raised manually. 
Heat detectors generally detect a developing fire and the alarm is activated within 2 to 5 
minutes of the start of a fire (53).  
 
Automatic alarm / heat detectors & local smoke detectors (Type 5) – This provides the most 
rapid warning in the room of origin, typically within 1 to 3 minutes and approximately 2-
5minutes in rooms outside the room of fire origin (53). 
 
Automatic alarm / smoke detectors (Type 4) – This is the most rapid detection and warning 
system. Again the alarm is likely to sound with 1 to 3 minutes of start of the fire. We shall 
assume a detection time of 60 seconds for the purpose of this analysis. This alarm system 
shall score the maximum 5 points. 
 
The relative safety between these alarm types can be measured in several ways. Firstly we can 
look strictly at the time of activation. Alternatively we can look at the total evacuation time 
96 
from the room of fire origin/firecell, as these are the occupants most at risk in the early stages 
of a fire. The third method is to look at the impact on the time to evacuate an entire building.  
To illustrate this example let us assume that it takes 3 minutes to evacuate the fire floor and 
15 minutes to evacuate the building (including pre-movement time). Then the escape time 



















‘  Min. Time 
Time 
No alarm 20 0.05 23 0.17 35 0.46 
Type 2 Alarm - Manual Alarm 10 0.10 13 0.31 25 0.64 
Type 3 Alarm  - Auto Alarm with 
Heat Detectors 
3.5 0.28 6.5 0.62 18.5 0.87 
Type 5 Alarm  - Auto Alarm with 
Heat and Local Smoke Detectors 
2 0.50 5 0.80 17 0.94 
Type 4 Alarm -  Auto Alarm with 
Smoke Detectors 
1 1.00 4 1.00 16 1.00 
Min. Time 1  4  16  
Note that the above alarm types 2-5 refer to the alarm types as denoted in [Table 4.1 C/AS1] 
 
Table 6.9– Exemplar Fire Alarm Activation and Evacuation Times 
 
 
From the above table it is quite clear that the impact on life safety of the fire alarm type is 
very much dependant on the duration of the evacuation time. The shorter the evacuation 
duration the more significant the alarm type has on life safety. If for example we consider the 
total time to evacuate a fire floor (“escape time”) from Table 6.8 comparing a Type 3 and a 
Type 4 alarm. The “escape time” reduces from 6.5 minutes to 4 minutes changing from a 
Type 3 to a Type 4 alarm. This equates to a 38% reduction in “escape time”, however if the 
time to clear the floor was 1 minute + alarm time then the “escape time” would reduce from 
4.5 minutes to 2 minutes which equates to a 62% reduction in escape time. Furthermore if the 
time to clear the floor was 10 minutes + alarm time then the “escape time” would reduce from 
13.5 minutes to 11 minutes which equates to an 18% reduction in escape time. The same 
analysis could be carried based on the total evacuation time of the building and show a similar 




Based on the above analysis and assuming that firecell fire barriers perform as intended by 
C/AS1 then by inspection the critical evacuation time is the time required to evacuate a floor. 
The number of exitways, dead end open path lengths and total open path lengths are used to 
regulate the time it takes to evacuate a fire cell. 
 
According to C/AS1 the fire alarm type has the following impact on the open path lengths: 
 
Manual fire alarm   -  No increase in open path lengths 
Auto alarm with heat detectors -  20% increase in open path lengths 
Auto alarm with smoke detectors -  100% increase in open path lengths 
 
Using the above increases in open path lengths the ratio between smoke alarm and the other 
types of alarm are 0.5 and 0.6 for a manual alarm and automatic alarm with heat detectors 
respectively. It is reasonable to assume that the ratio for an automatic alarm with heat 
detectors and local smoke detectors lies between 0.6 and 1.0, but at the lower end of the scale. 
These figures are similar in magnitude to those given in the above table for evacuation of a 
floor. Given this the attribute scores for the alarm type parameter have been assigned as 
shown in Table 6.10 below: 
 
 
B – Fire Alarm Type 
Alarm Type As ‘  As   ‘  
5 
No Alarm 0 0.00 
Type 2 Alarm - Manual Alarm 2 0.40 
Type 3 Alarm - Automatic Alarm with Heat Detectors 3 0.60 
Type 5 Alarm - Automatic Alarm with Heat and Local  Smoke Detectors 4 0.80 
Type 4 Alarm - Automatic Alarm with Smoke Detectors 5 1.00 
Note that the above alarm types 2-5 refer to the alarm types as denoted in [Table 4.1 C/AS1] 
 




C) Smoke Control 
 
There are three primary methods of smoke control in a building, which will be used to assess 
this component of the risk model. These are:  
 
- Smoke Control in Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System. 
 - Smoke Extraction. 
 - Stairwell Pressurisation. 
 
C1 – Smoke Control in Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning System 
 
Smoke control in the HVAC system is required to prevent smoke being transported to rooms 
outside the room of fire origin by the building ventilation system. Smoke control is achieved 
by shutting down the system, although it is possible to run such systems in a smoke extraction 
mode. The system can be shutdown on a general fire alarm or activated by smoke detectors 
located within the HVAC ducting network.  
 
From a risk point of view there are three options; no smoke control, manual activation or 
automatic. These have been assigned points based on the likely activation time using the 
alarm detection criteria in B above as guidance and are shown in Table 6.11 below: 
 
 
C1 – HVAC Control 
Smoke Control As 
None 0 
Manual Shutdown 2 
Automatic Shutdown 5 
 




C2 – Smoke Extraction 
 
Smoke extraction is generally required in atria, large spaces or spaces with large intermediate 
(mezzanine) floors. Smoke extraction is generally part of a smoke control system which may 
include smoke reservoirs, smoke baffle/curtains, HVAC control, and extraction by natural 
ventilation or mechanical fans. All these systems can be operated manual or automatically. In 
the case of natural ventilation this may simply be non fire rated roof elements that melt or 
burn away early in a fire event to provide a ventilation opening.  
 
There are four possible systems that could be installed and they are ranked based on the speed 
at which they activate and their perceived efficiency at extracting smoke (i.e. mechanical fans 
are taken to be more efficient/reliable than natural ventilation). Note that this last measure 
could be questioned, as all systems would be designed to achieve the required performance 
criteria.  
 
The four smoke extraction systems to be included in this parameter are: 
 
Manual Natural Ventilation – This is taken to be vents that require breaking by the 
occupants or only activate on operation of a manual fire alarm (manual call point). 
 
Manual Mechanical Extraction – This is taken to be mechanical ventilation fans that 
require specific operation by the occupants prior to leaving the building or only 
activate on operation of a manual fire alarm (manual call point). 
 
Automatic Natural Ventilation – This is taken to be vents that are controlled by either 
a fusible link or burn/melt on exposure to fire products or open on activation of an 
automatic fire alarm. 
 
Automatic Mechanical Extraction – This is taken to be mechanical ventilation fans 
that operate on activation of an automatic fire alarm. 
 
Note a manual system is ranked based on operation by a manual alarm and the automatic 
system by operation of an automatic alarm. The mechanical extraction system is ranked ahead 
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of a natural ventilation system. Reliability of the different systems is not taken into account as 
both systems are assumed to function as intended. 
 
The following points have been assigned for smoke extraction as shown in Table 6.12 below: 
 
C2 – Smoke Extraction 
Method As 
None 0 
Manual Natural Ventilation 1 
Manual Mechanical Extraction 2 
Automatic Natural Ventilation 4 
Automatic Mechanical Extraction 5 
 
Table 6.12– Smoke Extraction Attribute Scores 
 
 
C3 – Stairwell Pressurisation 
 
Stairwell pressurisation is normally installed in tall buildings where the exit stairs must be 
kept clear of smoke for a sufficient period to allow the building to be evacuated. The systems 
are typically connected to an automatic fire alarm system.  
 
C/AS1 requires pressurisation of “safe paths” in some buildings. Stairwells are usually 
constructed as safe paths, and in some cases there may be a corridor or lobby connected to the 
stairs, which is also designated as a safe path. In this case the pressurisation would be required 
to extend to the corridor or lobby. 
 









Table 6.13– Stairwell Pressurisation Attribute Scores 
 
 
D) Building Fire Control 
 
There are three aspects that will be assessed under building fire control in this component of 
the risk model. These are:  
 
- Sprinkler system. 
 - Water supply. 




D1 – Sprinkler System 
 
Sprinklers have proved themselves over time to be the most reliable and efficient method for 
controlling a fire and preventing fire fatalities in buildings in New Zealand, Marrayat(27). A 
wet pipe sprinkler system is usually installed in New Zealand(10), however in special 
circumstances, such as where an accidental discharge could cause severe damage to an 
owner’s property then a dry pipe system may be used. From a risk point of view the only 
difference between the systems is the time delay while the dry pipe system charges with water 




Points have been assigned for sprinkler systems as shown in Table 6.14 below: 
 
D1 – Sprinkler System 
Type As 
None 0 
Dry Pipe Sprinkler System 4 
Wet Pipe Sprinkler System 5 
 
Table 6.14 – Sprinkler System Attribute Scores 
 
 
D2 – Water Supply System 
 
The New Zealand sprinkler standard, NZS 4541:2003(47) recognises the importance of water 
supply in ensuring the reliability and efficiency of sprinkler systems. The standard specifies 
three classes of water supply as follows: 
 
Class A   - Dual superior supply, comprising two independent supplies with only 




Class B   - Dual standard supply 
 
Class B1 -  Comprising connection to two independent parts of a town 
main. 
 
Class B2 -  Comprising a dual private site fire main with one reticulation 
reserved solely for fire purposes.  
 
Class C   -  Single supply, typically comprises a town main or private supply. 
 
However, C/AS1 Appendix D currently deletes the provisions of NZS 4541:2003 regarding 
water supply. This means that ordinarily a building only requires a Class C water supply. The 
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only exception to this is that the Fire Service may require a higher Class of water supply as 
part of their evacuation approval procedure under the provisions of The Fire Safety and 
Evacuation Regulations 1992(11).  
 
Grading of the water supply has been determined on the basis of reliability. Feeney(24) 
estimates the following reliability of a towns main to be between 6.0x10-5 and 8.0x10-5 and 
the probability of no tank water supply being 5.7x10-5. From this we can determine the 
probability of failure for each class of water supply as follows: 
 
Class A   Pf  =  8.0x10-5 x 5.7x10-5  =  4.56x10-9 
Class B Pf  =  8.0x10-5 x 8.0x10-5  =  6.40x10-9 
Class C Pf  =      =  8.0x10-5  
 
Based on the above probabilities Class A is only marginally better than Class B, but Class C 
is significantly less reliable. From this the following attribute scores have been assigned as 
shown in Table 6:15 below:  
 
D2 – Water Supply 
Type As 
Class C 2 
Class B 4 
Class A 5 
 
Table 6.15– Water Supply Attribute Scores 
 
 
D3 – Occupant Fire Fighting Facilities 
 
Fire fighting facilities for use by the occupants are generally not mandatory for most buildings 
under the Building Code (3). The only exception is SA and SR purpose groups where fire hose 
reels are required in some building height categories. The Fire Service may require additional 
occupant fire fighting facilities under the provisions of The Fire Safety and Evacuation 
Regulations 1992 (11).  
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The types of occupant fighting facilities considered in this project are fire blankets, fire 
extinguishers and fire hose reels. 
 
Fire blankets are usually kept in a kitchen area and are used to smother small fires in cooking 
implements. 
 
Fire extinguishers come in a number of classes and sizes depending on the hazard. People 
should be trained to use these but most people with a basis level of knowledge can operate 
them. These will generally extinguish a larger fire than a fire blanket but the size of the fire 
must still be relatively small. 
 
Fire hose reels comprise a 25mm (1 inch) diameter hose connected to the building’s general 
water supply. These can be used to extinguish a fire similar in size to that by an extinguisher 
but unlike an extinguisher have an unlimited supply of water. 
 
Fire blankets have very limited uses and can be dangerous to use as they require the person to 
get very close to the fire. These shall be rated very low to reflect this risk. 
 
Given the above the following points have been assigned for occupant fire fighting facilities 
as shown in Table 6.16 below: 
 
D3 – Occupant Fire Fighting 
Type As 
None 0 
Fire Blanket 1 
Fire Extinguisher 3 
Fire Hose Reel 4 
Fire Hose Reel and Extinguisher 5 
 






E) Emergency Power Supply 
 
There are a number of options for emergency power supply including, battery banks and 
diesel generators.  Emergency power supplies are designed in accordance with NZS 6104 
“Specification for emergency power supplies in buildings” (48). Most emergency power 
supplies installed in buildings in NZ are in the form of a diesel generator. Battery banks are 
only usually used to provide an uninterrupted power supply to important equipment, such as 
computer systems, whilst the diesel generator starts up. This equipment may or may not be 
required for the fire systems emergency power supply. 
 
Emergency lights and alarm panels have a built in battery backup where required to ensure 
continuous operation of the alarm system. This is not a requirement under the emergency 
power supply requirements of C/AS1 but is under the respective alarms and emergency 
lighting specifications. 
 
On rare occasions for important buildings, for example hospitals and some government 
buildings, a back up generator may be provided. While this vastly improves the safety and 
reliability of the power supply, these types of buildings are not included in this study and as 
such this will not be taken into account. 
 
The points have been assigned for emergency power supply facilities on a compliance basis as 
shown in Table 6.17 below: 
 
 
E – Emergency Power Supply 
Type As 
None 0 
Emergency Power Supply 5 
 






F) Communication Systems 
 
The type of communication system in a building has a large impact on the pre-movement time 
of occupants and hence impacts on the time taken to evacuate the fire floor and/or building. 
 
Sime (49) estimates pre-movement times as 6, 4, and 2 minutes for alarm only, non-directive 
public address and directive public address respectively. Furthermore Sime gives the results 
of trial evacuations carried out in an underground train station in 1991 which shows that the 
presence of warden and/or a public address system vastly improves the evacuation time. 





Warning System Time to Clear the Station 
Alarm only 15 minutes 
Alarm + Two Staff 8 minutes 
Alarm + Repeated Non-directive PA Announcement 11 minutes 
Alarm +  Live PA Announcement + Two Staff 6-7 minutes 
 
Table 6.18 – Evacuation Trials in under Ground Station, Sime (49) 
 
 
From the above table the presence of fire wardens and a directive public address system 
greatly influenced the escape time. Based on this the attribute points for communications 




F – Communication System 
Type As 
None 0 
Evacuation Plan + Fire Wardens 1 
Voice Communication System  3 
Fire Systems Centre 4 
Voice Communication System + Fire Systems Centre 5 
 
Table 6.19– Communication System Attribute Scores 
 
 
In this project it is assumed the all buildings have at least an evacuation plan and fire wardens. 
A voice communication system complying with AS 2220:1989, “Emergency warning and 
intercommunication systems in buildings” (50) is set at 3 points.  
 
 
G) Fire Service 
 
The Fire Service provides the primary source of extinguishment for most reported fires. They 
are also required to provide rescue services, if the building evacuation is not complete prior to 
their arrival. The water supply is essential to the fire service operation and is covered under 
sprinkler system above. There are a number of other requirements under C/AS1 that impact 
on the efficiency of the Fire Service and hence the safety of a building. These are: 
 
- Alerting 
 - Lift Control 
 - Fire Fighting Access. 
 
G1 – Alerting 
 
The term “Alerting” shall be used to describe the method by which the Fire Service is advised 
of the fire. There are a number of options, which are used as follows: 
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 -  Telephone 
 -   Direct connection to a security firm. 
 -  Direct connection to the Fire Service. 
 
The safety issue here is the time required for the Fire Service to respond and commence 
rescue or fire fighting operations. The quicker the Fire Service is alerted, the sooner they 
arrive and commence activities.  
 
The first method relies on a person within the building or a passerby noticing the fire, finding 
a phone (a lesser problem with the advent of the mobile phone). This could take anywhere 
upwards from a few minutes depending on the time of day, location of the person relative to 
the fire and state of alertness of the person (i.e. if they are asleep a delay is likely to occur). 
Therefore the primary detection method governs; in this case it is a person sensing the fire 
cues and their reaction to them. For the purposes of this project, based on B above, this is 
taken as 10 minutes. 
The second method is dependent on two operations. The first is detection of the fire 
(approximately 1-1.5 minutes for smoke detection and 3-4 minutes for heat detection, B 
above) and the second is the response time of the security firm. The latter will vary depending 
on whether or not a security guard is dispatched to confirm whether or not there is a fire. This 
generally only happens for unoccupied buildings and as such life safety is not an issue. 
Therefore the likely alerting time is likely to be in the order of 2-5 minutes. 
 
The third method is by far the best option. The Fire Service is alerted immediately and can 
respond immediately. Therefore the alerting time is likely to be of the order of 1-3 minutes.  
 
Given the above the attribute points have been assigned as shown in Table 6.20 for alerting 
the Fire Service: 
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G1 – Alerting 
Type Alerting Time As 
No means for alerting the Fire Service  Not alerted 0 
Telephone 10-20 minutes 1 
Direct Connection via Security Firm 2-5 minutes 4 
Direct Connection to Fire Service 1-3 minutes 5 
 
Table 6.20– Fire Service Alerting Attribute Scores 
 
 
G2 –Lift control 
 
During a fire event occupants are discouraged from using a lift and in fact, on alarm generally 
the lifts automatically return to the ground floor. This is for several reasons, the main being 
that it is unsafe to use a lift in case the doors inadvertently open on the fire floor. Lift shafts 
can also act as chimneys drawing smoke up through a building, which could incapacitate or 
kill occupants of a lift.  Lift control is given to the Fire Service so that if the lifts are deemed 
safe they can be used to transport personnel and equipment up to fire attack base, generally 1 
or 2 floors below fire floor in a multistorey building or to effect rescue operations. 
 
The attribute scores have been assigned as shown in Table 6.21 below: 
 









G3 – Fire Fighting Access 
 
Fire fighter access is an important part of building safety. In this case the term “access” relates 
to the ability of the Fire Service to attack the fire with hose lines in order to bring it under 
control. The requirements under C/AS1 are quite simple, either the fire hose run length does 
not exceed 75 m or the building must have a fire hydrant system. With regards to safety both 
should give a similar level of safety. The fire hydrant system is judged to be better than 75 m 
fire hose runs as hoses can be susceptible to damage.  
 
Therefore the attribute scores have been assigned as shown in Table 6.22 below: 
 
G3 – Fire Fighting Access 
Type As 
No hydrant System or Hose Run >75m 0 
Fire Hose Run<75m 4 
Fire Hydrant System 5 
 
Table 6.22 – Fire Fighting Access Attribute Scores 
 
H)  Means of Escape  
 
The means of escape provisions along with the fire safety precautions define the majority of 
the specific life safety requirements of C/AS1. From the means of escape provisions, there are 
a number of requirements that can be ranked qualitatively or quantitatively to give a measure 
of the life safety. These have been determined as follows: 
 
- Number of Escape Routes 
    - Width of Escape Routes 
    - Emergency Lighting 
    - Refuge Areas 
    - Dead End Open Paths 
    - Total Open Paths 
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    -  Protected Paths Lengths 
    - Surface Finishes Exitways 
    - Surface Finishes Occupied Spaces 
    - Signage 
 
H1 – Number of Escape Routes 
 
The number of escape routes required depends on the number of person to be evacuated, the 
dead end and total open path lengths. Most buildings will have one or two escape routes but 
where there are more than 501 persons in a firecell a minimum of 3 is required and over 1001 
persons 4 or more are required depending on the number. 
 
Therefore the attribute scores have been assigned as shown in Table 6.23 below: 
 
H1 – Number of Escape Routes 






Table 6.23 – Number of Escape Routes Attribute Scores 
 
 
H2 – Width of Escape Routes 
 
The width of escape routes affects the queuing time and hence the time it takes to evacuate a 
floor. The total required width of escape routes in C/AS1 depends on the number of persons 
to be evacuated but is 1000 mm minimum or 9 mm per person for vertical escape routes. 
Therefore the minimum equates to approximately 100 persons. 
 
The required ratio (9 mm/person) is the important safety aspect of the code. The ratio sets a 
consistent level of safety, by adjusting the width of escape proportional to the number of 
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persons. Therefore a firecell would require 4500 mm and 9000 mm of escape route width for 
500 and 1000 occupants respectively. 
 
Given the above, the points for escape width have been assigned as shown in Table 6.24 
below: 
 
H2 – Width of Escape Routes 
Width As 
Width <1000 mm 0 
1000 mm ≤ Width <2000 mm 1 
2000 mm ≤ Width <4500 mm 2 
4500 mm ≤ Width <9000 mm 3 
9000 mm≤ Width 5 
 
Table 6.24 – Width of Escape Routes Attribute Scores 
 
H3 – Emergency Lighting 
 
Emergency lighting is required for two reasons, firstly to provide adequate light in an escape 
path in the event of a power failure at night during a fire event and secondly to enhance the 
visibility in an escape path that may become smoke logged. In some cases the emergency 
lighting is combined with signage. 
 
C/AS1 does not require emergency lights in all cases. In some cases the lights are only 
required in exitways, which may be at the final exit for single storey buildings. For large 
buildings or occupant numbers emergency lights are required in open paths throughout the 
firecell. 
 
The attribute scores for emergency lighting have been assigned based on the extent of lighting 






H3 – Emergency Lighting 
Extent As 
None 0 
At Final Exit 2 
Exitways 4 
Open Paths and Exitways 5 
 
Table 6.25 – Width of Escape Routes Attribute Scores 
 
 
H4 – Refuge Areas 
 
C/AS1 only requires refuge areas in tall buildings (over 58m). They are included as part of the 
escape stair (safe path), allow for only 4-6 persons and only allow for fast persons to pass 
slow moving persons. Given this they will not contribute significantly to the safety of the 
occupants of a building.   
 
The attribute scores have been assigned based on the extent of refuge areas with the code 
requirement set at 3 points as shown below in Table 6.26: 
 
H4 – Refuge Areas 
Extent As 
None 0 
In Staircase (<6 persons capacity) 3 
Protected Lobby to Staircase (>6 persons capacity) 5 
 
Table 6.26– Refuge Areas Attribute Scores 
 
 
H5 – Dead End Open Path Lengths 
 
The Dead End Open Path (DEOP) is the length of escape route where an occupant has only 
one direction of escape. It is important to limit the length of DEOP escape routes to minimise 
the risk that the occupants will get trapped by the fire or smoke. In a building without an 
automatic alarm the occupants need to be able to detect the fire cues before the fire has grown 
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sufficiently large that it cuts off the only means of escape. Automatic fire alarms with heat 
and smoke detectors provide early warning and as such C/AS1 permits the escape route 
lengths to be increased.  The permitted DEOP range for the Purpose Groups considered in this 
study are shown in Table 6.27 below: 
Purpose group 
Type of path 
CS,CL,CM  WL,WM SA SR 
Dead End Open Path (DEOP) 18.0m 24.0m 18.0m 24.0m 
DEOP with Heat Detection (+20%) 21.6m 28.8m 19.8m 26.4m 
DEOP with Smoke Detection or 
Sprinklers (+100%) 
 
36.0m 48.0m 27.0m 36.0m 
DEOP with Smoke Detection and 
Sprinkler (+200%) 
 
54.0m 72.0m - - 
 
Table 6.27 – Permitted DEOP Lengths 
 
Note that the safety of a building improves considerably with the addition of a fire alarm 
and/or sprinkler system. However a reduction in the improved safety level due to the alarm 
/sprinkler occurs if the escape route lengths are increased as a result due to an increase in the 
time it takes to evacuate the building. Therefore this reduction in safety is taken into account 
in the model by allowing for the increased escape path lengths. 
 
The attribute scores have been assigned based on the range of DEOP for the purpose groups 
under consideration as shown in Table 6.28 below: 
 
H5 – Dead End Open Path (DEOP) Length 
Range of DEOP Length As 
>60 m 0 
45< DEOP ≤ 60 m 1 
30< DEOP ≤ 45 m 2 
25< DEOP ≤ 30 m 3 
20< DEOP ≤ 25 m 4 
≤20 m 5 
 
Table 6.28 – Dead End Open Path Attribute Scores 
116 
 
H7 – Protected Path Lengths 
 
A Protected Path (PP) is part of an escape route, which is protected from smoke migration 
with smoke barriers. These areas may be formed with walls; non-opening windows or smoke 
stop doors. C/AS1 does not permit increases in the allowable PP lengths for the installation of 
fire alarms and sprinklers. The permitted lengths are shown in Table 6.31 below.  
 
Purpose group 
Type of path 
CS,CL,CM  WL,WM SA SR 
Protected Path (PP) 45.0 m 60.0 m 45.0 m 60.0 m 
 
Table 6.31– Permitted Protected Path Lengths 
 
 
The attribute scores for protected paths shall be assigned as shown in Table 6.32 below: 
 
 
H7 – Protected Path (PP) Length 
Range of PP Length As 
>90 m 0 
75< PP ≤ 90 m 1 
60< PP ≤ 75 m 2 
45< PP ≤ 60 m 3 
30< PP ≤ 45 m 4 
PP≤30 m 5 
 




H8 – Exitways Surface Finishes  
 
C/AS1 limits the type of surface finishes in exitways to prevent spread of fire and smoke 
development.  Products are required to be tested to AS 1530: “Methods for Fire Tests on 
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H6 – Total Open Path Lengths 
 
The Total Open Path (TOP) is the total length of escape route through an open path, including 
the DEOP. C/AS1 also permits TOP escape routes to be increased if automatic fire alarms 
with heat and smoke detectors are present.  The permitted TOP range for the purpose groups 
are shown in Table 6.29 below: 
 
Purpose group 
Type of Path and Alarm/Protection 
CS,CL,CM  WL,WM SA SR 
Total Open Path (TOP) 45.0m 60.0m 45.0m 60.0m 
TOP with Heat Detection (+20%) 54.0m 72.0m 49.5m 66.0m 
TOP with Smoke Detection or Sprinklers
(+100%) 
90.0m 120.0m 67.5m 90.0m 
TOP with Smoke Detection and Sprinkler 
(+200%) 
135.0m 180.0m - - 
 
Table 6.29 – Permitted Total Open Path Lengths 
 
 
The attribute scores have been assigned based on the range of TOP for the purpose groups 
under consideration as shown in Table 6.30 below: 
 
 
H6 – Total Open Path (TOP) Length 
Range of TOP Length As 
>140 m 0 
110< TOP ≤ 140 m 1 
80< TOP ≤ 110 m 2 
60< TOP ≤ 80 m 3 
50< TOP ≤ 60 m 4 
≤50 m 5 
 
Table 6.30 – Total Open Path Length Attribute Scores 
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Building Materials, Components and Structures” (12). C/AS1 requirements for walls and 
ceilings are the same for all purpose groups in exitways.  
 
The flammability index requirements for suspended flexible fabric do not apply to WL, WM 
and WH purpose groups in terms of the scope of this project. The limitations for surface 
finishes in exitways based on Table 6.3 - C/AS1 are as follows: 
 
Spread of Flame Index (SFI)    = 0 
Smoke Development Index (SDI)  < 3 
Flammability Index (FI)   < 12  (Not in Purpose Group WL, WM  and WH) 
 
Clause 6.20.7 C/AS1 allows an increase of SFI to 7 and SDI to 5 for surface finishes above 
1.2 m high in exitways in school buildings (purpose groups CS and CL).  This will be ignored 
in this study due to the narrow limitations placed on this dispensation. 
 
The attribute scores have been assigned based on compliance with the above with the 
minimum code requirement set at 3 points as shown in Table 6.33 below:  
 
 
H8 – Exitways Surface Finishes  
Extent As 
SFI > 0, SDI > 3, FI > 12 0 
SFI = 0, SDI ≤ 3, FI > 12 3 
SFI = 0, SDI ≤ 3, FI ≤ 12 4 
No applied surface finishes, non-combustible surfaces 5 
 
Table 6.33 – Exitway Surface Finishes Attribute Scores 
 
 
H9 – Occupied Spaces Surface Finishes 
 
These are assessed in the same manner as for exitways (H8 above). The code requirements are 
shown in Table 6.34 below.  
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Surface Finishes Requirements (Table 6.2 C/AS1) Purpose 
Group SFI SDI FI 
CS, CL, CM 2 5 12 
WL, WM 5 (or 9) 10  (or 8) No Requirement 
SA 2 5 No Requirement 
SR No Requirement No Requirement No Requirement 
 
Table 6.34 – Occupied Spaces Surface Finish Requirements 
 
Clause 6.20.7 C/AS1 allows a SFI of 7 and SDI of 5 for surface finishes above a height 1.2 m 
and SFI of 8 and SDI of 6 below a height of 1.2 m in Purpose groups CS and CL where there 
is less than 250 persons and at least two means of escape.  This shall be taken as a parameter 
score of 3 in Table 6.35 below. 
 
Clause 6.20.5 C/AS1 limits the requirements to the ceiling where fire cells are sprinklered. 
Therefore, there is no restriction on wall linings under this requirement and as such there is a 
higher risk that fire could spread. The reduced risk due to sprinklers is accounted for 
elsewhere in this model.  Therefore the increased risk due to relaxing the requirements on the 
surface finishes is included in this parameter. 
 
The attribute scores for surface finishes in the occupied spaces have been assigned based the 
above as shown in Table 6.35 below:  
 
H8 – Occupied Spaces Surface Finishes 
Surface Requirement As 
Walls and Ceilings None 0 
Ceilings SFI ≤ 5, SDI ≤ 10 1 
Ceilings SFI ≤ 2, SDI ≤ 5 2 
Walls and Ceilings 
(or Ceilings Only) 
SFI ≤ 5, SDI ≤ 10 
(or  SFI ≤ 2, SDI ≤ 5, FI ≤ 12) 
3 
Walls and Ceilings SFI ≤ 2, SDI ≤ 5 4 
Walls and Ceilings SFI ≤ 2, SDI ≤ 5, FI ≤ 12 5 
 
Table 6.35 – Occupied Spaces Surface Finishes Attribute Scores 
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H10 – Signage 
 
C/AS1 requires signage in escape routes, on fire and smoke control doors to comply with F8. 
Signs are required to direct occupants to the nearest fire exit and remind occupants to keep 
fire and smoke control doors closed. Only signage required to direct occupants to a fire exit 
shall be considered in this report. 
 
Signage visibility depends on a number of factors including the scattering and absorption 
coefficient of the smoke, illumination in the room, whether a sign is light emitting or light 
reflecting, the wavelength of the light, the individual’s visual acuity and whether the 
individuals eyes are dark or light adapted, Mulholand(51). Jin (52) found that the type of lighting 
also impacted on whether or not people passed through the smoke and the pace at which they 
moved. People are more likely to pass through the smoke as the signage visibility improved 
from reflective to illuminated and from illuminated to flashing illuminated signage. 
 
The attribute scores have been assigned linearly based increasing visibility as shown in Table 
6.36 below. It is assumed that illuminated exit signs will be used where emergency lighting is 
required. 
 
H10 – Signage 
Extent As 
None 0 
Fire Exit Signs 1 
Illuminated Fire Exit signs 3 
Flashing Illuminated Fire Exit signs 5 
 
Table 6.36– Signage Attribute Scores 
 
6.4 Weighting System 
 
Methods for determining weightings can be undertaken by: 
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a) Delphi Group Analysis – this is where a group of experts (typically 10-20) assign 
weights to the parameters. The experts are given opportunity to revise their assessment 
until a consensus is reached. This method was not used for this project, however, a 
Delphi panel approach could be used to verify and/or refine the model. 
 
b) Probabilistic Risk Analysis – this would require undertaking a full PRA on a number 
of sample building, with careful attention being paid to the sensitivity analysis in order 
to determine how each parameter affects safety. This method was not used for this 
project however this approach could also be used to verify and/or refine the model. 
 
c) Analysis of weighting systems for existing fire risk models. 
 
The weighting system for this model has been derived by assessing the weightings in the 
existing FSES (NFPA 101A)(32) and FRIM- MAB(35) systems, as described in Sections 5.6.6 
and 5.6.7 of this report. The weighting systems were adapted to suit the parameters required 
to assess safety to C/AS1. In cases where items were deemed not relevant to C/AS1, their 
weightings were excluded and the weights normalised back to 1.0. 
  
Additional items, such as purpose group and fire hazard category etc, were also included 
which required assessment and assigning of appropriate weights. This was done based on 
judgment using the calculated weighting assessment as a guide. Sub-weightings, such as the 
means of escape parameters to C/AS1, were also determined on the same basis where no data 
was available.  
 
 
6.4.1 NFPA 101A Fire Safety Evaluation System – Weighting Analysis 
 
Refer to Section 5.7.6 for a detail description of the NFPA 101A - Fire Safety Evaluation 
System (FSES) (32) method. 
 
The FSES method is a zero-base system where fire safety features score positive points and 
fire risk and adverse building features score negative points. The weightings used in this 
project were determined based on the absolute value of the range for each item in the FSES 
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check sheets. The weightings were then determined as a proportion of the sum of the ranges 
for all parameters. Refer to example below for sample calculation. 
 
The weightings used in this project are derived in part from the FSES method based on the 
models for “Business Occupancies” (equivalent to purpose groups WL and WM), “Apartment 
Building” (equivalent to purpose group SR) and “Board and Care Facilities” (equivalent to 
purpose groups SA and SC).  
 
FSES method assesses several safety parameters including S1 – Fire Control, S2 –Egress, S3 
– Refuge (not applicable for Business Occupancies) and S4 – General Fire Safety (Denoted 
S3 for Business Occupancies). The weightings used in this project are based on an average 
across safety criteria, S1, S2 and S3/S4 and all three occupancy types. The safety parameter 
S3 - Refuge was not used as there are currently no requirements in C/AS1 for designing for 
persons to take refuge in a building and wait out a fire. Note the parameter H4 – Refuge in the 
FSI model proposed in this study is based on the NZ definition of refuge, which allows an 
additional area in a vertical escape path for slow persons to rest and be passed by quicker 
persons.  
 
The FSES method weighting assessment comprised the following basis steps: 
 
i) The weighting for each parameter of the FSES was determined for each occupancy 
type. 
ii) The weightings were then adjusted to account for parameters that were deemed not 
applicable, as they are not included as a design requirement for C/AS1. 
iii) The weightings were then normalised. 
iv) The FSES parameters were then assigned to the closest equivalent parameter in the 
C/AS1 model proposed in this study. This entailed adding some FSES parameter 
weightings together or proportioning FSES weightings between two or more C/AS1 
parameters. 
 
Refer to Appendix C for the calculations of the parameter weightings and the respective 
Safety categories S1 to S4 for each occupancy type. The final parameter weightings 
calculated for the NFPA 101A - Fire Safety Evaluation System in accordance with the above 





The example presented below is for Business Occupancies, NFPA101A Worksheet 8.6.1. Let 
us consider the “Construction” parameter, the scores range between -12 and +2 so the 
maximum range is 14 points for this item.  
 
The total points available for all parameters depend on which parameter is included in each 
Fire Safety category and the weighting. In the NFPA 101A method “Construction” is 
weighted 1.0 for S1 – Fire Control, 0.0 for S2 – Egress and 1.0 for S3 – General. From Table 
C1 – Appendix C, the total points available based on all parameters are 50, 60 and 92 
respectively for S1, S2 and S3. Therefore the unadjusted parameter weightings for 
Construction shown in Table 6.37 are calculated as follows: 
 
 SN    
totaloccupancy
rangeSWi weightparameter ×=  
thus: 
S1     
50
140.1 ×=onConstructiWi  = 0.2800 
S2       
60
140.0 ×=onConstructiWi  = 0.0000 
S3/4(General)   
92
140.1 ×=onConstructiWi  = 0.1522 
  
The Construction parameter weightings were calculated in a similar manner for Board and 
Care Large Facilities (NFPA101A Worksheet 7.5.1) and Apartment Buildings (NFPA101A 
Worksheet 7.7.1) as follows and are shown in Table 6.38: 
 
    Business Board  Apartments    Average
  (Wi Construction) (Wi Construction) (Wi Construction) (WA) 
S1    0.2800  0.2243  0.2609  0.2551 
S2    0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
S3/4 (General) 0.1522  0.1290  0.1446  0.1419 
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Step ii) & iii) 
 
The mean for each of the above figures was then adjusted and normalised based on excluding 
the “Vertical Openings” (Atriums and intermediate floors) and “Occupant Emergency Plan” 
parameters from the NFPA 101A method as these are not considered in this study. This gave 
the following revised weightings for the “Construction” parameter: 
 




Where:    








WA = Average Weighting for each FSES parameter 
 
 














WAd = Adjusted Weighting for Each FSES Parameter 
 
combining the above two equations we get: 
 
 







W 1   
 
Thus, for S1 – Fire Control: 
 






=  = 0.2868 
 
where ∑ parametersomittedAW  is the associated value for Vertical Opening from Table 6.38. 
Similarly for S2: 
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=  = 0.0000 
 
where ∑ parametersomittedAW  are the associated values for Vertical Opening and Occupant 
Emergency Plan from Table 6.38 and ∑ AdW  is the associated sum of AdW  values 
again given in Table 6.38. 
 






=  = 0.1653 
 




The above figures are shown in Table 6.38 below.  
    
Step iv) 
 
The final average weightings are then assigned to the various and most appropriate parameters 
of the C/AS1 model as noted in the final column of Table 6.38. For example the 
“Construction” parameter weighting is a function of both fire rated construction and building 
height. In this case 50% (0.1507/2 = 0.0754) is assigned to the Building Height parameter, 
BU2 and parameter A2 - Structural Endurance Rating. Therefore from Table 6.38 the 
Structural Endurance Rating parameter A2 is calculated as follows: 
 
 
WNFPA101 A2  =  50% WNA Construction + WNA Segregation of Hazards 
  = 0.5 x 0.1507 + 0.0843 
  = 0.1596     
 
The above WNFPA101  A2 is included in Table 6.45 where it is compared to the results of a 
similar analysis on the FRIM-MAB(35) model weightings from which the C/AS1 weightings 
are derived. Refer to Section 6.4.2 for a description of the FRIM-MAB weighting assessment 









Control Egress Refuge General Fire Control Egress Refuge General
1 Construction 0.2800 0.0000 0.1522 0.2243 0.0000 0.2034 0.1290 0.2609 0.0000 0.2400 0.1446
2 Segregation of Hazards 0.1400 0.1167 0.0761 0.0748 0.0290 0.0678 0.0430 0.0870 0.0333 0.0800 0.0482
3 Vertical Openings 0.1100 0.1833 0.1196 0.1028 0.1594 0.1864 0.1183 0.1196 0.1833 0.2200 0.1325
4 Sprinklers 0.2400 0.1000 0.1304 0.1869 0.0725 0.0847 0.1075 0.1739 0.0667 0.0800 0.0964
5 Fire Alarm 0.0400 0.0667 0.0435 0.0280 0.0435 0.0000 0.0323 0.0326 0.0500 0.0000 0.0361
6 Smoke Detection 0.0400 0.0667 0.0435 0.1495 0.2319 0.1356 0.1720 0.1087 0.1667 0.0000 0.1205
7 Interior Finishes 0.0500 0.0000 0.0543 0.0467 0.0725 0.0000 0.0538 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0361
8 Smoke Control 0.0000 0.0333 0.0435 0.0000 0.0580 0.0678 0.0430 0.0000 0.0667 0.0800 0.0482
9 Exit Access 0.0000 0.0833 0.0543 0.0000 0.1159 0.0000 0.0860 0.0000 0.1333 0.0000 0.0964
10 Egress Route 0.0000 0.1833 0.1196 0.0000 0.1449 0.0847 0.1075 0.0000 0.1667 0.1000 0.1205
11 Corridor/Room Separation 0.1000 0.0833 0.1087 0.1869 0.0725 0.1695 0.1075 0.2174 0.0833 0.2000 0.1205
12 Occupant Emergency Plan 0.0000 0.0833 0.0543
Sum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Board & Care Large Facilities (SA/SC) Apartment Buildings (SR)Business Occupancies (WL/WM)
Not Included in FSES for Board & Care Facilities Not Included in FSES for Apartment Buildings
 
 
Table 6.37 -  NFPA 101A - Fire Safety Evaluation System, Parameter Weightings (Wi) by Occupancy 
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Equivalent NZBC C/AS1 Fire Safety Parameter
No. Safety Parameter Average
Adjusted & 
Normalised Average Adjusted Normalised Average Adjusted Normalised
WA WN WA WAd WN WA WAd WN
1 Construction 0.2551 0.2868 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1419 0.1733 0.1653 0.1507
2 Segregation of Hazards 0.1006 0.1131 0.0597 0.0813 0.0749 0.0558 0.0681 0.0650 0.0843 A2  Structural Endurance Rating
3 Vertical Opening 0.1108 0.1754 0.1235
4 Sprinklers 0.2003 0.2252 0.0797 0.1086 0.1000 0.1114 0.1361 0.1298 0.1517 D1 Sprinkler System & D2 Water Supply
5 Fire Alarm 0.0335 0.0377 0.0534 0.0727 0.0670 0.0373 0.0455 0.0434 0.0494 F Communication System & G1 Fire Service Alerting 
6 Smoke Detection 0.0994 0.1118 0.1551 0.2113 0.1946 0.1120 0.1368 0.1305 0.1456 B Fire Alarm
7 Interior Finishes 0.0322 0.0363 0.0408 0.0556 0.0512 0.0481 0.0587 0.0560 0.0478 H8 Surface Finishes Exitways & H9 Occupied Spaces
8 Smoke Control 0.0000 0.0000 0.0527 0.0717 0.0661 0.0449 0.0548 0.0523 0.0395 C Smoke Control
9 Exit Access 0.0000 0.0000 0.1109 0.1511 0.1391 0.0789 0.0964 0.0919 0.0770 Means of Escape H1, H2
10 Egress Route 0.0000 0.0000 0.1650 0.2248 0.2070 0.1159 0.1415 0.1350 0.1140 Means of Escape H5, H6, H7
11 Corridor/Room Separation 0.1681 0.1890 0.0797 0.1086 0.1000 0.1122 0.1371 0.1307 0.1399  A1 Firecell Rating
12 Occupant Emergency Plan 0.0000 0.0833 0.0543
Sum 1.0000 1.0000 0.9722 1.0858 1.0000 0.9819 1.0482 1.0000 1.0000
Excluded as it only pertains to Business Occupancies in NFPA 
101A and is not a design parameter in C/AS1
GeneralEgress
Excluded as it pertains to attriums and mezzanine floors which 
are outside the scope of this project








Table 6.38 -  NFPA 101A - Fire Safety Evaluation System, Average Parameter Weightings (WNA) 
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6.4.2 FRIM-MAB – Weighting Analysis 
 
An analysis of the FRIM-MAB model was initially undertaken as an alternative to using the 
NFPA101A scheme to determine the C/AS1 weightings.  However, given the results were similar 
the final weightings used in the C/AS1 model were based on the average weightings from both 
the FRIM-MAB and NFPA101A methods. 
 
The FRIM-MAB weightings were taken directly from the Fire Risk Index Method – Multi-storey 
Apartment Buildings (FRIM–MAB) (35) model. The weightings (Wo) shown in Table 6.39 below 
are based on those of Karlsson and Hultquist(21) which are shown previously in Table 5.7. The 
parameter weightings were adjusted (Wr) to account for parameters that have been omitted, as 
they were judged not relevant to this study.  
 
The following parameters from the FRIM-MAB model were omitted as they were not included in 
this C/AS1 assessment: 
 
− P7 Windows 
 
− P8 Facades 
 
− P9 Attics 
 
− P10 Adjacent Buildings 
 

















Where:   Wo  =  The parameter weighing for each parameter 1 through to 17. 
 





Equivalent C/AS1 Fire Safety 
Parameter 
P1 Linings in Apartments 0.0623 0.0766 
H9 - Surface Finishes in Occupied 
Space 
P2 Suppression System 0.0658 0.0888 D - Building Fire Control  
P3 Fire Service 0.0571 0.0905 
G - Fire Service (47% Alerting, 22% 
Lift Control, 31% FF Access) 
P4 Compartmentation 0.0623 0.0885 A1 - Firecell Rating 
P5 Structure Separating 0.0588 0.0897 A1 - Firecell Rating 
P6 Doors 0.0718 0.0928 
67% to A1 Firecell Rating and 33% to 
H7 Protected Paths 
P7 Windows 0.0407 - Not relevant to project therefore not included. 
P8 Facades 0.0363 - Not relevant to project therefore not included. 
P9 Attic 0.0320 - Not relevant to project therefore not included. 
P10 Adjacent Buildings 0.0242 - Not relevant to project therefore not included. 
P11 
Smoke Control 
System 0.0701 0.0810 
C - Smoke Control (50% Extraction, 
50% Stair Pressurisation) 
P12 Detection 0.0814 0.0837 B - Fire alarm 
P13 Signal System 0.0762 0.0681 B - Fire alarm 
P14 Escape Routes 0.0839 0.0824 
H - Means of escape (34% to H4,H5, 
and H6, and 27% to H1,H2 and 16% 
to H3 and H10 and 23% to H8)  
P15 
Structure Load 
Bearing 0.0463 0.0837 
A2 - Structural Endurance Rating 
P16 
Maintenance and 
Information 0.0692 - 
Not relevant to project therefore not included. 
P17 Ventilation System 0.0614 0.0742 C1 - HVAC Control 
 Sum 1.0000 1.0000  
 
Table 6.39-  FRIM-MAB - Fire Safety Parameter and Parameter Weightings 
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The final average weightings are then assigned to the various and most appropriate parameters of 
the C/AS1 model as noted in the final column of Table 6.39. For example the parameter 
weightings for P4, P5 and P6 are added together to reach a weighting for the Firecell Rating (A1) 
parameter of the C/AS1 model as all three are a function of fire separation. Therefore from 
Table 6.39 the Firecell Rating parameter A1 is calculated as follows: 
 
 
Wr FRIM-MAB A1   =  Wr P4 + Wr P5 + 67% Wr P5 
   = 0.0885 + 0.0897+0.67x 0.0928 
   = 0.2404    
 
 
The above weighting, Wr FRIM-MAB A1, is included in Table 6.45 and is used along with the 
parameter weightings determined from NFPA101A (Section 6.4.1 of this report) to determine the 
parameter weightings for the C/AS1. 
 
 
6.4.3 C/AS1 Fire Safety Risk Ranking Model – Weightings 
 
a) Building Use Score Parameter Weightings 
 
The Building Use Score (BU1 to BU4) parameter weightings were the most difficult to assign, as 
these parameters were not included in the existing risk ranking models assessed. Furthermore 
there was negligible data available in the literature suitable to provide a numerical estimate of the 
weightings directly. An estimate of the weightings was made using subjective judgment and 
simple hand calculations where appropriate to gauge the rough order of the weightings. 
 
 
The Building/Use Score parameters all have an impact on either the amount of time it takes to 
evacuate a building/firecell (BU1, BU2 and BU3) or the time to untenable conditions. In all cases 
the common measurable unit is time. Therefore a “first order” analysis of the evacuation times 
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and time to untenable conditions was calculated for the buildings classes under consideration in 
this study and the averages used to estimate the parameter weightings.  In this case the building 
escape height parameter BU2 was weighted 7.54% (refer Section 6.4.1 and Table 6.38 for 
derivation) in the NFPA101A FSES model and as such this was used as a benchmark for 
weighting the other three parameters, BU1, BU3 and BU4 and integrating them into the overall 
model.  
 
The derivation of the Building /Use score parameters BU1 to BU4 is discussed below. 
 
The building escape height predominantly affects the evacuation time of the building, i.e. the 
taller the building the longer it takes to evacuate the building. Hand calculations of the time it 
takes to evacuate a building were undertaken using the methods in the Fire Engineering Design 
Guide (53) and used as the benchmark for assessing the impact of purpose group, occupant 
numbers and fire hazard category on the escape time and time to untenable conditions.  The 
evacuation calculations are shown in Appendix D and summarised below in Table 6.40. 
 
The calculations are based on the mean of the range of the input data. The input data is based on 
the requirements of C/AS1. For example permitted Open Path lengths for each purpose group 
were used to calculate the maximum travel time in a firecell and the minimum rate for stairs of 
9mm/person was used to determine the maximum number of occupants using a single stair. 
 
Mean Time to Clear a Floor 
Mean Pre-movement [Table 3-13.1 SFPE Handbook]  tp 4.83 Minutes 
Mean Open Path Travel Time   top 0.67 Minutes 
Queuing Time = No Person per Floor / Stair Travel Speed tq 2.75 Minutes 
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(m)     (Minutes) (Minutes) (Minutes) (Minutes) (Minutes) 
4 1 133 1.7 0.20 1.90 8.25 10.2 
10 3 399 5.1 0.20 5.31 8.25 13.6 
25 8 1064 13.6 0.20 13.84 8.25 22.1 
34 11 1463 18.8 0.20 18.95 8.25 27.2 
46 15 1995 25.6 0.20 25.78 8.25 34.0 
58 19 2527 32.4 0.20 32.60 8.25 40.8 
Mean      16.2 0.2 16.4 8.25 24.7 
 
Table 6.40 – Results of Evacuation Time Calculations 
 
 
A mean total vertical travel time of 16.4 minutes was calculated based on the building escape 
heights of this study. This is equivalent to a building in the 25-34 m escape height category. 
Variations above and below the mean are accounted for in the risk model by the various escape 
height categories in parameter BU2. The 25-34 m height category scores a 3 in the model as the 
building increases in height the escape time increases above the mean and the parameter score 
reduces accordingly. 
 
As already alluded to previously, “Purpose Group” pertains to human behaviour and as such 
response time. In terms of evacuation time this relates to the pre-movement time and time to 
evacuate the open path, including queuing which varies according to purpose group type. The 
mean time to clear a floor has been assessed as 8.25 minutes which equates to approximately 
50% of the mean total vertical travel time of 16.4 minutes. Therefore the purpose group 
parameter (BU1) was weighted 50% of that for building escape height parameter (Wi BU2 = 
7.55%), i.e. Wi BU1 = 3.78%.  
 
Occupant numbers parameter (BU3) is a little more difficult to assess. C/AS1 specifies a constant 
rate per person for the widths of escape routes. This has the effect of equalising the escape time 
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regardless of the number of persons in a firecell or building. For example 100 persons require a 
900mm wide escape route and 1000 persons require 9000mm of escape route width.  Therefore 
assuming the same density and travel speed the evacuation time should be the same for both 
occupant number scenarios, hence there is no impact on escape time from increasing occupant 
numbers. In reality there is an increased risk as the occupant numbers increase due to a variety of 
human behaviour related aspects. For example crowd behaviour where people follow a leader 
which may result in all persons trying to use one exit when others are available or simply that 
statistically there are more people to make less appropriate decisions.   To this end the occupant 
numbers (BU3) parameter was crudely estimated at a weighting of 33% of that for the building 
escape height parameter (BU2), i.e. Wi BU3 = 2.52%.  
 
In this project the time to untenable conditions was used to estimate the weighting of the Fire 
Hazard Category parameter (BU4). Life safety is typically concerned with the early stages of fire 
development and evacuating occupants before the firecell or building becomes untenable. 
Therefore the time to untenable conditions is more a function of the fire growth rate rather than 
the total fuel load in a firecell. The fire hazard category assignments in C/AS1, although 
primarily based on FLED, do include an element of fire growth rate [Clause 2.2.1 C/AS1](1). The 
times to untenable conditions were estimated based on the correlation equation for a t2 fire given 
by Frantzich et al 1997(38) from Section 5.6.8, repeated below for clarity. 
 
  S = 1.67 α -0.26 H 0.44 A0.54 Time to untenable conditions 
Where: 
α = t2 fire growth rate  = 0.00293 MW/s2 for a slow fire 
       = 0.01170 MW/s2 for a medium fire 
        = 0.04660 MW/s2 for a fast fire 
  
  H = Height of room   = 3.0 m   assumed height 
 
  A =  Area of room  = 5000m2  for FHC 1 
      = 2500m2  for FHC 2 
         = 1500m2  for FHC 3 
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The above floor areas have been selected based on the maximum areas permitted for 
unsprinklered firecells in accordance with Clause 4.2.3 C/AS1. 
 
The results of the calculations are shown in Table 6.41 below. 
 
Fire Hazard Category FHC1 FHC2 FHC3 




Time to Untenable Conditions S (minutes) 
Slow 0.00293 20.44 14.06 10.67 
Medium 0.0117 14.26 9.81 7.44 
Fast 0.0466 9.96 6.85 5.20 
10.97 
 
Table 6.41 – Time to Untenable Conditions in Unsprinklered Firecells 
 
 
This gave an average time to untenable conditions of 11.0 minutes. The mean time to evacuate a 
floor and building was estimated to be 8.3 minute and 24.7 minutes respectively, Table 6.40 
above. Given that the times are in the same order of magnitude, the fire hazard category 
parameter has been weighted the same as the escape height parameter, therefore Wi BU4 = 7.55%. 
 
Finally the weightings were normalised for the C/AS1 model to account for parameters BU1, 
BU3 and BU4 which were not included in the NFPA models. Therefore the weighting for the 
Building/Use Score parameters reduced as follows: 
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NFPA101A - Average weightings (Refer Table 6.45) 
for equivalent FSFS parameters. 
0.9245 0.8121 
50% “Construction” Parameter 
Equivalent to Escape Height parameter - BU2  
0.0755 0.0663 
Total NFPA 1.0000  
Purpose Group Parameter BU1 (= 50% BU2) 0.0378 0.0332 
Occupant Numbers Parameter BU3 (= 33% BU2)  0.0252 0.0221 
Fire Hazard Category Parameter BU4 (= BU2)  0.0755 0.0663 
Total  1.1385 1.000 
 
Table 6.42 – Building/Use Score Weighting Normalisation 
 
 
Therefore the Building/Use parameters are weighted 18.79% and the Fire Safety Features Score 
parameters are weight 81.21%. Derivation of the Fire Safety Features Score parameter 
weightings is discussed in Subsection b) below. 
 
The Building/Use Score parameter weightings are summarised in Table 6.43 below and 
incorporated into the final weighting scheme in Table 6.. 
 
No. Fire Safety Parameter C/AS1 
Weighting Wi BUS 
BU1 Purpose Group 0.0332 
BU2 Building Escape Height 0.0663 
BU3 Occupant Numbers 0.0221 
BU4 Fire Hazard Category  0.0663 
 Total 0.1879 
 
Table 6.43 – Summary Building/Use Score Parameter Weightings 
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b) Fire Safety Feature Score Parameter Weightings 
 
The parameter weightings for the fire safety features were determined from the average of the 
weightings calculated from the FRIB-MAB(35) and NFPA101A(32) models and are shown in 
Table 6.45 below.  
 
The emergency power supply is not included in any of the existing models. This is assumed to be 
similar in importance to the communications system and assigned 2% in the calculated mean 
weighting. This reduced to 1.58% in the final C/AS1 model. 
 
The Building Fire Control parameter (D) contains three sub-parameters. These are sprinklers 
(D1), water supply (D2) and occupant fire fighting (D3). The total weighting for building fire 
control, based on the average of the sprinkler and/or suppression parameters from the FRIB-
MAB(35) and NFPA101A(32) models, is 9.51% (adjusted for the BUS parameters). The breakdown 
of the building fire control parameter weight has been estimated at 7.1%, 1.9% and 0.5% for 
sprinklers, water supply and occupant fire fighting respectively. 
 
A number of parameters for the C/AS1 Means of Escape parameter (H) were not included 
specifically in the FRIB-MAB(35) and FSES(32) models. Therefore the most appropriate parameter 
weighting from both the FRIB-MAB and FSES models were assigned to the C/AS1 Means of 
Escape parameter. For example FRIB-MAB parameter P14, Escape Routes, had a weighting of 
0.0824Error! Reference source not found.. In this case a proportion of this weighting was 
assigned to all the C/AS1 Means of Escape (H) parameters that did not have a specific 
corresponding parameter in either FRIM-MAB or NFPA101A models. The proportion was 
determined using judgment and is given as a percentage breakdown in Table 6.44. 
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Fire Safety Features Score 
Means of Escape Parameters (H) 




Breakdown of  
FRIM-MAB  
Parameter P14 
H1 Number of Escape Routes 13.5% 0.0111 
H2 Width of Escape Routes 13.5% 0.0111 
H3 Emergency Lighting 8.0% 0.0065 
H4 Refuge Areas 4.0% 0.0033 
H5 DEOP Lengths 15.0% 0.0124 
H6 Total Open Lengths 15.0% 0.0124 
H8 Surface Finishes Exitways 23.0% 0.0189 
H10 Signage 8.0% 0.0065 
 Total 100.0% 0.0822 
 
Table 6.44 – Estimated Means of Escape Parameter Weightings 
 
Note the difference between the FRIM-MAB weighting for P14 of 0.0824 and the C/AS1 
weighting of 0.0822 in the above table is a rounding error and would not show up if an additional 
decimal place was used. 
 
The C/AS1 Fire Safety Features Score weightings have been determined from the mean of the 
weightings calculated from the FRIB-MAB and NFPA101A models, adjusted to include new 











The final weightings have been scaled to sum 0.8121, the total assigned to the Fire Safety 
Features Score Component of the C/AS1 Fire safety Index model.  













The Fire Safety Features Score parameter weightings are shown in Table 6.45 below: 
 













A Fire Barriers        
A1 Fire Cell Rating 0.2404 0.1399 0.1902 0.1504 
A2 Structural Endurance Rating 0.0837 0.1596 0.1217 0.0962 
B Fire Alarm 0.1518 0.1456 0.1487 0.1176 
C Smoke Control         
C1       HVAC Control 0.0742 0.0189 0.0466 0.0368 
C2       Extraction 0.0405 0.0103 0.0254 0.0201 
C3       Pressurisation 0.0405 0.0103 0.0254 0.0201 
D Building Fire Control 0.0888 0.1517 0.1203   
D1      Sprinklers No breakdown No breakdown   0.0713 
D2      Water Supply No breakdown No breakdown   0.0190 
D3      Occupant Fire Fighting No breakdown No breakdown   0.0048 
E Emergency Power Supply Not Included Not Included 0.0200 0.0158 
F Communication System Not Included 0.0247 0.0247 0.0195 
G Fire Service         
G1     Alerting 0.0425 0.0247 0.0336 0.0266 
G2     Lift Control 0.0199 Not Included 0.0199 0.0157 
G3     Fire Hydrant System 0.0280 Not Included 0.0280 0.0221 
H Means of Escape         
H1      Number of Escape Routes 0.0111 0.0385 0.0248 0.0196 
H2      Width of Escape Routes 0.0111 0.0385 0.0248 0.0196 
H3      Emergency Lighting 0.0065 Not Included 0.0065 0.0051 
H4      Refuge Areas 0.0033 Not Included 0.0033 0.0026 
H5      DEOP Lengths 0.0124 0.0380 0.0252 0.0199 
H6      Total Open Lengths 0.0124 0.0380 0.0252 0.0199 
H7      Protected Path Lengths 0.0309 0.0380 0.0345 0.0272 
H8      Surface Finishes Exitways 0.0189 0.0095 0.0142 0.0112 
H9      Surface Finishes Occupied      Spaces 0.0766 0.0383 0.0575 0.0454 
H10      Signage 0.0065 Not Included 0.0065 0.0051 
 Total 1.0000 0.9245** 1.0267 0.8121## 
** 7.55% assigned to the Building Escape Height Parameter     
## 18.79% assigned to the Building/Use Score Parameters 
 
Table 6.45 – Summary Fire Safety Features Parameter Weightings 
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c) Fire Safety Index - Final Parameter Weightings 
 
No. Fire Safety Parameter Fire Safety IndexWeighting Wi C/AS1
Building Use Score 
BU1 Purpose Group 0.0332 
BU2 Building Escape Height 0.0663 
BU3 Occupant Numbers 0.0221 
BU4 Fire Hazard category 0.0663 
Fire Safety Features Score 
A Fire Barriers   
A1 Fire Cell Rating 0.1504 
A2 Structural Endurance Rating 0.0962 
B Fire Alarm 0.1176 
C Smoke Control   
C1       HVAC Control 0.0368 
C2       Extraction 0.0201 
C3       Pressurisation 0.0201 
D Building Fire Control   
D1      Sprinklers 0.0713 
D2      Water Supply 0.0190 
D3      Occupant Fire Fighting 0.0048 
E Emergency Power Supply 0.0158 
F Communication System 0.0195 
G Fire Service   
G1     Alerting 0.0266 
G2     Lift Control 0.0157 
G3     Fire Hydrant System 0.0221 
H Means of Escape   
H1      Number of Escape Routes 0.0196 
H2      Width of Escape Routes 0.0196 
H3      Emergency Lighting 0.0051 
H4      Refuge Areas 0.0026 
H5      DEOP Lengths 0.0199 
H6      Total Open Lengths 0.0199 
H7      Protected Path Lengths 0.0272 
H8      Surface Finishes Exitways 0.0112 
H9      Surface Finishes Occupied Spaces 0.0454 
H10      Signage 0.0051 
 Total 1.0000 
 




As noted in the introduction to this section the model is a simple risk ranking model which 
produces a single numerical safety index which will enable comparison of risk/safety between 
buildings of different heights and occupancy types and with different fire safety features.  
 
The proposed risk index model for buildings designed to the C/AS1 Fire Safety requirements has 
been developed as a worksheet. The model is suitable for use in a computer spreadsheet program 




7 LEVEL OF SAFETY OF BUILDINGS DESIGN TO C/AS1 
 
7.1 General  
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to assess the apparent level of safety of buildings designed to 
C/AS1, to investigate inconsistencies that may arise and identify fire safety features that impact 
the most on the fire safety of buildings.  
 
Individuals and /or society may have an expectation that the level of safety of a building is the 
same regardless of the building the person is occupying, however, the fire statistics do not 
support this rationale. The fire statistics clearly indicate that the most fire fatalities (70.6%)(60) 
occur in the building class with the least C/AS1 fire safety requirements; domestic houses. 
Whether or not this is reflected in the building classes assessed in this report will be discussed 
later in this Chapter.  
 
The proposed model has been developed to assess multi-story buildings with occupancies made 
up entirely of the general population or “average” people. The analysis avoids buildings of a 
specialist nature, such as hospitals and prisons, so that the additional requirements for these types 
of buildings do not skew the model.  
 
The analysis includes all building heights including and above a 4m escape height and occupant 
numbers in excess of 50 persons, with the exception of SR and SA purpose groups which have a 
maximum of 40 occupants permitted in an unsprinklered firecell. 
 
7.2 Method of Analysis 
 
The model has been developed as a worksheet in the Microsoft Excel(42) spreadsheet computer 
program for ease of use.  
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The following buildings are assessed based of C/AS1 purpose groups: 
 
  CS  –  Crowd Small 50< Occupants < 100 
  CL –  Crowd Large > 100 Occupants 
  CM  –  Crowd Mercantile 
  SA  –  Sleeping Accommodation 
  SR  –  Sleeping Residential 
  WL  –  Working Low (Fire load) 
  WM  –  Working Medium (Fire Load) 
 
 
The following escape heights and occupant numbers are assessed: 
 
Escape Heights Occupant Numbers 
4m to <10m Up to  100 
10m to < 25m 101 -500 
25m to <34m 501 - 1000 
34m to < 46m Over 1000 
46m to < 58m  
Over 58m  
 
The fire safety index score has been calculated for each occupancy type, building height and 
occupant number combination. The scores have been recorded and assessed using the functions 
of the Excel spreadsheet program to compare the relative safety. 
 
The fire safety parameters for each purpose group/building height and occupant number 
combination have been selected based on the requirements of C/AS1. For example where a 
building is deemed to require smoke detectors the open paths lengths may be doubled for most 
occupancies. Therefore the increased open path lengths have been used in the model where 
applicable to account for the increased risk/reduced safety of occupants having further to travel to 
evacuate the building.  
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The input parameters for the analysis are shown in Appendix F and a sample calculation of the 
fire safety index is shown in Appendix E.  
 
7.3 Results  
 





Fire Safety Precautions Maximum 100 Occupants(#Maximum 40 persons in SA Occupancy) 
4m to<10m  10m to<25m  25m to<34m 
CS CM WL WM SA# SR  CS CM WL WM SA# SR  CS CM WL WM SA SR 
2.663 2.531 2.387 2.255 2.736 2.103  3.021 2.812 2.669 2.536 2.782 2.645  2.755 2.622 2.424 2.291 3.035 2.630 
                      
34m to<46m  46m to<58m  >58m 
CS CM WL WM SA SR  CS CM WL WM SA SR  CS CM WL WM SA SR 
3.001 2.927 2.542 2.409 3.108 2.564  2.994 2.861 2.916 2.784 3.042 2.556   3.508 3.375 3.410 3.277 3.556 3.084 
Fire Safety Precautions 101 - 500 Occupants (* Maximum 160 persons in SA Occupancy) 
4m to<10m  10m to<25m  25m to<34m 
CL CM WL WM SA*    CL CM WL WM SA*    CL CM WL WM SA*   
2.661 2.528 2.385 2.252 2.821    3.019 2.809 2.587 2.455 2.856    2.752 2.620 2.422 2.289 3.013   
                      
34m to<46m  46m to <58m  >58m 
CL CM WL WM SA*    CL CM WL WM SA*    CL CM WL WM SA*   
2.999 2.925 2.539 2.407 3.086    2.933 2.859 2.886 2.754 3.020     3.505 3.373 3.459 3.326 3.526   
Fire Safety Precautions 501 - 1000 Occupants 
4m to<10m  10m to<25m  25m to<34m 
CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM     
2.833 2.701 2.603 2.470      2.970 2.916 2.818 2.685      3.082 2.950 2.752 2.619     
                      
34m to<46m  46m to<58m  >58m 
CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM     
3.016 2.942 2.869 2.737      2.950 2.876 2.904 2.771      3.522 3.390 3.397 3.264     
Fire Safety Precautions >1000 Occupants 
4m to<10m  10m to<25m  25m to<34m 
CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM     
3.078 2.945 2.842 2.710      3.011 2.958 2.855 2.722      3.124 2.992 2.788 2.656     
                      
34m to<46m  46m to<58m  >58m 
CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM     
3.058 2.984 2.906 2.774      2.992 2.918 2.940 2.808      3.564 3.432 3.434 3.310     
 
Table 7.1 – Fire Safety Index Results by Occupant Numbers 
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Purpose Group CS/CL 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 2.663 3.021 2.755 3.001 2.994 3.508 
101-500 2.661 3.019 2.752 2.999 2.933 3.505 
501-1000 2.833 2.970 3.082 3.016 2.950 3.522 
+1000 3.078 3.011 3.124 3.058 2.992 3.564 
       
Purpose Group CM 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 2.531 2.812 2.622 2.927 2.861 3.375 
101-500 2.528 2.809 2.620 2.925 2.859 3.373 
501-1000 2.701 2.916 2.950 2.942 2.876 3.390 
+1000 2.945 2.958 2.992 2.984 2.918 3.432 
       
Purpose Group WL 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 2.387 2.669 2.424 2.542 2.916 3.410 
101-500 2.385 2.587 2.422 2.539 2.886 3.459 
501-1000 2.603 2.818 2.752 2.869 2.904 3.397 
+1000 2.842 2.855 2.788 2.906 2.940 3.434 
       
Purpose Group WM 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 2.255 2.536 2.291 2.409 2.784 3.277 
101-500 2.252 2.455 2.289 2.407 2.754 3.326 
501-1000 2.470 2.685 2.619 2.737 2.771 3.264 
+1000 2.710 2.722 2.656 2.774 2.808 3.301 
       
Purpose Group SA 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 2.736 2.782 3.035 3.108 3.042 3.556 
101-160 2.821 2.856 3.013 3.086 3.020 3.526 
       
Purpose Group SR 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
40 2.103 2.645 2.630 2.564 2.556 3.084 
 




7.3.1 Crowd Occupancy  
 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 below show the FSI values for Crowd Small (CS), Crowd Large (CL) and 
Crowd Mercantile (CM) occupancies as the building escape height and number of occupants 
varies.  
 
The fire safety index (FSI) of building in the 4-10 m escape height ranges is very much 
dependant on the type of fire alarm installed and whether or not sprinklers are installed.  
 
The 10-25 m escape height buildings have a similar FSI to the buildings over 34 m. This is due to 
having a higher firecell rating requirement in the absence of a sprinkler system. 
 
Buildings with an escape height of 25-34 m have the most inconsistent FSI. The safety index of 
buildings in this height category is sensitive to the fire alarm type and whether or not there are 
sprinklers present. There is a significant step in the FSI at the 500 occupant mark as sprinklers are 
introduced into the safety requirements for occupant numbers in excess of 500. There is a drop in 
FSI between the 10-25 m and 25-34 m height categories where there is less than 500 persons. 
This is primarily due to the reduction in the firecell rating when sprinklers are introduced. This 
issue is discussed further in Section 7.4.3. 
 
Buildings in the over 58 m escape height category have the highest FSI due to the step up in 
firecell rating requirements of C/AS1 from 30 to 60 minutes for this height category. This is 
typical for all Purpose Groups 
 
The CM purpose group has a FSI approximately 5% lower than that of CS and CL purpose 
groups for the same occupant number and building escape height ranges. This is due to the 
increased fire hazard category parameter (BU4) as these two building categories generally have 
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Up to 100 Occupants 101 to 500 Occupants 501 to 1000 Occupants Over 1000 Occupants  
 
Figure 7.2 - Fire Safety Index - Crowd Purpose Group CM 
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7.3.2 Working Occupancy  
 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 below show the FSI values for Working Low (WL) and Working Medium 
(WM) occupancies as the building escape height and number of occupants varies.  
 
The FSI of building in the 4-10 m escape height ranges is similar in pattern to that of the crowd 
occupancies with the fire alarm type dominating the variance.  
 
The FSI of the 10-25 m high buildings is a little more inconsistent as a variety of factors 
including alarm type, sprinklers and firecell rating affect the safety index. The drop in safety 
index between the “up to 100” and “101-500” occupant number categories in this height range is 
due to the Occupant number parameter (BU3) as these two occupant ranges have the same fire 
safety requirements to C/AS1. 
 
Buildings in the ranges of 25-34 m and 34 - 46 m have a significant step in the FSI at the 500 
occupant mark. This is due to the introduction of sprinklers and number of other fire safety 
precautions where there are more than 500 occupants in these purpose groups.  
 
The FSI for buildings above 46 m in height is also relatively constant for Purpose groups WL and 
WM. This is because the height of the building dominates the fire safety requirements of building 
code for these purpose groups. The FSI for buildings with over 1000 persons is also consistent 
with the FSI for building over 46 m in this occupancy category. 
 
The WM purpose group also has a FSI approximately 5% lower than that of WL purpose group 
for the same occupant number and building escape height ranges. This is due to the increased fire 
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Up to 100 Occupants 101 to 500 Occupants 501 to 1000 Occupants Over 1000 occupnats  
 
Figure 7.4 - Fire Safety Index - Working Purpose Group WM 
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7.3.3 Sleeping Occupancy  
 
Figure 7.5 below shows the FSI values for Sleeping Residential (SR) and Sleeping 
Accommodation (SA) occupancies as the building escape height and number of occupants varies. 
 
The FSI for the SA purpose group increases uniformly up to building heights of 46m as fire 
safety precautions are incrementally introduced into the design. Note that the maximum number 
of occupants per firecell in a SA Purpose Group is 40 if the building is unsprinklered. This 
applies to building escape height categories up to 25 m high. Buildings over 25 m must be 
sprinklered due to the height and as such are permitted up to 160 occupants. 
 
The FSI for the SR purpose group follows a similar pattern to SA but is considerably lower 
(approximately 20%) in magnitude due to lesser safety requirements, in particular the lack of 
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7.3.4 All Purpose Groups – By Occupant Numbers 
 
Figures 7.6 to 7.9 below show the FSI for all purpose groups by occupant number category. 
 
There is considerable range and scatter of FSI for buildings up to 500 occupants (Figures 7.6 and 
7.7). FSI ranges between 2.100 for SR purpose group and 3.108 for the SA purpose group. The 
working and crowd occupancies generally fit in between with one or two anomalies. 
  
The crowd and working purpose groups have a spike in FSI in the 10-25 m purpose group. This 
is unusual and can be attributed solely to the high weighting for the firecell (F) rating and 
structural endurance (S) rating parameters. There is a step up in safety as the F and S ratings 
increase from 30 minutes to 45 minutes and 60 minutes to 90 minutes for the F and S rating 
respectively between escape heights of 4-10 m and 10-25 m. The FSI then drops for height 
categories between 10-25 m and 25-34 m as the F and S rating drop back to 30 minutes and 60 
minutes respectively with the introduction of sprinklers.  C/AS1:June 2001 allows a “tradeoff” 
between firecell rating and sprinklers whereas the C/AS1:Oct 2005 revisions have reduced this 
“tradeoff”. These issues will be discussed further in Section 7.4.3 and 7.4.4. 
 
From Figures 7.8 and 7.9 the crowd occupancies have a higher FSI than the working occupancies 
for the equivalent escape height categories where occupants exceed 500 persons. The average 
difference is approximately 7%. Furthermore the FSI is relatively constant across the various 
building height categories up to 58 m suggesting a constant level of safety. This is because the 
building height governs the fire safety precautions required by C/AS1; hence most buildings will 
have a 30 minutes firecell rating, sprinkler system and smoke detection in these height/occupancy 
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Figure 7.9 - Fire Safety Index - All Purpose Group, Over 1000 Occupants 
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7.3.5 All Purpose Groups – By Escape Height 
 
Figures 7.10 to 7.15 below show the FSI for all purpose groups by escape height category. 
 
The FSI for the 4-10 m building escape height category generally increases with an increase in 
occupant numbers across the range of purpose groups (Figure 7.10). This is the only height 
category where this type of grading occurs. For 10-25 m, 25-34 m and 34 m-46 m building 
escape height categories there are a numbers of steps in the FSI. These steps are typically caused 
by introduction of sprinklers and/or reduction in F and S ratings. 
  
The SA purpose group has the highest FSI in all escape height categories except the 10-25 m 
category (Figure 7.11). The FSI for the SA purpose group is 2.782 and 2.856 for the 10-25 m 
escape height category and are similar in magnitude to the 4-10 m escape height FSI. Therefore 
the index appears to be in the right order, with an increase in the relative level of safety for the 
other purpose groups in the 10-25 m escape height category. The FSI for the crowd and working 
purpose groups in the 10-25 m escape height category is controlled by the firecell rating 
parameter. Refer to discussions in Sections 7.4.3 and 7.4.4. 
 
It is apparent from figures 7.10 to 7.15 that there is a clear difference in FSI between each 
purpose group and escape height categories. However as the height of the building increase the 
FSI converge and the difference become small, approximately 5%. 
 
The trend for the SR purpose group is difficult to assess as there is only one occupant number 
category. It generally scores the lowest FSI in most escape height categories. This is due to the 
low number of fire safety precautions required for this purpose group, in particular smoke control 
in the heating and ventilation system is not required and stairwell pressurisation is only required 
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Fire Safety Indices determined in this study range from 2.10 to 3.6 (Table 7.1) indicating that 
there is considerable variation in the level of safety of buildings designed to C/AS1. This is not 
necessarily a bad thing, depending on the underlying reasons for the variations. These shall be 
investigated and discussed below as appropriate. 
 
There are also a number of significant steps in the level of safety, particularly when changing 
between the 10-25 m and 25-34 m building escape height category. These are mainly to do with 
the introduction of sprinklers and /or the reduction or increase in the firecell and structural 
endurance rating.   
 
 
7.4.1 Apparent Level of Safety of Buildings Designed to C/AS1 
 
From Table 7.1 and 7.2 and Figures 7.1 to 7.15 it is apparent that the level of safety generally 
increases as a function of escape height and/or building occupant numbers as additional fire 
safety features are introduced to reduce the risk.  
 
As noted above the model gives a fire safety index value for all occupancies, occupant numbers 
and building escape heights in the range of 2.1 to 3.6. Variations in FSI between successive 
building parameters vary by 5-15% in most cases. The most notable exception to this is the 4-
10 m building escape height for SR purpose group which has a FSI 26% below that of 10-25 m 
building escape height category. This is primarily due to the lack of required safety precautions in 
this class of building at the lower building heights. 
 
The FSI ranks the different purpose groups from most safe to least safe in the following order as 





Rank Purpose Group Fire Safety Index 
Rankings Based on the NZ 
Fire Service Statistics ## 
  Min. Max. Average deaths/year Rank 
1 
SA – Sleeping 
Accommodation 
2.736 3.556 3.048 0.2 1 
2 
CL – Crowd Large  
(CS under 100 occupants) 
2.661 3.564 3.042 0.4 2 
3 CM - Crowd Mercantile 2.528 3.432 2.927 Not included Not included 
4 
WM - Working Medium  
(Medium Fire Hazard) 
2.252 3.326 2.690 
5 
WL - Working  Low  
(Low Fire Hazard) 
2.385 3.459 2.822 
2.8 3 
6 SR - Sleeping Residential 2.103 3.084 2.597 4.6 4 
## Refer to Appendix H for assessment of NZ Fire Service Statistics 1999 to 2004 
 
Table 7.3 – FSI Rankings for Purpose Groups - C/AS1: June 2001 
 
 
The above rankings are what could reasonably be expected and compare very well with the 
rankings determined from the New Zealand Fire Service statistics. The purpose groups can be 
divided into two categories. The FSI Rankings 1, 2 and 3 are largely made up of purpose groups 
with large occupant numbers and/or persons who may have a low familiarity with the building.  
FSI Rankings 4, 5 and 6 are largely made up of purpose groups with low occupant numbers and 
persons who may have a high familiarity with the building.   
 
The unusual result is that of the Sleeping residential (SR) purpose group which score the lowest 
ranking. It could have been expected that this group, given that it is a sleeping purpose group, 
would have scored higher, and may be above the working purpose groups (WL and WM). 
However it is consistent with the New Zealand Fire Service statistics which show that the 
residential occupancy has the highest death rate in building fires of the purpose groups assessed 
in this study. Note that domestic houses, purpose group SH, have the overall highest death rate 
for building fire, 19.2 deaths/year(60), which is an order of magnitude greater than the SR purpose 
group. The SH purpose group was excluded from this study as noted in Section 4.2.2. 
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Table 7.4 below shows that the level of safety increases with increasing occupant numbers. This 
is because C/AS1 generally increases the safety requirements with increases in occupant 
numbers. The number of escape routes and escape widths required is directly proportional to the 
number of persons thus effectively maintaining a constant escape time. Increased safety due to 
improvements in the type of alarm with occupant numbers is not significantly reduced by the 
additional risk posed by permitted increased escape lengths. 
 
Fire Safety Index 
Rank Occupant Numbers 
Min. Max. Average 
1 Over 1000 Occupants 2.656 3.564 2.872 
2 501 to 1000 Occupants 2.470 3.522 2.801 
3 101 to 500 Occupants 2.252 3.526 2.744 
4 Up to 100 Occupants 2.103 3.556 2.725 
 
Table 7.4– FSI Rankings based on Occupant Numbers - C/AS1: June 2001 
 
The FSI ranks the different building height categories from least safe to most safe in the 
following order as shown in Table 7.5 below. 
 
Fire Safety Index 
Rank Building Heights 
Min. Max. Average 
1 Over 58 m 3.084 3.564 3.405 
2 46< He≤58 m 2.556 3.042 2.882 
3 34< He≤46 m 2.407 3.108 2.831 
4 10< He≤25 m 2.455 3.021 2.796 
5 25< He≤34 m 2.289 3.124 2.727 
6 4< He≤10 m 2.103 3.078 2.605 
 
Table 7.5 – FSI Rankings based on Building Escape Height - C/AS1: June 2001 
 
From Table 7.5 the level of safety generally increases with building height. The only exception to 
this is the 10-25 m building height category, which is graded ahead of the 25-34 m building 
height category. The difference between these two categories comes down to the level of safety 
provided by the increased firecell rating in the 10-25 m height category over installation of 
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sprinklers in the 25-34 m height category. The model as it stands rates the impact on safety of fire 
barriers at almost twice that of sprinklers. This is reflected in risk ranking models from other 
countries but may not be appropriate to a model for New Zealand buildings. Refer to Section 
7.4.3 below for further discussion and evaluation. 
 
7.4.2 Building/Use Parameters Sensitivity 
 
The Building/Use parameters were chosen and weighted based on a simple assessment of the 
likely impact on the evacuation time of a building. The analysis although crude at best, met the 
objective of providing an estimate of the weightings, however it was noted during the 
development of the model that the FSI was sensitive to some of the Building/Use parameters. 
This sensitivity is assessed as follows: 
 
If the weighting of the purpose group parameter (BU1), occupant number parameter (BU3) or fire 
hazard category parameter (BU4) are halved or doubled this has little impact on the FSI. Changes 
in these parameter weightings cause a 1-2% change in the range for each building height and 
occupant number category but there is negligible differential change across building height 
categories. Refer to Figures 7.16 to 7.18 below for an example of the change resulting from 
variations to the purpose group parameter (BU1), occupant number parameter (BU3) or fire 
hazard category parameter (BU4) respectively. 
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CL Purpose Group - 101 to 500 Occupants




















Original Model BU1 50% BU1 200%  
Figure 7.16 - Fire Safety Index - Example of Purpose Group Weighting Sensitivity 
 
 
CL Purpose Group - 101 to 500 Occupants




















Original Model BU3 50% BU3 200%
 
Figure 7.17 - Fire Safety Index - Example of Occupant Number Weighting Sensitivity 
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CL Purpose Group - 101 to 500 Occupants




















Original Model BU4 50% BU4 200%  
 
Figure 7.18 - Fire Safety Index - Example of FHC Weighting Sensitivity 
 
 
The model is sensitive to changes in the building escape height parameter (BU2) weighting, 
although the magnitude of the change is small. If the weighting is reduced by 50% from 6.6% to 
3.3% then the FSI reduces for the lower building height ranges by approximately 2.5 to 5.5% 
depending on the purpose group. The FSI for upper building height ranges increased by 
approximately 3.3% across all purpose groups.  
 
Furthermore, if the building escape height parameter (BU2) weighting is increased from 6.6% to 
13.2%, which gives it the same order of weighting as the firecell and sprinkler rating then the 
opposite trend to reducing the weighting occurs. The FSI increases for the lower building height 
ranges by approximately 6.5 to 10% depending on the purpose group. The FSI for upper building 
height ranges increased by approximately 7.1% across all purpose groups. Therefore the fire 
safety feature score is dominating the FSI when the BU2 weighting is low and the building 
escape height is dominating when the weighting is high.  
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Figure 7.19 below shows the change to FSI resulting from variations to the building escape 
height parameter (BU2). From the graph it is apparent that the model as it is currently proposed is 
quite sensitive to the building height parameter weighting.  
 
Furthermore, given that the vertical safe paths (stairs) have a definitive fire rating, then the risk to 
occupants must increase and as such the safety of the building reduces as the height of a building 
is increased for uniformly prescribed fire safety precautions. For example there are no increases 
in the safety requirements for building that exceeds a height of 58m by a factor of 2 or 3 in 
C/AS1. The firecell rating of the vertical safe path (stairs), alarm type etc is not required to 
change but the number of occupants and escape time does increase by an order of magnitude. 
Therefore by inspection the risk to occupants must increase. It is the author’s opinion that the 
weighting of the building escape parameter in this model is in the right order of magnitude for the 
type and nature of this study based on the literature reviewed.  
 
CL Purpose Group - 101 to 500 Occupants




















Original Model BU2 50% BU2 200%  
 
Figure 7.19 - Fire Safety Index - Example of Building Escape Height Weighting Sensitivity 
The same sensitivity analysis was carried out on the Building /Use score parameter weightings as 
a whole. All four parameter weightings were reduced by 50% and increased by 200%. The results 
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are shown in Table 7.20 below. By inspection the results are dominated by the change in the 
building escape height parameter similar to the above analysis. 
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7.4.3 Impact of Firecell Rating Parameter 
 
The analysis of C/AS1:June 2001 revision shows an apparent drop in safety between the 10-25 m 
building escape height category and the 25-34 m escape height category. The reason for the drop 
is the reduction in the firecell rating permitted with the addition of sprinklers is not offset in the 
risk model by the sprinkler parameter. In simple terms the tradeoff of firecell rating for sprinklers 
is not deemed equal in the model. There are two possible conclusions one can draw; firstly that 
the model weightings for the firecell rating and sprinklers are not compatible or secondly that the 
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tradeoff may not be justifiable. The compatibility of the firecell and sprinkler parameter 
weightings is assessed below. 
 
Buildings in the 10-25 m escape height range generally have either a Type 3 (heat detection) or 
Type 4 (smoke detection) automatic alarm system and a 45 minute firecell (F) rating. The 
introduction of sprinklers at the next building escape height category allows for the (F) rating to 
be reduced to 30 minutes. It is assumed that this equates to 50% of a 60 minute rating that would 
be required for these types of building if they were permitted to be un-sprinklered along the same 
lines as the 50% reduction in the structural endurance rating permitted for a sprinkled fire cell. 
 
The weightings from both the FRIM-MAB(35) and NFPA101A FSES(32) system clearly weight the 
fire separation and structural fire capacity at approximately twice that of sprinklers. However this 
weighting ratio is the main reason for the apparent anomaly in the 10-25 m escape height results 
from this model. What this suggests is that the safety provided by sprinklers is either grossly 
overrated by C/AS1 and that a 50% reduction in fire rating for sprinkled firecells may be 
unconservative or that sprinkler systems in other countries are not as reliable at controlling fires 
as sprinkler systems in NZ. 
 
Marryat (27) reported that sprinklers in New Zealand and Australia are 99.5% effective in 
controlling fire based on a study of sprinkler data from 1886-1986. This is considerably more 
reliable than noted by Edward et al (25) 86% to 99.5% and William el al (26) 84% to 96%. 
Furthermore, Feeney (24) suggests that passive fire resistance could be omitted from structural 
elements in sprinkled buildings, as it is effectively redundant due to the excellent reliability of 
sprinkler systems in NZ in controlling fires.  
 
Therefore given the above it maybe reasonable to allow a significant tradeoff between providing 
sprinklers and fire rated barriers/construction, as allowed for in C/AS1. It is clear from both NZ 
and international experience that sprinklers provide considerable fire safety to a building. 
 
The impact of changing the weighting of fire barrier parameter (A) and the building fire control 
parameters (D) in the fire safety feature score was investigated. The weighting for the fire barrier 
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parameters A1 (0.1504) and A2 (0.0962) were reduced by 25% and 50% and the weighting for 
the building fire control D1 (0.0713), D2 (0.0190) and D3 (0.0048) were increased by 25% and 
50%. Finally the weighting for the A and D parameters were equated. Example results are shown 
in Figure 7.21 below: 
 




















Original Model A1&A2 50% A1&A2 75% D1-D3 150% D1-D3 200% A = D
 
 
Figure 7.21 - Fire Safety Index - Example of Fire Barrier/Building Fire Control Weighting 
Sensitivity 
 
Reducing the fire barrier parameter weightings (A1 & A2) had no impact on the 10-25 m 
building escape heights. This was because the fire barrier parameter dominates the FSI for the 10-
25 m building escape height category. It did however impact on other height categories, as the 
reduction in safety index was more than made up by increasing the weightings uniformly across 
all the remaining parameters. 
 
Increasing the building fire control parameter weightings (D1: sprinklers, D2: water supply and 
D3: occupant fire fighting) had more impact on the model. In particular the FSI for the 10-25 m 
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escape height category reduced significantly and FSI for buildings over 25 m escape height 
increased. 
 
Equating the fire barrier and building fire control parameter weightings produced the combined 
effect of reducing the fire barrier and increasing the building fire control weighting. The result is 
a lower FSI for the lower building escape height categories and increased FSI for the higher 
building escape height categories. The key feature from this is that the 10-25 m high buildings 
are ranked below the 25-34 m high buildings, as the fire barrier rating no longer dominates. 
 
So is the safety afforded the firecell rating in this model, being approximately twice that of 
sprinklers, appropriate? The model as it stands is based on similar Swedish(35) and USA(32) 
ranking systems where sprinklers are clearly not rated as important to life safety as fire barriers 
(firecell ratings). However, Enright (22) investigated the impact on life safety of using a Type 5 
alarm in lieu of a Type 4 or part of a Type 7. The analysis involved a probabilistic risk analysis. 
This study found that the most sensitive parameter was the Theoretical Annual Loss of Life 
(TALL) for the occupants in the room of fire origin. This is not surprising as the occupants of the 
room of fire origin are exposed to the fire first, have the least warning (depending on state of 
alertness) and more likely to be required to travel through the smoke and/or past the flames to 
escape. Therefore fire barriers provide negligible safety to the occupants of the room of fire 
origin. The key safety parameters for the occupants in the room of fire origin are the alarm type, 
smoke or heat detection, and whether or not sprinklers are installed and the performance of the 
sprinklers. 
 
Frantzich (54) used the reliability index method to assess the fire safety of a hotel. The most 
sensitive parameter to the occupants of the room of fire origin was found to be the t2 fire growth 
parameter (α). The growth rate of a fire is reduced by the operation of sprinklers. The most 
sensitive parameter for occupants outside the room of fire origin was found to be the fire barriers 
(walls and doors). Therefore, for the majority of occupants in a building it could be argued that 
the firecell (fire barrier) rating provides the most safety. 
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Thomas (61) evaluated the effectiveness of combinations of alarms, sprinklers and passive fire 
protection (fire rated wall construction) based on the number of injuries and fatalities of civilians 
and injuries to fire fighters using data from the USA National Fire Incident Reporting System 
(NFIRS). Thomas concluded: 
 
“Based on the data analysed it appears that sprinklers are generally more effective in 
reducing fire spread, civilian fatalities, fire fighter injuries and property losses than either 
detectors, protected construction or both detectors and protected construction.” (61) 
 
This conclusion appears to be well supported by the data presented by Thomas (61), as indicated 
by the summary of the data for civilian fatalities which is reproduced in Table 7.6 below. From 
Table 7.6 the sprinklered buildings clearly have a lower fatality rate than the non-sprinklered in 
the event of a fire. The average fatality rates have been determined as follows from the data in 
Table 7.6: 
 
Average Fatalities with Sprinklers    1.7 deaths/1000 fires 
Average Fatalities without Sprinklers   5.2 deaths/1000 fires 
Average Fatalities with Detection    3.6 deaths/1000 fires 
Average Fatalities with Protected Construction 2.6 deaths/1000 fires 
 
Number of Civilian Fatalities per 1000 Fire in the USA 
Sprinklers (S) / Detectors (D) / Protected Construction (PC) Occupancy 
(Purpose Group) None D PC D/PC S S/D S/PC S/D/PC
Public Assembly (CL) 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Educational (CL) 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Institutional (SC/SD) 4.3 8.3 1.1 4.0 5.4 0.0 2.2 1.9 
1&2 Family Dwellings  
(SH & SR) 
11.6 5.9 9.5 4.7 10.9 7.0 4.0 5.1 
Apartment (SR) 9.4 8.7 7.4 6.8 2.6 1.3 2.3 2.8 
Rooming, Boarding (SR) 39.5 30.0 15.7 28.2 0.0 21.3 0.0 0.0 
Hotels and Motels (SA) 4.2 11.6 4.8 6.8 0.0 3.7 0.0 1.2 
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Dormitories (SR) 2.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Retail (CM) 1.6 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 
Offices (WL) 1.2 1.9 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
Manufacturing (WL/WM) 1.9 0.7 3.7 0.9 0.9 1.6 0.8 2.8 
Storage (WM) 1.3 3.0 1.8 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Average 6.6 6.0 3.9 4.3 1.8 2.9 0.9 1.3 
 
Note: the shaded figures should be treated with caution as they are based on low numbers of fires (less than 2000) 
 
Table 7.6 – Civilian Fire Fatality Rate in USA(61) 
 
Therefore based on the above it appears reasonable that the weighting given the sprinkler 
parameter should be equal to, if not greater than, the weighting given to both the fire 
detection/alarm system parameter and the firecell rating parameter. An adjustment to the 
weightings has not been incorporated into the FSI model as part of this study. It is suggested that 
all the weightings be reviewed in the future if work is undertaken to develop the model further. 
 
7.4.4 Impact of C/AS1: October 2005 Revisions 
 
C/AS1 was re-issued in October 2005(55) with a number of minor revisions and two significant 
revisions. The first change of note was the introduction of a new occupancy class under the 
crowd purpose group category. The new class is “Early Childhood Centres”. This is a special 
class as it incorporates both crowd and sleeping occupancy requirements. This class of building is 
not specifically relevant to this study and will not be discussed further. The second major revision 
is to the firecell ratings. This is particularly significant to this study and follows on from the 
discussion above regarding the tradeoff between firecell rating and sprinklers.   
 
Table 4.1-C/AS1 has been revised with new firecell ratings for all purpose groups. The firecell 
ratings are now a function of the escape height and the fire hazard category. There is still a drop 
in firecell rating (15 to 30 minute drop) at a number of escape height categories, typically when 
sprinklers are introduced, however there is also an increase in the firecell rating up to 90 minutes 
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in the higher building escape heights. For example the difference in firecell ratings for the crowd 
Purpose Group CL and the escape heights relevant to this study are shown in Table 7.7 below. 
 
The full range of firecell ratings for all occupancies under consideration in this study is shown in 
Appendix F. 
 
Firecell (F) Rating (Minutes)  
Building Escape Heights Code Revision 
4 to <10m 10 to <25m 25 to <34m 34 to <46m 46 to <58m Over 58m 
Up to 100 Occupants 
C/AS1:June 2001 30 45 30 30 30 60 
C/AS1:October 2005       
FHC = 1 45 45 30 45 45 60 
FHC = 2 60 60 45 45 60 90 
FHC = 3 60 90 45 60 60 90 
101-500 Occupants 
C/AS1:June 2001 30 45 30 30 30 60 
C/AS1:October 2005       
FHC = 1 45 45 30 45 45 60 
FHC = 2 60 60 45 45 60 90 
FHC = 3 60 90 45 60 60 90 
501-1000 Occupants 
C/AS1:June 2001 30 30 30 30 30 60 
C/AS1:October 2005       
FHC = 1 45 30 30 45 45 60 
FHC = 2 60 30 45 45 60 90 
FHC = 3 60 45 45 60 60 90 
Over 1000 Occupants 
C/AS1:June 2001 30 30 30 30 30 60 
C/AS1:October 2005       
FHC = 1 45 30 30 45 45 60 
FHC = 2 60 30 45 45 60 90 
FHC = 3 60 45 45 60 60 90 
 
Table 7.7 - Firecell Ratings for CL Purpose Group 
 
 
Full tabulated results of the FSI analysis based on C/AS1: October 2005 are shown in Appendix 
G. 
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The FSI rankings based on C/AS1: October 2005 for the different purpose groups, occupant 
numbers and building escape heights are shown below in Tables 7.8, 7.9 and 7.10 respectively. 
The results are graded from most safe to least safe. 
 
Fire Safety Index 
Rank Purpose Group 
Min. Max. Average 
1 CL – Crowd Large (CS under 100 occupants) 2.968 3.809 3.338 
2 CM - Crowd Mercantile 2.865 3.676 3.213 
3 SA – Sleeping Accommodation 2.781 3.554 3.190 
4 WM - Working Medium (Fire Hazard) 2.534 3.571 3.048 
5 WL - Working  Low (Fire Hazard) 2.667 3.704 3.109 
6 SR - Sleeping Residential 2.348 3.082 2.719 
 
Table 7.8– FSI Rankings for Purpose Groups - C/AS1: Oct. 2005 
 
 
From Table 7.8 the FSI rankings for the different purpose groups have changed as a result of the 
change to the firecell ratings in the C/AS1: Oct. 2005 revisions. The crowd purpose groups are 
now ranked the safest purpose groups with the Sleeping Accommodation (SA) purpose group 
dropping from 1st to 3rd place in the rankings. The purpose group rankings for 4th through to 6th 
have not changed. 
 
 
Fire Safety Index 
Rank Occupant Numbers 
Min. Max. Average 
1 501 to 1000 Occupants 2.817 3.767 3.096 
2 Over 1000 Occupants 2.709 3.814 3.087 
3 101 to 500 Occupants 2.534 3.750 3.045 
4 Up to 100 Occupants 2.348 3.752 2.990 
 
Table 7.9 – FSI Rankings based on Occupant Numbers - C/AS1: Oct. 2005 
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From Table 7.9 the FSI rankings for the different occupant numbers have also changed as a result 
of the change to the firecell ratings in the C/AS1: Oct. 2005 revisions. Buildings with 501 to 
1000 occupants are now ranked the safest group.  
Fire Safety Index 
Rank Building Heights 
Min. Max. Average 
1 Over 58m 3.082 3.809 3.611 
2 46< He≤58m 2.801 3.485 3.335 
3 34< He≤46m 2.785 3.550 3.141 
4 4< He≤10m 2.348 3.325 2.955 
5 10< He≤25m 2.644 3.266 2.950 
6 25< He≤34m 2.534 3.369 2.933 
Table 7.10 – FSI Rankings based on Building Escape Height - C/AS1: Oct. 2005 
 
From Table 7.10 the FSI rankings for the different building escape heights have also changed as a 
result of the change to the firecell ratings in the C/AS1: Oct. 2005 revisions. The main change is 
at the bottom end of the rankings where 25-34 m escape height is now least safe.  The 4-10 m 
building escape height category has moved from least safe to a ranking of 4th. 
 
The percentage difference in FSI between C/AS1: June 2001 and C/AS1: October 2005 revisions 
for the different purpose groups, occupant numbers and building escape heights are shown below 
in Tables 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13 respectively. The results are graded from least impact on FSI to 
most impact on FSI. 
 
% Change in Fire Safety Index 
Rank Purpose Group 
Min. Max. Average 
1 WM - Working Medium (Fire Hazard) 0.0% 21.9% 13.8% 
2 WL - Working  Low (Fire Hazard) 0.0% 20.7% 10.4% 
3 CM - Crowd Mercantile 0.0% 19.5% 10.1% 
4 SR - Sleeping Residential 0.0% 11.8% 5.2% 
5 CL/CL – Crowd Large/Small 0.0% 18.6% 10.0% 
6 SA – Sleeping Accommodation 0.0% 9.0% 4.9% 
 





From Table 7.11 the changes in C/AS1: Oct. 2005 revision had the most impact on the working 
purpose groups and the least impact on the sleeping purpose groups. 
 
 
% Change in Fire Safety Index 
Rank Occupant Numbers 
Min. Max. Average 
1 101 to 500 Occupants 0.0% 21.9% 11.1% 
2 501 to 1000 Occupants  0.0% 20.0% 10.4% 
3 Up to 100 Occupants 0.0% 21.9% 9.9% 
4 Over 1000 Occupants  0.0% 17.8% 7.3% 
 








% Change in Fire Safety Index 
Rank Building Heights 
Min. Max. Average 
1 46< He≤58 m 8.1% 17.9% 15.8% 
2 4< He≤10 m 0.0% 21.9% 14.0% 
3 34< He≤46 m 7.9% 20.5% 11.2% 
4 25< He≤34 m 0.0% 10.8% 7.8% 
5 Over 58 m 0.0% 7.6% 6.1% 
6 10< He≤25 m 0.0% 20.1% 5.8% 
 
Table 7.13 – Percent Change in FSI Between C/AS1:June 2001& C/AS1: Oct. 2005 for 




From Table 7.13 the change in FSI rankings for the different building escape heights are divided 
into to groups although there is no rational pattern. The FSI of building in the 25-34 m escape 
height category have only increased by 2% over the 10-25 m escape height category. Therefore 
buildings with a 25-34 m escape height are still graded with an apparent level of safety below that 
of the lower building heights.  
 
From the above analysis, based on the Fire Safety Index risk model developed in this study, it is 
appears that the changes to C/AS1 have had a significant impact of raising the level of safety of 
most building height, occupant number and purpose group classes. However it should be noted 
that there remains an apparent safety disparity between the level of safety provided by sprinklers 






8.1 Prescriptive versus Performance Based Codes 
 
The introduction of performance based fire safety building codes has resulted in a rather 
interesting dilemma for the fire engineering profession. The performance based codes generally 
set out the performance criteria in rather simple and broad terms. For example: 
 
“Buildings shall be provided with escape routes which allow occupants to reach a safe 
place without being overcome by the effects of fire and give the fire service adequate time 
to rescue occupants”[ NZ Building Regulations 1992(2)]. 
 
There are no specific design standards (written into law) that spell out what an appropriate design 
fire is, an acceptable method for calculating the escape times, or time to untenable conditions and 
the acceptable level of safety/safety margin. Given this, a fire engineer that chooses the specific 
design path needs to determine the parameters for themselves and justify their solutions.  This in 
itself is no easy task without recognised benchmarks or standard to design to.  
 
The territorial authorities are faced with a similar problem. How do they verify that an engineered 
solution that has been submitted for consent meets the performance requirements of the NZ 
Building Regulations?  
 
There is a school of thought in the fire engineering profession that the engineered 
designs/alternative solutions should provide an “equivalent” level of safety to that of prescriptive 
solutions. In fact some territorial authorities and regulatory authorities in New Zealand will not 
accept a design unless it is proven to have an “equivalent” level of safety to a solution prepared to 
the prescriptive code. 
 
The NFPA 101A (32) Fire Safety Evaluation System from the USA is a risk ranking scheme that 
has specifically been designed to assess whether or not a design or an existing building provides 
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an equivalent level of safety to a building design to the NFPA 101 Life Safety Handbook (31). The 
Swedish Building Code, BBR,  “requires that an analytic design provide a level of safety the 
same as or better than that which would have been obtained using prescriptive design”, Ludin 
(56). Therefore equivalency is used rightly or wrongly in other countries as a means for controlling 
the level of fire safety in buildings that are designed using performance based engineering design. 
 
In New Zealand the Department of Building and Housing (DBH) is sometimes required to rule 
on whether or not a particular building design or design/construction detail complies with the 
relevant New Zealand Building Code. This process is known as a “Determination”. When there is 
a dispute between an owner, designer, territorial authority or regulatory authority (e.g. Fire 
Service Commission) on a matter of code compliance one of the parties may seek a 
Determination from the DBH. The DBH ruling (determination) is binding on all parties. 
 
Sometimes a situation arises where a fire engineer designs and details a building that clearly 
deviates or does not follow the provisions of the New Zealand Building Code Approved 
Document for Fire Safety C/AS1. In this case the design is deemed an “alternative solution”. In 
most cases additional fire safety precautions are included in the design to compensate for the 
apparent “non-compliance”. Depending on the extent of the variation to C/AS1 and the details of 
the compensating fire safety measures the validity of the design may be questioned. This can 
occur at the Building Consent stage or on completion of the building at the construction 
certification stage. If agreement cannot be reached between the parties as to whether or not the 
building complies with the performance requirements of the Building Regulations as an 
alternative design then a Determination from the DBH may be sought. 
 
In the absence of specific measurable performance criteria in the Building Regulations for 
alternative solutions the DBH have decreed that: 
 
“The Authority (DBH) sees the acceptable solutions as an example of the level of fire safety 
required by the building code. Any departure from the acceptable solution must achieve the 
same level of safety if it is to be accepted as an alternative solution complying with the 
building code.” (5) 
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Hence the DBH require alternative fire engineering designs to provide at least an equivalent level 
of safety to a design prepared to C/AS1.  
 
8.2 Why Equivalency? 
 
There are many reasons for and against using the level of safety provided by the prescriptive 
documents as a minimum benchmark for performance based design. Some of these are given 
below to highlight the issues: 
 
Are the prescriptive documents safe? This is one of the major debatable questions. There is an 
argument that the low level of fatalities in many building categories covered by the prescription 
solution indicates that they are safe and that society has accepted this level of safety. There is of 
course the possibility that we may not have had a major fire that has fully tested the provisions of 
the Acceptable Solutions, C/AS1.  
 
Furthermore has society really accepted the level of safety of the prescriptive document? There 
may or may not be sufficient information on fire safety of buildings in the public arena in a 
format the members of the public can understand to enable the public to judge. 
 
It should be noted that there are many buildings that exist today that were built before the current 
provisions of the prescriptive document were introduced. Many of these building are not likely to 
comply with the provisions of the current prescriptive document. Therefore the safety 
performance of the current prescriptive document is difficult to judge based on the fire history 
alone. 
 
Bukowski (57) notes four reasons that equivalency and society’s apparent acceptance of perceived 
building safety may not be justified. These are repeated below as follows: 
 
a)  When dealing with rare events, such as disastrous fires, society may believe that 
the risk is zero. 
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b) Codes set the minimum requirements, which are often exceeded in practice. 
Therefore the apparent good performance of a code may in fact be overrated such 
that designing to the minimum code standard may actually result in a reduction in 
safety of the building stock and an increase in losses. 
c) There is an assumption that engineering methods accurately reflect the expected 
risk to life in different buildings. Methods and accuracy are constantly changing. 
d) There is an assumption that both the buildings and society’s views of risk are 
static. Fire disasters often point out the flaws in codes, which are subsequently 
corrected. 
 
Despite the above issues there remains a need to be able to validate fire engineering designs 
undertaken to the performance based codes and at this time, in the absence of fire engineering 
design standards, an equivalency approach may be considered a reasonable method. 
 
It should be noted that it is not the objective of this study to determine whether or not 
equivalency is a reasonable approach for validating alternative designs and the issue certainly 
requires much debate in a forum outside the bounds of this report. However there is a side issue 
for which the work in this study may contribute to resolving with some further research. The 
issue being alluded to is that of “how” we determine whether or not a design is equivalent to a 
design prepared to C/AS1. 
 
8.3 Fire Safety Index as a Tool for Evaluating Equivalency  
 
The model proposed in this report could be used to validate engineering designs by allowing a 
rapid comparison between the “alternative” engineered design and an equivalent designed 
prepared to the prescriptive solutions C/AS1. 
 
In this application the building use parameters would essentially cancel each other out and the 
fire safety comparison would be based solely on the fire safety features score. 
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It is envisaged that this model could be used as a first order assessment tool enabling a rapid 
assessment of a design for equivalency to C/AS1. The object being to identify designs which 
clearly pass, clearly fail or are questionable and require a closer and more robust investigation 
such as a full probabilistic risk analysis. 
 
Further validation of the model is required before it could be used with confidence for this type of 
task. However some examples have been investigated below to assess the model’s capabilities. 
 
8.4 Exemplar Analysis 
 
8.4.1 Example 1 – Type 5 Alarm Assessment 
 
A Type 5 alarm comprises a modified alarm system with heat and/or smoke detection and manual 
call points. This is permitted in Sleeping Purpose groups in lieu of a Type 4 alarm (smoke 
detection) and Type 7 alarm (smoke detection + sprinklers). These are denoted types 4e and 7e 
respectively in Table 4.2 C/AS1.  The key difference is that the smoke detection is a local alarm 
connected to sounders in the room of fire origin only. A heat detector provides a delayed alarm, 
which alerts all occupants in the building. This enables occupants to deal with a false alarm 
generated by inadvertent activation of the smoke detector without the need to evacuate the 
building, but provides early warning to the occupants in the room of fire origin if necessary.  
 
The safety of the Type 5 alarm was investigated for the New Zealand Fire Service Commission in 
2003, Enright (22). The study comprised a full probabilistic risk analysis using combined event 
tree and Monte Carlo numerical sampling techniques. 
 
The example model was a hotel room using the same geometry and basis assumptions as that of 
Frantzich’s hotel study (18). The room was a 6.0 m x 5.0 m in plan with a ceiling height of 2.4 m. 
The room was assumed connected to a corridor which was in turn assumed to be connected to a 
stair. A four storey building with 12 persons per floor (48 occupants) was assessed. This equates 
to a building with an approximate escape height of 9 m which places it in the 4-10 m escape 
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height category in term of this project. Note that C/AS1 does not require a building of this height 
to have a type 7 alarm system (sprinklers + smoke detection). However for the purposes of this 
comparison the FSI calculation will be based on a building in the 4-10 m height category. 
 
The analysis by Enright(22) involved determining the limit state equations for RSET and ASET in 
a similar manner to that described in section 5.6.8 above for the reliability index method. The 
parameters of the equations were assigned probability distributions and the Expected Loss of Life 
(ELL) and Total Annual Loss of Life (TALL) were calculated for the various alarm options. The 
reader is referred to the full Fire Service Commission Report (22) for a more comprehensive 
description of the method. The results for TALL are shown in Table 8.1 below. 
 
The Type 4 and 4e alarm systems were analysed in the FSI model using the SA purpose group, 
maximum 40 occupants and 4-10 m building escape height category. As previously noted the 
Type 7 and 7e alarm systems were also analysed using the SA purpose group, and 4-10 m 
building escape height category. It should be noted that the maximum number of persons 
permitted in a SA purpose group firecell with a type 7 alarm is 160 persons, although less than 50 
persons is used in this analysis for comparative purposes. The results for both are shown in 
Table 8.1 below. 
 
PRA - Enright (22) Fire Safety Index 




Fire Alarm (B) and 
Sprinkler (D1) 
Parameters Only 
4  9.8x10-6 2.815 0.588 
4e (5) 1.2x10-5 2.697 0.470 
Difference 2.2x10-6 0.118 0.118 
% Drop in Safety 18.3% 4.2% 20.0% 
7 1.3x10-7 3.061 0.945 
7e (5 & Sprinklers) 1.5x10-7 2.944 0.827  
Difference 2.0x10-8 0.118 0.118 
% Drop in Safety 13.3% 3.8% 12.5% 
Table 8.1– Comparison Between FSI and PRA for a Type 5 Alarm System 
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The FSI model correctly predicts a drop in safety but the magnitude of the drop is significantly 
different to that predicted by the probabilistic risk analysis, i.e. from Table 8.1 Enright(22) 
calculated a reduction in safety of 18.3 % for change from a Type 4 to a Type 4e alarm where as 
the FSI calculated a 4.2% drop. Therefore this suggests that further work is required to calibrate 
the FSI model. It should be noted that the FSI model takes into account numerous other factors 
such as building height, occupant numbers and escape paths lengths to name but few. If we assess 
the fire alarm (B) and sprinkler (D1) parameters only, refer Table 8.1 above, we get results more 
in line with the PRA result.  The 20% drop in safety determined by the PRA suggests that the 
alarm type has a significant impact on the safety of the building and as such should be weighted 
more heavily in the FSI model. By inspection it would not be possible to increase the weighting 
of the fire alarm parameter (B) to such an extent that the FSI model would give 20% drop in 
safety similar to the result of the PRA undertaken by Enright(22). 
 
The above results indicate that these two forms of analysis are not numerically compatible at this 
time and further work is required to confirm the suitability of the model.  
 
8.4.2 Example 2  – Single Means of Escape Apartment Buildings 
 
The following assessment is based on two Determinations issued by the DBH in July 2005, 
Determination 2005/109(5) and September 2005, Determination 2005/134(6), for two single means 
of escape apartment buildings (purpose group SR). Both buildings exceeded the maximum 
permitted escape height for a single means of escape and as such were deemed alternative 
designs. For the purposes of this study the building shall be designated “Building 109” and 
“Building 134”. 
 
For complete details of the buildings, the risk analysis and Determination rulings the reader is 
referred to the Determinations (5) (6). A brief description of the buildings, analyses and ruling for 
each building is given below along with the FSI assessment results. 
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a) Building 109 
 
Building 109 comprises an 18 storey apartment building with an escape height of 48 m. The 
purpose group is designated sleeping residential (SR). With the exception of ground and first 
floor level there are six 27 m2 apartments on each floor opening onto an atrium which also 
contains lifts and a single stair.  The number of occupants is approximately 12 per floor based on 
the number of beds in each unit. The stair in the atrium is the only means of escape. The building 
is fully sprinklered, has smoke detection, stair/atrium pressurisation and a voice communication 
system as the primary active fire safety precautions. 
 
The major non-compliance with C/AS1 for this building is the single means of escape. The fact 
that the stairs are a part of an atrium also raises questions with regard to the stairs adequately 
performing as a safe path. 
 
The risk analysis carried out by the DBH involved a comparative quantitative risk analysis. The 
analysis involved calculating the individual risk of fatality using event tree and probabilistic 
analysis for the Building 109 layout and a C/AS1 compliant building with a similar floor plate, 
but incorporating two stairs. There are no specific details of the analysis in the determination 
however the results found that there was a 51% to 74% probability that the building would be as 
safe as a building complying with C/AS1 or in other words there is a 25% to 49% probability that 
the building was less safe. This was deemed unacceptable by the DBH and it was determined that 
the building did not demonstrate equivalency to C/AS1.  
 
b) Building 134 
 
Building 134 comprises a 16 storey apartment building with an escape height of 43.6 m. The 
basement and a 3-level podium contains car parking and retail tenancies. The 12 storey tower 
block contains apartments and is designated a sleeping residential (SR) purpose group. Each floor 
contains 8 to 10 apartments separated into two separate sections (firecells) of 4 to 5 apartments. 
Each section contains lift, a single stair and the apartments open on to a horizontal safe path.  The 
number of occupants is approximately 16 per floor based on the number of beds in each unit. The 
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building is fully sprinklered, has smoke detection, stair pressurisation and a voice communication 
system as the primary active fire safety precautions. 
 
The major non-compliance with C/AS1 for this building is also the single means of escape.  
 
The risk analysis carried out by the DBH involved a comparative quantitative risk analysis. More 
details of the analysis are given in this determination and the method is similar in structure to that 
detailed in section 5.6.1 of this report.  The analysis involved calculating the individual risk of 
fatality using event tree and probabilistic analysis for Building 134 layout and a C/AS1 compliant 
building with a similar floor plate, but incorporating two stairs. The results of the analysis found 
that there was a 55% to 79% probability that the building would be as safe as a building 
complying with C/AS1 or in other words there is a 21% to 45% probability that the building was 
less safe. This was deemed acceptable by the DBH and it was determined that the building 
demonstrate equivalency to C/AS1.  
 
The primary difference between Building 109 and 134 was the presence of a horizontal safe path 
at each level in Building 134. The horizontal safe path provides an additional barrier between the 
room of fire origin and the stair in Building 134; where as the stair in Building 109 is likely to be 
immediately exposed to the fire products when the fire breaches the fire barriers of the room of 
fire origin.  
 
c) Fire Safety Index Assessment 
 
The fire safety index was calculated for the actual alternative design and a C/AS1 compliant 
design for each building. Building 134 has a lower escape height and as such has a lower C/AS1 
compliant FSI required score due to parameter BU2. There is no specific horizontal safe path 
parameter in the FSI modelled so the “Protected Path” parameter (H7) was used to account for 
this in the Building 134 analysis. The FSI model also takes into account the safety due to reduced 
dead end and open path escape lengths in the alternative designs. The FSI analysis takes no 
account of the fast response sprinklers used in both alternative designs to enhance the sprinkler 
performance. An allowance for an enhanced water supply was accounted for in the alternative 
185 
solution by selecting a Class B water supply. The impact of the voice communication system was 
included in the FSI analysis. 
 
The results of the FSI analysis of Buildings 109 and 134 are given below in Table 8.2. The 
Determinations do not present the results in term of risk to life as used for comparison in the 
previous example, but gives the probability that the building is “as safe as or safer” than the 
control building which is compliant to C/AS1.  Therefore the results are not directly comparable 
or numerically compatible; however a check was undertaken to see if the FSI ranked the 
buildings in the same order of safety. 
 
PRA – DBH (5)(6) 
Probability of Being “As Safe As” 
 or “Safer” than C/AS1 












109 51% 74% Fail 3.014 2.598 1.160 Pass 
134 55% 79% Pass  2.916 2.564 1.137 Pass 
Ratio 134 
   109 1.09 1.07  0.967 0.986 0.981  
 
Table 8.2 - Comparison of the DBH Determination Results with FSI 
 
From Table 8.2 the FSI scores both buildings as been safer than a similar building that complies 
with C/AS1. However the FSI also scores Building 109 as a safer building than Building 134 
which is in direct contrast to the DBH results.  
 
The most significant difference between the two buildings is the fact that building 109 has an 
increased firecell rating for the wall between the apartments and the stair.  The Firecell parameter 
(A1) carries the highest weighting and as noted in the Section 7.4.3 is one of the most sensitive 
parameters in the FSI model.  
 
The analysis was repeated with the increase in Firecell rating for Building 109 ignored. The 
results are shown in Table 8.3 below. Both buildings still achieve a FSI score indicating that they 
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are safer than the C/AS1 compliant control building. However the ranking between the two 
buildings has altered with Building 134 now being deemed the safer building.  
 
PRA – DBH (5)(6) 
Probability of Being “As Safe As” 
 or “Safer” than C/AS1 
Fire Safety Index 












109 51% 74% Fail 2.713 2.598 1.044 Pass 
134 55% 79% Pass  2.916 2.564 1.137 Pass 
Ratio 134 
   109 
1.09 1.07  1.075 0.986 1.031  
 
Table 8.3 - Comparison of the DBH Determination Results with Revised FSI 
 
 
The analysis of these examples was undertaken to give an indication of whether or not the FSI 
could be used to rank buildings for the purpose of determining whether or not an alternative 
design is equivalent to a similar building complying with the requirements of C/AS1. The results 
obtained from this particular analysis are not conclusive with respect to relying on the current FSI 
model to determine compliance with C/AS1 with confidence. However the result are encouraging 
and with further analysis, refinement and validation of the model a simple risk ranking model 
could be used for this task in the New Zealand fire engineering environment. 
 
The FSI model is not likely to replace the need for PRA, but may prove useful as a tool for 
designers, territorial authorities and regulatory authorities in determining which building designs 







9.1 Fire Safety Index 
 
A Fire Safety Index has been developed based on a simple weighted points system where the 
building geometry, use and fire safety features are graded according to the likely impact they will 
have on occupant safety. The points system was developed based on the grading systems 
developed in Sweden(35) and USA(32) for similar risk ranking models, adapted for the New 
Zealand Building Code requirements. 
 
The model is made up of two parts. The first is the Building/Use Score section which contains 
four parameters relating to the building geometry, hazard and occupancy of the building. The 
second part, Fire safety Features Score, contains eight main parameters with a number of separate 
sub-parameters all relating to the fire safety features or safety precautions required by C/AS1. 
 
The points system involves grading each building, hazard and safety feature/parameters on a 
scale of 0 to 5. A lower score indicates a more hazardous or least safe parameter. The weighting 
system determines the interdependence between the parameters and the contribution each 
parameter provides to the level of safety of a building. 
 
The output of the model is a single numerical index value, Fire Safety Index. The higher the 
index indicates a safer building. 
 
The model does not give risk in absolute terms or an expected risk to life format and as such is 
only suitable for comparative analyses. 
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9.2 Apparent Level of Fire Safety of Buildings Designed to C/AS1 
The study reviewed the safety of building designed in accordance with the New Zealand Building 
Code Approved Document for Fire Safety C/AS1. The analysis was limited to buildings with the 
following parameters: 
 
Purpose groups   –  Crowd CS CL and CM 
    –  Working WL and WM 
– Sleeping SR and SA 
 
 Building escape heights  – Greater than 4m high 
  
 Occupant numbers   – Greater than 50 (up to 40 in SR) 
  
The results indicate that the level of safety increases predominantly with increasing escape height 
of the building and increasing occupant numbers.  
 
From the FSI analysis the Sleeping Accommodation (SA) purpose group is generally graded the 
safest building across all building escape height categories while the Sleeping Residential (SR) is 
graded the least safe. 
 
The sensitivity of most parameters is proportional to their respective weightings, i.e. parameters 
with very low weighting affect the FSI by only 1-2%.   
 
There is one exception to the trends for the crowd and working purpose groups. The FSI indicates 
a significant drop in safety for the 25 -34 m escape height category due to a drop in the firecell 
(F) and structural endurance (S) rating requirements with the introduction of sprinklers. Changes 
to the F and S parameter weightings had negligible impact on the FSI resulting in the same drop 
in safety. Changes to the sprinkler parameter weighting reduced or eliminated the drop in safety, 




The sprinkler parameter weighting based on Swedish(35) and USA(32) risk ranking systems is rated 
approximately 50% of the firecell rating. Work by Feeney(24) and Marryat(27) suggest that the 
performance of sprinkler systems in New Zealand is very reliable. Therefore it appears 
reasonable that the weighting for sprinklers could be increased to equate more with the firecell 
parameter weighting. Further analysis on the effectiveness of sprinkler systems would be required 




New Zealand currently lacks a method for assessing the compliance of specific fire engineering 
designs (alternative solutions) in a consistent manner. In most cases designs are assessed by 
subjective judgment or comparisons to the fire safety requirements of the Building Code 
Approved Document C/AS1. There is much debate among the fire engineering profession as to 
the validity of the equivalency approach and a quick and economical method for reviewing and 
certifying designs uniformly across the country is desired.  
 
It is not the objective of this study to determine whether or not equivalency is the best and/or 
most valid approach to certifying alternative solutions. However, given the current use of the 
equivalency measure in the fire engineering profession there is a need for a method of evaluating 
equivalency consistently. A risk ranking scheme, such as the Fire Safety Index proposed in this 
study, is a tool is that could be used to carry out such checks. 
 
The model proposed in this study could be developed further and used to determine whether or 
not an alternative design provides an equivalent level of safety to that required by C/AS1. The 
model requires further testing and validation before it would be suitable for this task.  
 
9.4 Further Research 
 
This study is essentially an initial investigation of the level of safety of building design to the 
New Zealand Building Code Approved Document C/AS1. The study has identified a number of 
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alternative methods for evaluating safety and developed a rudimentary risk ranking system to 
evaluate the safety of C/AS1. There is a significant amount of potential further work that can be 
carried out in the area of fire safety of buildings. A number of these are discussed below in 
relation to this project: 
 
i) Acceptable Level of Risk 
 
A study could be undertaken to establish what an acceptable level of risk is for a building 
in terms of fire safety. Comparison could be made to other design codes in New Zealand 
such as the structural codes and /or international standards. 
 
ii) Validation of the Model 
 
The Fire Safety Index model proposed in this study requires further validation, 
particularly if the model is to be used in practice for checking equivalency to C/AS1.   
 
Possible methods for validation studies could include: 
 
− Delphi panel assessment 
− Probabilistic risk analysis of exemplar buildings 
− Reliability index (β) risk analysis of exemplar buildings. 
− Comparison with computer risk analysis models 
 
iii) Extension of the Model to Other Purpose Groups 
 
The version of the Fire Safety Index model could also be developed for low rise 
buildings, hospitals and prison type purpose groups and /or high fire hazard facilities. 
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iv) Development of a Computer Risk Model 
 
The proposed index is suitable for development into a simple computer model. This could 
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NZPA-101A Fire Safety Evaluation System - Weighting Calculations
Business Occupancies:  (Equivalent to C/AS1 Purpose Group WL & WM)
No. Safety Parameter Parameter Attributes Parameter Parameter Parameter
Min Max Range Weighting Contribtn Range Weighting Contribtn Range Weighting
1 Construction Combusitble/Non Com./ Height -12 2 14 0.152 1 14 0.280 0 0 0.000
2 Segregation of Hazards Exposed  -> Segregated System -7 0 7 0.076 1 7 0.140 1 7 0.117
3 Vertical Openings Open -> Enclosed -10 1 11 0.120 0.5 5.5 0.110 1 11 0.183
4 Sprinklers None -> Fast Resp.& Total Bldg 0 12 12 0.130 1 12 0.240 0.5 6 0.100
5 Fire Alarm None -> Voice Com. & FD Not. 0 4 4 0.043 0.5 2 0.040 1 4 0.067
6 Smoke Detection None -> Total Building 0 4 4 0.043 0.5 2 0.040 1 4 0.067
7 Interior Finishes Flame Spread Ratings -3 2 5 0.054 0.5 2.5 0.050 0 0 0.000
8 Smoke Control None / Passive / Active 0 4 4 0.043 0 0 0.000 0.5 2 0.033
9 Exit Access Dead Ends & Total Travel Length -2 3 5 0.054 0 0 0.000 1 5 0.083
10 Egress Route Single, Multiple, Protected & Final -6 5 11 0.120 0 0 0.000 1 11 0.183
11 Corridor/Room Separation Door Closers, Smoke Sep., FRR -6 4 10 0.109 0.5 5 0.100 0.5 5 0.083
12 Occupant Emergency Plan No. of Fire Drills Per Year -3 2 5 0.054 0 0 0.000 1 5 0.083
92 1 50 1 60 1
Reference: NFPA 101A :Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety: 2001 Edition (32)
Parameter Score Parameter Score





NZPA-101A Fire Safety Evaluation System - Weighting Calculations
Board & Care Large Facilities: (Equivalent to C/AS1 Purpose Group SA and SC)
No. Safety Parameter Parameter Values Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
Min Max Range Weighting Contribtn Range Weighting Contribtn Range Weighting Contribtn Range Weighting
1 Construction Combusitble/Non Com./ Height -10 2 12 0.1290 1 12 0.2243 0 0 0.0000 1 12 0.2034
2 Hazardous Areas Exposed  -> Segregated System -4 0 4 0.0430 1 4 0.0748 0.5 2 0.0290 1 4 0.0678
3 Manual Fire Alarm None -> FD Not. 0 3 3 0.0323 0.5 1.5 0.0280 1 3 0.0435 0 0 0.0000
4 Smoke Detection None -> Total Building -10 6 16 0.1720 0.5 8 0.1495 1 16 0.2319 0.5 8 0.1356
5 Sprinklers None -> Total Bldg 0 10 10 0.1075 1 10 0.1869 0.5 5 0.0725 0.5 5 0.0847
6 Corridor/Room Separation Smoke Separation & FRR -6 4 10 0.1075 1 10 0.1869 0.5 5 0.0725 1 10 0.1695
7 Exit System(Egress Route) Single, Multiple, Protected & Final -6 4 10 0.1075 0 0 0.0000 1 10 0.1449 0.5 5 0.0847
8 Exit Access Dead Ends & Total Travel Length -6 2 8 0.0860 0 0 0.0000 1 8 0.1159 0 0 0.0000
9 Interior Finishes Flame Spread Ratings -3 2 5 0.0538 0.5 2.5 0.0467 1 5 0.0725 0 0 0.0000
10 Vertical Openings Open -> Enclosed -10 1 11 0.1183 0.5 5.5 0.1028 1 11 0.1594 1 11 0.1864
11 Smoke Control None / Passive / Active 0 4 4 0.0430 0 0 0.0000 1 4 0.0580 1 4 0.0678
93 1 53.5 1 69 1 59 1
Reference: NFPA 101A :Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety: 2001 Edition (32)
Refuge Provided  - S3
Parameter Score Parameter Score
General Fire Safety  - S4 Fire Control  - S1 Egress Provided  - S2




NZPA-101A Fire Safety Evaluation System - Weighting Calculations
Apartment Buildings: (Equivalent to C/AS1 Purpose Group SR)
No. Safety Parameter Parameter Values Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
Min Max Range Weighting Contribtn Range Weighting Contribtn Range Weighting Contribtn Range Weighting
1 Construction Combusitble/Non Com./ Height -10 2 12 0.145 1 12 0.261 0 0 0.000 1 12 0.240
2 Hazardous Areas Exposed  -> Segregated System -4 0 4 0.048 1 4 0.087 0.5 2 0.033 1 4 0.080
3 Manual Fire Alarm None -> FD Not. 0 3 3 0.036 0.5 1.5 0.033 1 3 0.050 0 0 0.000
4 Smoke Detection None -> Total Building -4 6 10 0.120 0.5 5 0.109 1 10 0.167 0 0 0.000
5 Sprinklers None -> Total Bldg 0 8 8 0.096 1 8 0.174 0.5 4 0.067 0.5 4 0.080
6 Corridor/Room Separation Smoke Separation & FRR -6 4 10 0.120 1 10 0.217 0.5 5 0.083 1 10 0.200
7 Exit System(Egress Route) Single, Multiple, Protected & Final -6 4 10 0.120 0 0 0.000 1 10 0.167 0.5 5 0.100
8 Exit Access Dead Ends & Total Travel Length -6 2 8 0.096 0 0 0.000 1 8 0.133 0 0 0.000
9 Interior Finishes Flame Spread Ratings -3 0 3 0.036 0 0 0.000 1 3 0.050 0 0 0.000
10 Vertical Openings Open -> Enclosed -10 1 11 0.133 0.5 5.5 0.120 1 11 0.183 1 11 0.220
11 Smoke Control None / Passive / Active 0 4 4 0.048 0 0 0.000 1 4 0.067 1 4 0.080
83 1 46 1 60 1 50 1
Reference: NFPA 101A :Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety: 2001 Edition (32)
Refuge Provided  - S3
Parameter Score Parameter Score
General Fire Safety  - S4 Fire Control  - S1 Egress Provided  - S2
Parameter Score Parameter Score
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TABLE C4 
NZPA-101A Fire Safety Evaluation System - Weighting Calculations
Summary of Index Weightings for Fire Safety Parameters to NFPA 101A




Control Egress Refuge General Fire Control Egress Refuge General
1 Construction 0.2800 0.0000 0.1522 0.2243 0.0000 0.2034 0.1290 0.2609 0.0000 0.2400 0.1446
2 Segregation of Hazards 0.1400 0.1167 0.0761 0.0748 0.0290 0.0678 0.0430 0.0870 0.0333 0.0800 0.0482
3 Vertical Openings 0.1100 0.1833 0.1196 0.1028 0.1594 0.1864 0.1183 0.1196 0.1833 0.2200 0.1325
4 Sprinklers 0.2400 0.1000 0.1304 0.1869 0.0725 0.0847 0.1075 0.1739 0.0667 0.0800 0.0964
5 Fire Alarm 0.0400 0.0667 0.0435 0.0280 0.0435 0.0000 0.0323 0.0326 0.0500 0.0000 0.0361
6 Smoke Detection 0.0400 0.0667 0.0435 0.1495 0.2319 0.1356 0.1720 0.1087 0.1667 0.0000 0.1205
7 Interior Finishes 0.0500 0.0000 0.0543 0.0467 0.0725 0.0000 0.0538 0.0000 0.0500 0.0000 0.0361
8 Smoke Control 0.0000 0.0333 0.0435 0.0000 0.0580 0.0678 0.0430 0.0000 0.0667 0.0800 0.0482
9 Exit Access 0.0000 0.0833 0.0543 0.0000 0.1159 0.0000 0.0860 0.0000 0.1333 0.0000 0.0964
10 Egress Route 0.0000 0.1833 0.1196 0.0000 0.1449 0.0847 0.1075 0.0000 0.1667 0.1000 0.1205
11 Corridor/Room Separation 0.1000 0.0833 0.1087 0.1869 0.0725 0.1695 0.1075 0.2174 0.0833 0.2000 0.1205
12 Occupant Emergency Plan 0.0000 0.0833 0.0543
Sum 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000
Reference: NFPA 101A :Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety: 2001 Edition (32)





NZPA-101A Fire Safety Evaluation System - Weighting Calculations
Summary of Revised Index Weightings for Fire Safety Parameters to NFPA 101A and Equivalent C/AS1 Parameters
Equivalent NZBC C/AS1 Fire Safety Parameter
No. Safety Parameter Average
Adjusted & 
Normalised Average Adjusted Normalised Average Adjusted Normalised
WA WN WA WAd WN WA WAd WN
1 Construction 0.2551 0.2868 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1419 0.1733 0.1653 0.1507
2 Segregation of Hazards 0.1006 0.1131 0.0597 0.0813 0.0749 0.0558 0.0681 0.0650 0.0843 A2  Structural Endurance Rating
3 Vertical Opening 0.1108 0.1754 0.1235
4 Sprinklers 0.2003 0.2252 0.0797 0.1086 0.1000 0.1114 0.1361 0.1298 0.1517 D1 Sprinkler System & D2 Water Supply
5 Fire Alarm 0.0335 0.0377 0.0534 0.0727 0.0670 0.0373 0.0455 0.0434 0.0494 F Communication System & G1 Fire Service Alerting 
6 Smoke Detection 0.0994 0.1118 0.1551 0.2113 0.1946 0.1120 0.1368 0.1305 0.1456 B Fire Alarm
7 Interior Finishes 0.0322 0.0363 0.0408 0.0556 0.0512 0.0481 0.0587 0.0560 0.0478 H8 Surface Finishes Exitways & H9 Occupied Spaces
8 Smoke Control 0.0000 0.0000 0.0527 0.0717 0.0661 0.0449 0.0548 0.0523 0.0395 C Smoke Control
9 Exit Access 0.0000 0.0000 0.1109 0.1511 0.1391 0.0789 0.0964 0.0919 0.0770 Means of Escape H1, H2
10 Egress Route 0.0000 0.0000 0.1650 0.2248 0.2070 0.1159 0.1415 0.1350 0.1140 Means of Escape H5, H6, H7
11 Corridor/Room Separation 0.1681 0.1890 0.0797 0.1086 0.1000 0.1122 0.1371 0.1307 0.1399  A1 Firecell Rating
12 Occupant Emergency Plan 0.0000 0.0833 0.0543
Sum 1.0000 1.0000 0.9722 1.0858 1.0000 0.9819 1.0482 1.0000 1.0000
Reference: NFPA 101A :Guide on Alternative Approaches to Life Safety: 2001 Edition (32)
Excluded as it only pertains to Business Occupancies in NFPA 
101A and is not a design parameter in C/AS1
GeneralEgress
Excluded as it pertains to attriums and mezzanine floors which 
are outside the scope of this project
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EVACUATION CALCULATIONS FOR DETERMINING PARAMETER WEIGHTINGS
FOR PURPOSE GROUP, BUILDING HEIGHT & OCCUPANT NUMBERS
Refer Section 8.0 Fire Engineering Design Guide(FEDG) 2nd Edition (53)
The evacuation time is given by:
tev = td + ta + to + ti + tt + tq [Eqn 8.2 FEDG]
Where: td = time to detection (allowed for in alarm parameter)
ta = time from detection to alarm sounding (allowed for in alarm parameter)
to = time from alarm until occupants make decision to leave.(Critical to Purpose Group)
ti = time for occupants to investigate fire ,find belongings and to fight fire.(Critical to Purpose Group)
tt = travel time to safety (Critical to building height and occupant numbers)
tq = queuing time at doorways and obstructions. (Critical to Number of Occupants)
for this project :
tp = td + ta + to + ti Premovement time (Critical Purpose Group) [Based on Table 3-13.1 SFPE Handbook
(58)]
tf = tp + top + tq Time to clear a floor of a building.
tev = tp + tf +  tt Building evacuation time
Where: top = Travel time in open path
The travel speed is given by:
S = kt ( 1-0.266Do) [Eqn 8.4 FEDG]
kt = 84 Corridors [Eqn 8.5 FEDG]
kt = 51.8 (G/R)
0.5 for stairs [Eqn 8.6 FEDG]
69.8471
Do = Density of occupants (persons per square meter varies for Purpose Group)
The specific flow and actual flow of occupants is given by:
Fs = S x Do Specific Flow [Eqn 8.7 FEDG]
Fa = Fs x We Actual Flow
We = Effective width.(ie width - boundary layer)
The travel time is given by:
tt = N/Fa
The queuing time is given by:
tq = N/SStairs
N = Number of occupants in building on each floor using single stair
Assumptions/Engineering Judgements:
1.   All stairs are accessible stairs with 167mm risers and 300mm treads.
2.   Boundary  widths are similar to those quoted Page 87 FEDG as follows:
0.15m Stairs
0.05m Door
3.    Persons are distributed uniformly throughout the building.
4.    Persons will travel to nearest exit therefore the number of persons per stair is proportional to floor area.
5.    Maximum person to one escape route is 1200mm/(9mm/persons) =133 persons
6.    Maximum travel times is based on the a speed of 73/m over the maximum Total Open Path Lengths permitted by C/AS1
7.    Buildings above 4 m high have a 3 m interstorey height.
8.    Evacuation time is the time when the building is evacuated and all persons have passed through the final exit.
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EVACUATION CALCULATIONS
Refer Section 8.0 Fire Engineering Design Guide(FEDG) 2nd Edition (53)
Premovement and Open Path Movement Time
Mean
Purpose Group WL WM CL CM SA SR Values
Premovement Time tp 4 4 4 6 6 5 min 4.83 [Table 3-13.1 SFPE Handbook
(58)]
Open Path Travel Time:
Distance TOP 60 60 45 45 45 60 m
Density of occupants Do = N/Af 0.020 0.020 1.000 0.300 0.01 0.01 persons/m
2 [Table 2.2 C/AS1]
Travel constant kt 84 84 84 84 84 84 [Eqn 8.5 FEDG]
Open Path Travel Speed SOP = kt (1-0.266Do) 83.6 83.6 61.7 77.3 83.8 83.8 m/s [Eqn 8.4 FEDG]










Door Width Wd 1.1 m
Boundary Layer Bd 0.05 m
Effective Door Width Wed = Wd -2Bd 1 m
Specific Flow (Fig 8.3 FEDG) Fsd = 78 p/min/m
Maximum Flow through door Fad = Fsd . Wed 78.0 p/min
Stairs:
Width of Stair Ws 1.2 m
Boundary Layer Bs 0.15 m
Effective Stair Width Wes = Ws -2Bs 0.9 m
Stair Going G 0.3 m
Stair Riser R 0.167 m
Stair Ratio G/R 1.80 m
Interstorey Height Hi 4 m
No Steps Ns = Hi/R 24.0
Length of Stair Treads Ltr = G.Ns 7.19 m
Length of Landings Ll = 2 . Ws (Assumed) 2.4 m
Length of Stairs Ls = Ltr +Ll 9.59 m
Effective Area of  Stairs Aes 8.63 m
2
Specific Flow (Fig 8.3 FEDG) Fsd = (167x300 mm treads) 60 p/min/m
Maximum Flow down stair Fad = Fsd . Wed 54.0 p/min
Maximum Density in Stair DS 1.88 p/m
2




a = 0.266kt 18.5
b= -kt -69.4
c = Fs 60.0 p/min/m
Quadratic Solution 1       DS1 = 2.413 p/m
2
Quadratic Solution 2 or  DS2 = 1.346 p/m
2
Use       DS = Min DS1 & DS2 1.346 p/m
2
Stair Travel Speed SStairs = kt (1-0.266DS) 48.3 m/min
Time to traverse stair & landings 
(Bottom level governs)
tts=Ls/SStair 0.20 min
Max number of occupants per stair per floor @9mm/person
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EVACUATION CALCULATIONS
Refer Section 8.0 Fire Engineering Design Guide(FEDG) 2nd Edition (53)
Summary of Evacuation Time Calculation
Pre-movement [Table 3-13.1 SFPE Handbook] tp 4.83 minutes
Open Path Travel Time top 0.67 minutes
Queuing Time = No Person per Floor / Stair Travel Speed tq 2.75 minutes
Mean Time to Clear Floor tf 8.25 minutes
N tt (Door) tt (Stair) tt (Total) tf tev
(m) (Minutes) (Minutes) (Minutes) (Minutes) (Minutes)
4 1 133 1.7 0.20 1.90 8.25 10.2
10 3 399 5.1 0.20 5.31 8.25 13.6
25 8 1064 13.6 0.20 13.84 8.25 22.1
34 11 1463 18.8 0.20 18.95 8.25 27.2
46 15 1995 25.6 0.20 25.78 8.25 34.0
58 19 2527 32.4 0.20 32.60 8.25 40.8
Mean 16.2 0.2 16.4 8.25 24.7
Fire Hazard 
Category FHC1 FHC2 FHC3 Mean
Growth 
Rate
α    
(MW/s2)
Floor Area 
(A) 5000 2500 1500 - m
2
Slow 0.00293 20.44 14.06 10.67 15.06 minutes
Medium 0.0117 14.26 9.81 7.44 10.51 minutes
Fast 0.0466 9.96 6.85 5.20 7.33 minutes
Mean time to Untenable conditions 10.97 minutes
Note : S = 1.67α-0.26 H0.44 A 0.54 Frantzich et al 1997(38)
Where : H = 3m Ceiling Height
Note: The above evacuation times and time to untenable conditions have been used as a guide to estimate the
Building/Use Parameter weightings. Refer to Section 6.4.3 of report.
Total 
Travel Time










Time to Pass 
Through Ground 
Level Door





Mean Evacuation Times For a Single Staircase in a Building
Mean Time to Clear a Floor
Time to Untenable Conditions (S)
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Score Weighting Index Score
BU1 Purpose Group 1 Sleeping Accomodation (SA)
2 Sleeping Residential (SA)
3 Crowd x 3 0.0332 0.099
5 Working
BU2 Building Escape Height 0 Over 58m x 0 0.0663 0.000
1 46m < EH ≤ 58m
2 34m < EH ≤ 46m
3 25m < EH ≤ 34m
4 10m < EH ≤ 25m
5 EH < 10m
BU3 Occupant Numbers 1 Over 1000
2 501 < Occ. No. ≤ 1000
3 101 < Occ. No. ≤ 500
4 51 < Occ. No. ≤ 100 x 4 0.0221 0.088
5 Occ. No. < 50
BU4 Fire Hazard Category 0 FHC 4
1 FHC 3
3 FHC 2 x 3 0.0663 0.199
5 FHC 1








Score Weighting Index Score
A Fire Hazard




4 60 Minutes x 4 0.1504 0.602
5 >60 Minutes




4 120 Minutes x 4 0.0962 0.385
5 >120 Minutes
B Fire Alarm 0 No Alarm
2 Type 2 - Manual Alarm
3 Type 3 - Auto. Alarm /Heat Detectors
4 Type 5 - Auto Alarm / Heat & Local Smoke Detectors
5 Type 4 - Automatic Alarm / Smoke Detectors x 5 0.1176 0.588
BUILDING/USE SCORE





C1       HVAC Control 0 No Smoke Control
2 Manual Shut Down
5 Automatic Shut Down on Alarm x 5 0.0368 0.184
C2       Extraction 0 No Smoke Extraction x 0 0.0201 0.000
1 Manual/Natural Ventilation
2 Manual/Mechanical Extraction
4 Automatic Natural Ventilation
5 Automatic Mechanical Extraction
C3       Stair Pressurisation 0 No
5 Yes x 5 0.0201 0.100
D Building Fire Control
D1      Sprinklers 0 No Sprinklers
4 Dry Pipe Sprinklers
5 Wet Pipe Sprinklers x 5 0.0713 0.357
D2      Water Supply 0 No water supply
2 Class C - Water Supply (Typical Municipal Supply) x 2 0.0190 0.038
4 Class B - Water Supply
5 Class A - Water Supply
D3      Occupant Fire Fighting 0 No Occupant Fire Fighting Facilities x 0 0.0048 0.000
1 Fire Blanket
3 Fire Extinguishers
4 Fire Hose Reels
5 Fire Hose Reel & Extinguisher
E Emergency Power Supply 0 No Power Supply
5 Emergency Generator x 5 0.0158 0.079
F Communication System 0 No Voice Communication System
1 Evacuation Plan (EP)+Fire Wardens (WF)
3 Voice Communication System
4 Fire Systems Centre x 4 0.0195 0.078
5 Voice Communications System+ Fire System Centre
G Fire Service
G1     Alerting 0 No means for alerting Fire Service
1 Telephone
3 Direct Connection via Security Firm
5 Direct Alarm Connection to Fire Service x 5 0.0266 0.133
G2     Lift Control 0 No Lift Control
5 Lift Control x 5 0.0157 0.079
G3     Fire Fighting Access 0 No Hydrant System, Fire Service Hose Run >75m
4 Fire Service Hose Run <75m
5 Hydrant System x 5 0.0221 0.111
H Means of Escape
H1      Number of Escape Routes 1 Single (Code Limitations Apply)
2 2 off x 2 0.0196 0.039
3 3 off
4 ≥4 off  
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H2      Width of Escape Routes 0 Width <1000mm
1 1000mm < Width ≤ 2000mm x 1 0.0196 0.020
2 2000mm < Width ≤ 4500mm
3 4500mm < Width ≤ 9000mm
5 Width >9000mm
H3      Emergency Lighting 0 No Emergency Lighting
2 Emergency Lights at Final Exits
4 Emergency Lights in Exitways x 4 0.0051 0.021
5 Emergency Lighting in Open Paths & Exitways
H4      Refuge Areas 0 None
3 In Staircases (<6 Occupants Capacity) x 3 0.0026 0.008
5 Protected Lobby to Stairs (>6 Occupants)
H5     Dead End Open Path Lengths 0 >60m
1 45m < DEOP ≤ 60m x 1 0.0199 0.020
2 30m < DEOP ≤ 45m
3 25m < DEOP ≤ 30m
4 20m < DEOP ≤ 25m
5 ≤ 20m
H6      Total Open Path Lengths 0 >140m
1 110m < TOP ≤ 140m x 1 0.0199 0.020
2 80m < TOP ≤ 110m
3 60m < TOP ≤ 80m
4 50m < TOP ≤ 60m
5 ≤ 50m
H7      Protected Path Lengths 0 >90m
1 75m < PP ≤ 90m
2 60m < PP ≤ 75m
3 45m < PP ≤ 60m
4 30m < PP ≤ 45m x 4 0.0272 0.109
5 ≤ 30m
H8      Surface Finishes Exitways 0 SFI >0, SDI >3, FI >12
3 SFI = 0, SDI ≤ 3, FI > 12
4 SFI = 0, SDI ≤ 3, FI ≤ 12 x 4 0.0112 0.045
5 No applied finishes, non-combustible surfaces
H9      Surface Finishes 0 SFI >5, SDI>10, FI>12
     Occupied Spaces 1 Ceiling SFI ≤ 5, SDI ≤ 10
2 Ceiling SFI ≤ 2, SDI ≤ 5 x 2 0.0454 0.091
3 Wall & Ceiling SFI ≤ 5, SDI ≤ 10
4 Wall & Ceiling SFI ≤ 2, SDI ≤ 5
5 Wall & Ceiling SFI ≤ 2, SDI ≤ 5,FI ≤ 12
H10      Signage 0 None
1 Fire Exit Signs
3 Illuminated Fire Exit Signs x 3 0.0051 0.015
5 Flashing Illuminated Fire Exit Signs
Total Fire Safety Features Score (FSF) 0.8121 3.121
Fire Safety Index 3.508  
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CS CM WL WM SA SR CS CM WL WM SA SR CS CM WL WM SA SR
Fire Hazard Catergory 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1
F Rating minutes 30 30 30 30 30 30 45 45 45 45 45 45 30 30 30 30 30 30
S Rating (Assumed S = 2 x F)** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 60 90 90 90 90 90 90 60 60 60 60 60 60
Alarm Type/Sprinklers 3 3 3 3 4 2 4 3 3 3 4 5 6 6 6 6 7e 7e
Voice Communication System 8
Smoke Control 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Safe Path Pressurisation 13 13
Fire Hose Reels 14 14 14
Fire Service Lift Control 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Emergency lighting in Exitways 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Emergency Power Supply
Fire Hydrant System 18c 18c 18c 18c 18c 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Refuge Areas
Fire System Centre
DEOP m 21.6 21.6 28.8 28.8 27 24 36 21.6 28.8 28.8 27 26.4 36 36 48 48 27 36
TOP m 54 54 72 72 67.5 60 90 54 72 72 67.5 66 90 90 120 120 67.5 90
PP m 45 45 60 60 45 60 45 45 60 60 45 60 45 45 60 60 45 60
Surface in Occupied Space 5 5 3 3 4 0 5 5 3 3 4 0 2 2 1 1 2 0
F Rating C/AS1 : Oct 2005 minutes 60 60 60 60 45 45 60 60 60 90 45 45 45 45 45 45 30 30
S Rating C/AS1:Oct 2005 ** minutes 120 120 120 120 90 90 120 120 120 180 90 90 90 90 90 90 60 60
CS CM WL WM SA SR CS CM WL WM SA SR CS CM WL WM SA SR
Fire Hazard Catergory 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 3 1 1
F Rating minutes 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 60 60 60 60 60 60
S Rating (Assumed S = 2 x F)** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 120 120 120 120 120 120
Alarm Type/Sprinklers 7 7 6 6 7e 7e 7 7 7 7 7e 7e 7 7 7 7 7e 7e
Voice Communication System 8 8 8
Smoke Control 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Safe Path Pressurisation 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Fire Hose Reels
Fire Service Lift Control 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Emergency lighting in Exitways 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Emergency Power Supply 17 17 17
Fire Hydrant System 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Refuge Areas 19 19 19 19
Fire System Centre 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
DEOP m 54 54 48 48 27 36 54 54 72 72 27 36 54 54 72 72 27 36
TOP m 135 135 120 120 67.5 90 135 135 180 180 67.5 90 135 135 180 180 67.5 90
PP m 45 45 60 60 45 60 45 45 60 60 45 60 45 45 60 60 45 60
Surface in Occupied Space 2 2 1 1 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 0
F Rating C/AS1 : Oct 2005 minutes 45 45 45 60 45 45 60 60 60 60 45 45 90 90 90 90 60 60
S Rating C/AS1:Oct 2005 ** minutes 90 90 90 120 90 90 120 120 120 120 90 90 180 180 180 180 120 120
46m to<58m >58m
ANALYSIS INPUT PARAMETERS - FIRE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO C/AS1 : JUNE 2001   -   UP TO 100 OCCUPANTS
Parameter Units
Parameter Units




CL CM WL WM SA* SR CL CM WL WM SA* SR CL CM WL WM SA* SR
Fire Hazard Catergory 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1
F Rating minutes 30 30 30 30 30 45 45 45 45 45 30 30 30 30 30
S Rating (Assumed S = 2 x F)** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 90 90 90 90 90 60 60 60 60 60
Alarm Type/Sprinklers 3 3 3 3 7 4 3 3 3 7 6 6 6 6 7e
Voice Communication System 8
Smoke Control 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Safe Path Pressurisation 13 13
Fire Hose Reels
Fire Service Lift Control 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Emergency lighting in Exitways 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Emergency Power Supply
Fire Hydrant System 18c 18c 18c 18c 18c 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Refuge Areas
Fire System Centre
DEOP m 21.6 21.6 28.8 28.8 27 36 21.6 28.8 28.8 27 36 36 48 48 27
TOP m 54 54 72 72 67.5 90 54 72 72 67.5 90 90 120 120 67.5
PP m 45 45 60 60 45 45 45 60 60 45 45 45 60 60 45
Surface in Occupied Space 5 5 3 3 2 5 5 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 2
F Rating C/AS1 : Oct 2005 minutes 60 60 60 60 45 60 60 60 90 45 45 45 45 45 30
S Rating C/AS1:Oct 2005 ** minutes 120 120 120 120 90 120 120 120 180 90 90 90 90 90 60
CL CM WL WM SA* SR CL CM WL WM SA* SR CL CM WL WM SA* SR
Fire Hazard Catergory 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1
F Rating minutes 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 60 60 60 60 60
S Rating (Assumed S = 2 x F)** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 120 120 120 120 120
Alarm Type/Sprinklers 7 7 6 6 7e 7 7 7 7 7e 7 7 7 7 7e
Voice Communication System 8 8 8
Smoke Control 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Safe Path Pressurisation 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Fire Hose Reels
Fire Service Lift Control 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Emergency lighting in Exitways 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Emergency Power Supply 17 17 17
Fire Hydrant System 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Refuge Areas 19 19 19 19
Fire System Centre 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
DEOP m 54 54 48 48 27 54 54 72 72 27 54 54 72 72 27
TOP m 135 135 120 120 67.5 135 135 180 180 67.5 135 135 180 180 67.5
PP m 45 45 60 60 45 45 45 60 60 45 45 45 60 60 45
Surface in Occupied Space 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2
F Rating C/AS1 : Oct 2005 minutes 45 45 45 60 45 60 60 60 60 45 90 90 90 90 60
S Rating C/AS1:Oct 2005 ** minutes 90 90 90 120 90 120 120 120 120 90 180 180 180 180 120
>58mParameter Units 34m to<46m 46m to<58m
ANALYSIS INPUT PARAMETERS - FIRE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO C/AS1 : JUNE 2001   -   101 TO 500 OCCUPANTS
Parameter Units 4m to<10m 10m to<25m 25m to<34m
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CL CM WL WM SA SR CL CM WL WM SA SR CL CM WL WM SA SR
Fire Hazard Catergory 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
F Rating minutes 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
S Rating (Assumed S = 2 x F)** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Alarm Type/Sprinklers 4 4 4 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Voice Communication System
Smoke Control 9 9 9 9 9 9
Safe Path Pressurisation 13 13
Fire Hose Reels
Fire Service Lift Control 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Emergency lighting in Exitways 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Emergency Power Supply
Fire Hydrant System 18c 18c 18c 18c 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Refuge Areas
Fire System Centre
DEOP m 36 36 48 48 54 54 72 72 54 54 72 72
TOP m 90 90 120 120 135 135 180 180 135 135 180 180
PP m 45 45 60 60 45 45 60 60 45 45 60 60
Surface in Occupied Space 5 5 4 4 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
F Rating C/AS1 : Oct 2005 minutes 60 60 60 60 30 30 30 45 45 45 45 45
S Rating C/AS1:Oct 2005 ** minutes 120 120 120 120 60 60 60 90 90 90 90 90
CL CM WL WM SA SR CL CM WL WM SA SR CL CM WL WM SA SR
Fire Hazard Catergory 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
F Rating minutes 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 60 60 60 60
S Rating (Assumed S = 2 x F)** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 120 120 120 120
Alarm Type/Sprinklers 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Voice Communication System
Smoke Control 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Safe Path Pressurisation 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Fire Hose Reels
Fire Service Lift Control 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Emergency lighting in Exitways 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
Emergency Power Supply 17 17
Fire Hydrant System 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Refuge Areas 19 19 19 19
Fire System Centre 20 20 20 20 20 20
DEOP m 54 54 72 72 54 54 72 72 54 54 72 72
TOP m 135 135 180 180 135 135 180 180 135 135 180 180
PP m 45 45 60 60 45 45 60 60 45 45 60 60
Surface in Occupied Space 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
F Rating C/AS1 : Oct 2005 minutes 45 45 45 60 60 60 60 60 90 90 90 90
S Rating C/AS1:Oct 2005 ** minutes 90 90 90 120 120 120 120 120 180 180 180 180
>58mParameter Units 34m to<46m 46m to<58m
ANALYSIS INPUT PARAMETERS - FIRE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO C/AS1 : JUNE 2001   -   501 TO 1000 OCCUPANTS
Parameter Units 4m to<10m 10m to<25m 25m to<34m
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CL CM WL WM SA SR CL CM WL WM SA SR CL CM WL WM SA SR
Fire Hazard Catergory 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
F Rating minutes 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
S Rating (Assumed S = 2 x F)** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60
Alarm Type/Sprinklers 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Voice Communication System
Smoke Control 9 9 9 9 9 9
Safe Path Pressurisation 13 13
Fire Hose Reels
Fire Service Lift Control 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Emergency lighting in Exitways 16d 16d 16 16 16d 16d 16 16 16d 16d 16 16
Emergency Power Supply
Fire Hydrant System 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Refuge Areas
Fire System Centre
DEOP m 54 54 72 72 54 54 72 72 54 54 72 72
TOP m 135 135 180 180 135 135 180 180 135 135 180 180
PP m 45 45 60 60 45 45 60 60 45 45 60 60
Surface in Occupied Space 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
F Rating C/AS1 : Oct 2005 minutes 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 45 45 45 45
S Rating C/AS1:Oct 2005 ** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 90 90 90 90
CL CM WL WM SA SR CL CM WL WM SA SR CL CM WL WM SA SR
Fire Hazard Catergory 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
F Rating minutes 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 60 60 60 60
S Rating (Assumed S = 2 x F)** minutes 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 120 120 120 120
Alarm Type/Sprinklers 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Voice Communication System
Smoke Control 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Safe Path Pressurisation 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
Fire Hose Reels
Fire Service Lift Control 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Emergency lighting in Exitways 16d 16d 16 16 16d 16d 16 16 16d 16d 16 16
Emergency Power Supply 17 17
Fire Hydrant System 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18
Refuge Areas 19 19 19 19
Fire System Centre 20 20 20 20 20 20
DEOP m 54 54 72 72 54 54 72 72 54 54 72 72
TOP m 135 135 180 180 135 135 180 180 135 135 180 180
PP m 60 45 60 60 45 45 60 60 45 45 60 60
Surface in Occupied Space 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
F Rating C/AS1 : Oct 2005 minutes 60 45 45 60 60 60 60 60 90 90 90 90
S Rating C/AS1:Oct 2005 ** minutes 120 90 90 120 120 120 120 120 180 180 180 180
>58mParameter Units 34m to<46m 46m to<58m
ANALYSIS INPUT PARAMETERS - FIRE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS TO C/AS1 : JUNE 2001   -   OVER 1000 OCCUPANTS
Parameter Units 4m to<10m 10m to<25m 25m to<34m
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FIRE SAFETY INDEX - ANALYSIS RESULTS BY PURPOSE GROUP - C/AS1:OCT 2005 
       
Purpose Group CS/CL 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 3.155 3.266 3.000 3.247 3.485 3.752 
101-500 3.152 3.264 2.997 3.244 3.424 3.750 
501-1000 3.325 2.968 3.327 3.261 3.441 3.767 
+1000 3.076 3.010 3.369 3.550 3.483 3.809 
       
Purpose Group CM 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 3.022 3.057 2.867 3.172 3.353 3.620 
101-500 3.020 3.054 2.865 3.170 3.350 3.617 
501-1000 3.192 2.914 3.195 3.187 3.367 3.634 
+1000 2.944 2.956 3.237 3.229 3.409 3.676 
       
Purpose Group WL 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 2.879 2.914 2.669 2.787 3.408 3.655 
101-500 2.877 2.833 2.667 2.785 3.378 3.704 
501-1000 3.095 2.817 2.997 3.115 3.395 3.642 
+1000 2.841 2.853 3.034 3.151 3.432 3.679 
       
Purpose Group WM 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 2.747 3.028 2.537 2.901 3.275 3.522 
101-500 2.744 2.947 2.534 2.899 3.246 3.571 
501-1000 2.962 2.931 2.864 3.229 3.263 3.509 
+1000 2.709 2.721 2.901 3.265 3.300 3.546 
       
Purpose Group SA 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
100 2.982 2.781 3.033 3.353 3.286 3.554 
101-160 3.066 3.101 3.011 3.331 3.264 3.524 
       
Purpose Group SA 
Occupant Building Escape Height 
Number 4m-10m 10m-25m 25m-34m 34m-46m 46m-58m +58m 
40 2.348 2.644 2.629 2.809 2.801 3.082 
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FIRE SAFETY INDEX - ANALYSIS RESULTS BY OCCUPANT NUMBERS - C/AS1:OCT 2005      
                    
Fire Safety Precautions Maximum 100 Occupants(#Maximum 40 persons in SA Occupancy) 
4m to<10m  10m to<25m  25m to<34m 
CS CM WL WM SA# SR  CS CM WL WM SA# SR  CS CM WL WM SA SR 
3.155 3.022 2.879 2.747 2.982 2.348  3.266 3.057 2.914 3.028 2.781 2.644  3.000 2.867 2.669 2.537 3.033 2.629
                      
34m to<46m  46m to<58m  >58m 
CS CM WL WM SA SR  CS CM WL WM SA SR  CS CM WL WM SA SR 
3.247 3.172 2.787 2.901 3.353 2.809   3.485 3.353 3.408 3.275 3.286 2.801   3.752 3.620 3.655 3.522 3.554 3.082
Fire Safety Precautions 101 - 500 Occupants (* Maximum160 persons in SA Occupancy) 
4m to<10m  10m to<25m  25m to<34m 
CL CM WL WM SA*    CL CM WL WM SA*    CL CM WL WM SA*   
3.152 3.020 2.877 2.744 3.066    3.264 3.054 2.833 2.947 3.101    2.997 2.865 2.667 2.534 3.011   
                      
34m to<46m  46m to<58m  >58m 
CL CM WL WM SA*    CL CM WL WM SA*    CL CM WL WM SA*   
3.244 3.170 2.785 2.899 3.331     3.424 3.350 3.378 3.246 3.264     3.750 3.617 3.704 3.571 3.524   
Fire Safety Precautions 501 - 1000 Occupants 
4m to<10m  10m to<25m  25m to<34m 
CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM     
3.325 3.192 3.095 2.962      2.968 2.914 2.817 2.931      3.327 3.195 2.997 2.864     
                      
34m to<46m  46m to<58m  >58m 
CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM     
3.261 3.187 3.115 3.229       3.441 3.367 3.395 3.263       3.767 3.634 3.642 3.509     
Fire Safety Precautions >1000 Occupants 
4m to<10m  10m to<25m  25m to<34m 
CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM     
3.076 2.944 2.841 2.709      3.010 2.956 2.853 2.721      3.369 3.237 3.034 2.901     
                      
34m to<46m  46m to<58m  >58m 
CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM      CL CM WL WM     
3.550 3.229 3.151 3.265       3.483 3.409 3.432 3.300       3.809 3.676 3.679 3.546     
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New Zealand Fire Service - Fire Incident Statistics 2003/2004(60)
Average C/AS1
deaths/year Purpose
TABLE 42: SPECIFIC TYPE OF PROPERTY WHERE THE FATALITY OCCURRED Group
Property Type 2003/04 2002/03 2001/02 2000/01 1999/00
Recreational Place; Variable Use 1 - 1 - -
Assembly 1 - 1 - - 0.4 CS/CL
Rest home - 1 - - -
Rest home - 1 - - - 0.2 SR
House 18 24 25 13 16 19.2 SH
Flat, Home Unit, Apartment 4 3 5 4 1 3.4 SR
Boarding, Half-Way House, Dormitory - - - - 1 0.2 SR
Hotel, Motel, Lodge - - - 1 - 0.2 SA
Residential Outbuilding, Shed, Garage - 1 - 1 1 0.6 SR
Residential property - not classified above - - - 1 - 0.2 SR
Residential 22 28 30 20 19
Service Station: Public 1 - - - -
Vehicle, Boats - Sale /Service 1 - - - - 0.2 WL/WM
Agriculture, Horticulture 1 - - 1 4
Forest 1 - - 1 1
Primary Industries and Utilities 2 - - 2 5 1.8 WL/WM
Manufacture: Metal, Metal Products, Electrical - - 1 - -
Manufacture: Vehicle, Bicycle, Boat, Aircraft, Rail - - - 1 -
Manufacture: Meatworks 1 - - - -
Primary Industries and Utilities 2 - 1 1 - 0.8 WL/WM
Conservation, Recreation area 1 1 1
Special structures 1
Outdoor Area 3 3 1 4 2
Water Area
Road, Street 18 8 4 9 4
Unknown 1 1
Miscellaneous 21 13 7 15 6
Total Deaths by Fire 48 42 39 38 30 27.2
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